People v. Wheeler

• Decision Date: 22 June 2020
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 20SA115
• Citation: 465 P.3d 47
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Walter WHEELER, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

465 P.3d 47

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Walter WHEELER, Defendant-Appellee.

Supreme Court Case No. 20SA115

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 22, 2020

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant: Henry L. Solano, District Attorney, Third Judicial District, Rex B. Delmas, Deputy District Attorney, Walsenburg, Colorado

Attorney for Defendant-Appellee: Jonathan S. Willett, Boulder, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 In this interlocutory appeal brought by the People, we consider whether the district court correctly granted Walter Wheeler's pretrial motion to suppress after finding that deputies with the Huerfano County Sheriff's Office conducted an unlawful investigatory stop of the Subaru in which he was a passenger. Although this is a close call, we ultimately conclude that the court erred. We hold that the specific facts, considered together with the rational inferences that could have been drawn from those facts, provided the deputies reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that the occupants of the Subaru were committing, had committed, or were about to commit a crime. Therefore, the suppression order is reversed.

I. Facts and Procedural History¹

¶2 In early November of 2019, while driving his marked patrol car on the outskirts of Walsenburg at about 3:00 in the morning, Deputy Morgan Chapman observed a Subaru turn left on County Road 525 from Highway 69. County Road 525 is in a remote area; there are no structures, facilities, or buildings around it. In fact, in the eighteen months since joining the Huerfano County Sheriff's Office, Deputy Chapman had never seen a car on that road "at that time of night." Because the Subaru's location at such a late hour raised red flags, Deputy Chapman took County Road 525 as well. As he did so, he contacted Captain Craig Lessar and Deputy Bill LaPorte by radio, and they responded in separate vehicles.

¶3 Deputy Chapman momentarily lost sight of the Subaru. But Captain Lessar indicated that he had a visual on it and that it had taken a two-track road and stopped on private property belonging to a Raymond Faris. He added that the Subaru had turned off its lights and was parked next to a stock tank and a windmill. With Captain Lessar's assistance, Deputy Chapman located the Subaru. Concerned about possible poaching (due to the time of year) and possible tampering with the stock tank and windmill, Deputy Chapman approached the Subaru to contact its occupants. As he neared, the driver turned the headlights back on, shifted into reverse, and started driving backwards. Deputy Chapman thus activated his patrol car's emergency equipment. The Subaru then stopped.

¶4 Deputy LaPorte arrived shortly thereafter. He contacted the driver of the Subaru, Mia Raymond, and Deputy Chapman contacted her boyfriend, Wheeler, who was in the front passenger seat. On the dashboard of the vehicle, Deputy Chapman observed in plain view a white crystalline substance that he suspected was methamphetamine. He then noticed a bag of what appeared to be methamphetamine protruding from the top of Wheeler's shoe. After stepping out of the Subaru for a weapons pat-down, Wheeler admitted that he was in possession of methamphetamine. And during subsequent searches of his person and the Subaru, the deputies recovered approximately 38.5 grams of methamphetamine and $4,700 in cash. Wheeler was ultimately arrested and transported to a police station.

¶5 The People subsequently charged Wheeler with multiple crimes, including drug-related offenses. Before trial, he moved to suppress the evidence found on his person and in the car, arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court held an evidentiary hearing during which Deputy Chapman and Wheeler both testified.

After the hearing, the court issued a written order granting the motion on the ground that the deputies lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the Subaru.

¶6 The People then brought this interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2019), and C.A.R. 4.1(a).

II. Jurisdiction

¶7 Under Colorado law, the People may lodge an interlocutory appeal of a district court's order in limited circumstances. People v. Allen , 2019 CO 88, ¶ 12, 450 P.3d 724, 728. As pertinent here, section 16-12-102(2) and Rule 4.1(a) permit the People to do so if the district court grants a defense motion to suppress evidence and the People certify both that the appeal is not taken for a dilatory purpose and that the evidence suppressed constitutes a substantial part of the proof of the charges pending. Id. We conclude that the People have satisfied these threshold requirements here. Hence, we have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 16-12- 102(2) and Rule 4.1(a).

III. Standard of Review

¶8 Our review of the district court's suppression order involves "a mixed question of fact and law." People v. Berdahl , 2019 CO 29, ¶ 18, 440 P.3d 437, 442. We give deference to the district court's findings of fact and refrain from disturbing them if they are supported by the record. Id. This deference extends to a district court's credibility findings, again assuming record support. People v. Clark , 2020 CO 36, ¶ 21, ––– P.3d ––––. We assess the legal effect of factual findings de novo. Berdahl , ¶ 18, 440 P.3d at 442.

IV. Analysis

¶9 This case presents a straightforward question: Did the deputies have reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the Subaru? After discussing the relevant legal principles, we determine that they did. We thus conclude that the deputies did not violate Wheeler's Fourth Amendment rights.

A. Relevant Legal Principles

¶10 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by police. People v. Threlkel , 2019 CO 18, ¶ 16, 438 P.3d 722, 727. However, the Fourth Amendment does not outlaw all contact by police. Id. Instead, it prohibits police contact that arbitrarily and oppressively interferes "with the privacy and personal security of individuals." Id. (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado , 466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) ).

¶11 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourth Amendment sanctions two different levels of seizure of a person: an investigatory stop and an arrest. See People v. Fields , 2018 CO 2, ¶ 12, 411 P.3d 661, 665 (citing Dunaway v. New York , 442 U.S. 200, 207–13, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) ). The former, the less intrusive of the two, is justified when an officer has "reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that the detainee is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime." Id. The latter, the more intrusive of the two, is justified when an officer has "probable cause to believe a crime has been committed by the detainee." Id. In this case, we concern ourselves with the less intrusive type of seizure, an investigatory stop. Id.

¶12 The People bear the burden of justifying an investigatory stop. Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). To comport with the Fourth Amendment, an investigatory stop must meet three criteria: (1) there must be "an articulable and specific basis in fact for suspecting (i.e., a reasonable suspicion) that criminal activity has taken place, is in progress, or is about to occur"; (2) the purpose of the intrusion must be reasonable; and (3) the character and scope of the intrusion must be "reasonably related" to the purpose of the intrusion. Threlkel , ¶ 18, 438 P.3d at 727 (quoting People v. Reyes-Valenzuela , 2017 CO 31, ¶ 11, 392 P.3d 520, 522–23 ). As it bears on Wheeler's seizure, the district court found that the People failed to establish the first prong—reasonable and articulable suspicion—and we limit our review accordingly.²

¶13 In assessing whether an officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop, we ask whether there were "facts known to the officer," which "taken together with rational inferences from those facts," gave rise to "a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity" justifying the intrusion into the defendant's personal privacy. People v. Funez-Paiagua , 2012 CO 37, ¶ 9, 276 P.3d 576, 578–79. Thus, reasonable suspicion must be based on more than a mere generalized suspicion or hunch. See Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ("And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably ... due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience."). This standard requires us to consider the totality of the circumstances at the time of the intrusion. Threlkel , ¶ 19, 438 P.3d at 727. But we rely on "an objective analysis," not on an analysis driven by the subjective intent of the officer. Reyes-Valenzuela , ¶ 12, 392 P.3d at 523.

¶14 An officer is entitled to draw appropriate inferences from all the circumstantial evidence, regardless of whether such evidence "might also support other inferences." Threlkel , ¶ 20, 438 P.3d at 727 (quoting Reyes-Valenzuela , ¶ 14, 392 P.3d at 523 ). Reasonable and articulable suspicion may exist "even where innocent explanations are offered for conduct." Id. (quoting Reyes-Valenzuela , ¶ 14, 392 P.3d at 523 ). Courts must guard against engaging in a "divide-and-conquer analysis" that leads to the dismissal of factors merely because they are accompanied by plausible innocent explanations. Id. (quoting Reyes-Valenzuela , ¶ 14, 392 P.3d at 523 ). It follows that we may not discount acts which, in isolation, seem innocent. Id. Several such acts "may add up to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity." Id. (quoting Reyes-Valenzuela , ¶ 13, 392 P.3d at...