People v. Watson
| Citation | 2021 IL App (1st) 180034,201 N.E.3d 63,460 Ill.Dec. 405 |
| Decision Date | 29 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1-18-0034 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Britany WATSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Daniel H. Regenscheit, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Janet C. Mahoney, and David H. Iskowich, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 We must determine here whether due process bars the State from convicting a juvenile of first degree murder, based on either a felony-murder or common-design accountability theory, when the juvenile did not kill or intend for a killing to occur. We hold that due process does not impose such a bar.
¶ 3 In December 2012, when she was 17, defendant Britany Watson began a pay-for-sex arrangement with Sherman Horton, age 38.
¶ 4 On the evening of December 17, 2012, Horton sat in his car with defendant near the intersection of Mayfield Avenue and Superior Street in Chicago, arguing about the terms of their encounter that evening. Essentially, defendant wanted Horton to pay in full upfront; Horton wanted an installment plan.
¶ 5 Unbeknownst to Horton, in the days leading up to December 17, defendant and a man named Lavell Blanchard (whom defendant knew as "Baby Mafia") were conspiring to rob him. Blanchard would do the dirty work; defendant just had to get Horton in place. So, as defendant and Horton sat in Horton's car, defendant texted Blanchard and asked, to use their vernacular, whether he wanted to ("Lick," defendant explained, is slang for robbery; defendant was telling Blanchard that now would be a good time to rob Horton.)
¶ 6 Blanchard confirmed the plan and instructed defendant to stay in the car with Horton. Evidently, something aroused Horton's suspicions, because in the time between Blanchard's response and his eventual arrival at Horton's car, defendant texted Blanchard, telling him to "hurry" because Horton was "flogging," and she later added, "[d]ude tripping, come on."
¶ 7 Shortly thereafter, Blanchard and another man arrived at Horton's car. Blanchard, armed, approached the driver's side door, where Horton was sitting. His accomplice approached the passenger's side, holding a brick. Blanchard tapped his gun against the driver's side window, causing Horton to yell that he was being robbed; Horton started to move the car forward. Blanchard fired the gun through the window into the car, hitting Horton and spraying shattered glass on defendant in the passenger seat.
¶ 8 As defendant put it, Blanchard "got [Horton] good." After the shooting, Horton's car traveled for a short distance before crashing into a parked car. Blanchard then ran up to the car and ransacked Horton's pockets. At the same time, Blanchard told defendant to "play it off." Defendant ran into a nearby building, where she encountered some residents and pretended that she had just been the victim of a crime. Horton died from his injuries.
¶ 9 When the police arrived at the scene, neighbors directed the responding officer, Officer Magiera, to a nearby apartment. There, Officer Magiera found defendant hysterical and covered in blood. Defendant told Officer Magiera that she fled Horton's car after it crashed. She was then transported by ambulance to the hospital.
¶ 10 At the hospital, Chicago police Detective Anthony Green asked defendant what happened. Defendant became upset and said that Horton was not supposed to get shot. According to Detective Green, defendant then told the police that "she had set [the] robbery up." Defendant later gave a statement to police during custodial interrogation, admitting to planning the robbery with Blanchard days in advance but claiming that she had expected Horton to give up the money immediately on Blanchard's demand, as opposed to the encounter ending in gunfire.
¶ 12 The court continued:
¶ 13 The court merged defendant's convictions into a single conviction for felony murder and imposed a 25-year sentence. The court declined to impose a discretionary 15-year enhancement based on her age and the fact that she was not the shooter. This appeal followed.
¶ 15 Defendant raises constitutional claims as to both the felony-murder and accountability statutes. First, she argues that the same principles regarding juvenile accountability that underpinned the United States Supreme Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), operate to bar the State, under the aegis of due process, from convicting any juvenile of murder based on the felony-murder or accountability doctrines if the juvenile did not commit or intend to commit murder. Second, defendant raises an as-applied challenge, arguing in terms that largely parrot her facial claim, that applying the felony-murder and accountability doctrines violated her right to substantive due process.
¶ 17 We begin with the as-applied challenges to the statutes, because if defendant cannot show that these statutes are unconstitutional as applied to her, she obviously cannot mount a facial challenge on the same ground. See In re M.A. , 2015 IL 118049, ¶ 39, 397 Ill.Dec. 759, 43 N.E.3d 86 ().
¶ 18 As an initial matter, we question the factual premise of this challenge. Defendant claims that she did not intend for a killing to occur, but we have only her word for that from her statements to the police, where she claimed that Horton was "not supposed" to be shot and that she had anticipated a nonviolent ending to the encounter. The trial court did not make any finding as to defendant's intent because the court was not asked to do so—defendant did not raise this due process challenge below. Nor did the offenses charged require the State to prove defendant's intent, much less require the court to opine on that question.
¶ 19 What little else we can say from the record is that the trial court expressly found that defendant planned an armed robbery, so it is not as if the possibility of gunfire was completely out of the question. We can haggle over whether there were hints here or there in the record as to defendant's intent, as both parties do. But the long and short is that defendant asks us to simply assume what she did or did not intend, without an evidentiary finding, and then to invalidate a conviction (and possibly a state law or two) based on that assumption.
¶ 20 If we found defendant's argument to be potentially meritorious, we would have to decline consideration of this issue for lack of an adequate record. See People v. Harris , 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 38-39, 427 Ill.Dec. 833, 120 N.E.3d 900. But for the reasons we discuss below, we do not find it meritorious, even if we accepted defendant's premise about her lack of intent, so there is no reason to delay resolution.
¶ 22 The constitution generally leaves choices about substantive criminal law—questions, for example, like what should be a crime and who can be held criminally liable—to the states. See Clark v. Arizona , 548 U.S. 735, 752, 126 S.Ct. 2709, 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006). The reason is that criminal laws constantly evolve, shaped as they are by the public's ever-shifting moral, religious, philosophical, and medical views of social policy and moral culpability, as expressed through its elected legislators. See Kahler v. Kansas , 589 U.S. ––––, ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1028, 206 L.Ed.2d 312 (2020) ; Powell v. Texas , 392 U.S. 514, 536, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968). Some states outlaw cannabis use, others do not; some impose abortion restrictions, others do not; states vary widely in the age at which and the offenses for which juveniles may be prosecuted as adults. Courts are reluctant to impose rigid, judicially imposed formulas in the name of due process, lest they interrupt that " ‘constantly shifting adjustment.’ " Kahler , 589 U.S. at ––––, 140 S. Ct. at 1028 (quoting Powell , 392 U.S. at 536, 88 S.Ct. 2145 ).
¶ 23 Instead, the Supreme Court has long held, the due process clause will invalidate a state criminal statute only if that law " ‘offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’ " Id. at ––––, 140 S. Ct. at 1027 (quoting Leland v. Oregon , 343 U.S. 790, 798, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952) ). The ultimate question "is whether a...
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