People v. Weis

• Decision Date: 24 June 1969
• Citation: 301 N.Y.S.2d 186,32 A.D.2d 856
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edward WEIS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 186

301 N.Y.S.2d 186

32 A.D.2d 856

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edward WEIS, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

June 24, 1969.

Arnold W. Proskin, Albany County Dist. Atty., Albany, (Michael A. Feit, Albany, of counsel) for respondent.

Andrew M. Pinckney, Albany County Public Defender, Albany, (Douglas P. Rutnik, Albany, of counsel) for appellant.

Before GIBSON, P.J., and HERLIHY, REYNOLDS, COOKE and GREENBLOTT, JJ.

COOKE, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County, rendered March 6, 1967, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of robbery in the first degree.

Michael Angelo, 80, operated a grocery store at 422 Broadway in the City of Albany. The People offered proof: that, around nine o'clock on Sunday morning, December 4, 1966, defendant, accompanied by another, placed a knife tightly to Angelo's throat, pushed him to the cash register and told him to give him the money; that, after four one-dollar bills were taken from the register, defendant told the victim not to call the cops, that he would kill him; and that the two men left and went 'up Broadway'. It was also shown: that, very quickly after their departure, the grocer telephoned to the police; that Sergeant La Fountaine and Patrolman Smith arrived at the scene about 9:15 A.M. and were joined by Detective Jones; that Angelo related what had taken place and described the two men; that the one who held the knife was portrayed as six feet tall with a light brown-colored windbreaker and the other as short, about five-foot six or seven; that the police and Angelo went north on Broadway; that a clerk at a hotel on Broadway related that two men fitting the descriptions had been there previously leaving some luggage; that a clerk at another hotel on said street informed two of the officers that she had refused a room to two men fitting said descriptions a short time previously and that they had gone south on Broadway; that defendant was then spotted walking north on Broadway towards the officers with his right hand in a coat pocket; that the Sergeant asked defendant to remove his hand from the pocket and said official then reached in the pocket and pulled out a long blade knife; and that defendant, on questioning, said his friend, the short one, was in a diner about a half block down the street. There was testimony that, after defendant was arrested, he was searched and four one-dollar bills were found, but the bills themselves were not received in evidence.

A search and seizure will be upheld if incident to lawful arrest (People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 91, 262 N.Y.S.2d 65, 70, 209 N.E.2d 694, 698; People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 373, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462, 467, 179 N.E.2d 478, 482). A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person (Code Crim.Proc., § 177, subd. 3) '3. When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person to be arrested to have committed it', the standard to be applied is not the proof beyond a reasonable doubt required for the conviction of a crime but reasonable ground or probable cause for making a search (People v. Valentine,17 N.Y.2d 128, 132, 269 N.Y.S.2d 111, 114, 216 N.E.2d 321, 323; People v. White, 16 N.Y.2d 270, 273, 266 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102, 213 N.E.2d 438, 440). Here, it was known that a robbery had been committed in the vicinity recently, that defendant was in the same area, that he was wearing a light-colored three-quarter length jacket and fit the general description furnished by Mr. Angelo, that he had his right hand in his coat pocket and that defendant and a companion had sought a room at a nearby hotel shortly before. Under these circumstances it was not unreasonable for the police to believe that the man they saw approaching was the one they were seeking (cf. People v. Feldt, 26 A.D.2d 743, 272 N.Y.S.2d 223, affd. 22 N.Y.2d 839, 293 N.Y.S.2d 103, 239 N.E.2d 733) and, therefore, that the standards of what should be considered probable cause to a 'reasonable, cautious and prudent peace officer' were met and that the knife and money were obtained incident to a lawful arrest (People v. Brady, 16 N.Y.2d 186, 189, 264 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362, 211 N.E.2d 815, 816; cf. Code of Crim.Proc. § 180--a; People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1, 229 N.E.2d 581, app. dsmd. 392 U.S. 667, 88 S.Ct. 2317, 20 L.Ed.2d 1360; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917).

Defendant's complaint that he was not permitted to testify before the Grand Jury is not well taken since he failed to file or serve the requests specified in subdivision 2 of section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (People ex rel. De Groat v. Wallack, 16 A.D.2d 994, 229 N.Y.S.2d 785, cert. den. 372 U.S. 920, 83 S.Ct. 735, 9 L.Ed.2d 725), nor are his grievances concerning the manner in which the police court arraignment was conducted, since the Grand Jury had power to investigate and indict regardless of what had occurred before the magistrate (People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Close, 1 N.Y.2d 258, 261, 152 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3, 134 N.E.2d 818, 819).

Although personal opinions of counsel as to the merits of the case should not be stated to the jury (Greenberg v. United States, 2 Cir., 280 F.2d 472, 474--475; People v. Reimann, 266 App.Div. 505, 507, 42 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600; People v. O'Regan, 221 App.Div. 331, 338, 223 N.Y.S. 339, 348), the Assistant District Attorney in his opening merely uttered the belief that the jury, after viewing the exhibits and listening to the testimony of the witnesses and the charge of the court would be satisfied that defendant was guilty of robbery in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt, to which no objection was, or properly could be, made.

In response to a question asking at what time he placed a distinguishing mark on the knife, Detective Jones answered: 'After the complainant identified this man as the one that held him up.' When identification of any person is in issue, a witness who has on a previous occasion identified such person may testify to such previous identification (Code Crim.Proc., § 393--b), but this statutory exception to the hearsay rule does not extend to the testimony of any person other than the one who made the identification (People v. Cioffi, 1 N.Y.2d 70, 73, 150 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194, 133 N.E.2d 703, 705; People v. Oliver, 4 A.D.2d 28, 31, 163 N.Y.S.2d 235, 239, affd. 3 N.Y.2d 684, 171 N.Y.S.2d 811, 148 N.E.2d 874). Here, the prosecution does not appear to be responsible for such a response, defendant did not register any objection or make any request in regard thereto, this was not the only evidence of identification and, under all the circumstances, this unanticipated answer does not require reversed.

Absent 'imperative' circumstances necessitating resort to such a procedure, the practice of having a witness secretly view, for identification purposes, only the very suspect whom the police have taken into custody for the crime can be so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to amount to a denial of due process of law (Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199); but, here, since the victim had ample opportunity to observe the defendant during the commission of the crime, it is clear that his courtroom testimony identifying him was...