People v. White

• Decision Date: 30 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 08SC1003.,08SC1003.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. David Wayne WHITE, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

242 P.3d 1121 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. David Wayne WHITE, Respondent. No. 08SC1003. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. Nov. 30, 2010.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Matthew S. Holman, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Shann Jeffery, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent.

Justice COATS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The People petitioned for review of the court of appeals' judgment reversing White's convictions of sexual assault on a child, incest, and possession of marijuana. At trial, White moved for a mistrial on the grounds that one of the jurors was not a resident of Teller County. The trial court denied the motion, finding there to be sufficient evidence of residency. Because the record indicated that the juror had recently moved into his sister's apartment in Colorado Springs but failed to indicate an intent to return to reside in Teller County within twelve months, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court's finding of residency was unsupported by the record.

Because the court of appeals misconstrued the controlling statute and under a proper construction the juror's continued residence in Teller County was adequately evidenced in the record, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to reinstate the defendant's convictions.

I.

David W. White was convicted of sexual assault on a child, incest, and possession of marijuana, all arising out of a late-night sexual encounter with his daughter. After the jury had been empanelled in White's trial in Teller County, one of the jurors requested a discount at a local hotel, indicating that he had just moved to Colorado Springs, which prompted a motion for mistrial. The following morning, prior to opening statements, the juror was questioned regarding his residency.

The juror, who was then twenty-four years old, explained that despite receiving a jury summons at his father's home in Teller County, where he was living at the time, he subsequently moved to El Paso County to live with his sister; that he had been living in El Paso County for two weeks and intended to remain there for another eighteen to twenty-four months to work and complete a vocational hazmat training program organized by his employer; and that he had intermittently lived with his father in Teller County for the past nine years. On further inquiry by the prosecution, he also indicated that although his father was in the process of converting his room to a guest room, the details of which were still being worked out, he would be permitted to move back; that he left some of his furniture and other personalty at his father's home; that "mail and everything along those lines" was being delivered to his father's home; and that while he had not yet formally applied, his ultimate career plan was to return to Teller County and become a firefighter there. Finally, the juror made clear that he would like to live in Teller County, where his family was located, but that he had no plans to return there in the next year-and-a-half or two.

After entertaining the arguments of counsel, the trial court found the juror qualified and denied the motion for mistrial. The trial court relied largely on the transitional stage of life in which the juror found himself and the temporary nature of his presence in Colorado Springs for work and training. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that even if he otherwise met the statutory requirements for residency, the juror's recent move outside the county with no intention of returning during the succeeding twelve months disqualified him from service.

The People petitioned for a writ of certiorari.

II.

Like all criminal defendants in Colorado, White was constitutionally entitled to a trial "by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense [was] alleged to have been committed." Colo. Const., art. II, § 16. As we have noted elsewhere, "[t]he essential features of a jury trial lie in interposing between the accused and the accuser the common sense judgment of lay representatives of the community 'and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence.' " Aurora v. Rhodes, 689 P.2d 603, 610 (Colo.1984) (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1979)). Jury summoning and selection procedures must therefore adequately provide the accused with a fair opportunity for obtaining a representative cross section of the community on the jury. Id. Although the legislature has not sought to determine the limits of the term "district" as it appears in Article II, Section 16 of the Colorado Constitution, see id. (finding municipal ordinance in multi-county municipality permitting trial of ordinance violations by jurors from anywhere within city limits to nevertheless fall within constitutional limitations); cf. Wafai v. People, 750 P.2d 37, 44-47 (Colo.1988) (noting venue requirement for trial within county of commission, in the absence of any separate legislative definition of "district"), it has directly spoken to the meaning of a jury "of the county" in which the offense was allegedly committed.

Section 105 of the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act, §§ 13-71-101 to -145, C.R.S. (2010) (UJSSA), initially defines qualification for jury service in terms of citizenship and either residency or habitation in a particular county, and it then provides a number of specific conditions that will nevertheless disqualify an otherwise qualified prospective juror. ¹ The first subsection of thestatute specifies that a citizen of the United States who either "resides" in a particular county or who "lives in such county more than fifty percent of the time" shall be qualified to serve as a juror in that county. § 13-71-105(1). The second subsection, however, indicates that such an otherwise qualified prospective juror will be disqualified from service if, among other things, he resides outside the county and has no intention of returning within the succeeding twelve months. § 13-71-105(2)(e).

Although the UJSSA does not more expressly define the term "resides," "residence," or "residency," it does direct the state court administrator to create a "master juror list" of prospective jurors using for its sources lists of "residents" of the state, most particularly a voter registration list for each county in the state from the secretary of state and licensed driver lists from the department of revenue, matched against the department's most recent address of the individual for income tax purposes. See § 13-71-107. Unlike the UJSSA, the statutory scheme for voter registration spells out in great detail the standard for determining residence within a county, and it enumerates various factors of evidentiary significance. See §§ 1-2-102, -103, C.R.S. (2010); cf. § 31-10-201, C.R.S. (2010) (Municipal Election Code). Furthermore, it mandates that the residence given for voting purposes and those given for motor vehicle registration and for state income tax purposes must all be the same. See § 1-2-102(1)(c).

A person's residence for voting, motor vehicle, and income tax purposes is statutorily defined as his "principal or primary home or place of abode," which in turn is defined as "that home or place in which a person's habitation is fixed and to which that person, whenever absent, has the present intention of returning after a departure or absence, regardless of the duration of the absence." § 1-2-102(1)(a)(I). Factors to be taken into account in determining a person's principal or primary place of abode include "business pursuits, employment, income sources, residence for income or other tax purposes, age, marital status, residence of parents, spouse, and children, if any, leaseholds, situs of personal and real property, existence of any other residences and the amount of time spent at each residence, and motor vehicle registration." § 1-2-102(1)(b). Significantly, for these purposes no person can be considered to have gained a residence in any county while retaining a home or domicile elsewhere; and no person can gain a residence by reason of his presence, or lose it by reason of his absence, while a student at an institution of higher education. §§ 1-2-102(1)(d), -103(1).

III.

Within constitutional limitations, the legislature determines qualifications for jury service. As is the case with statutes generally, the proper interpretation of any applicable juror qualification statutes must therefore be determined according to legislative intent, as expressed in the language of the statutes themselves. People v. Owens, 228 P.3d 969, 972 (Colo.2010). Where statutory language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, and is therefore ambiguous, a body of accepted intrinsic and extrinsic aids to construction may be applied to determine the particular reasonable interpretation embodying legislative intent. Holcomb v. Jan-Pro Cleaning Sys., 172 P.3d 888, 890 (Colo.2007). Although a term may have a number of different meanings in the abstract, or standing alone, its intended meaning in a specific context will often become apparent from the context, or the greater statutory scheme, in which it is used. Curious Theatre Co. v. Colo. Dep't. of Pub. Health and Env't, 220 P.3d 544, 549 (Colo.2009); Walgreen Co. v. Charnes, 819 P.2d 1039, 1043 n. 6, 1046 (Colo.1991). Similarly, the historical development of a statutory scheme can often shed light on the purposes behind specific amendments. Frank M. Hall & Co. v. Newsom, 125 P.3d 444, 448 (Colo.2005).

Throughout most of this state's history, jury service has been limited to residents of the county in which a crime was alleged to have been committed. E.g., C.R.S.1963, § 78-1-2. In 1989, along with the repeal and...