People v. Whitfield

• Decision Date: 20 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. F023220,F023220
• Citation: 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 370,46 Cal.App.4th 947
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4613, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7314 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Cora Lee WHITFIELD, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 370

54 Cal.Rptr.2d 370

46 Cal.App.4th 947, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4613,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7314

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Cora Lee WHITFIELD, Defendant and Appellant.

No. F023220.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

June 20, 1996.

Certified for Partial Publication ^*

Review Denied Sept. 25, 1996.

[46 Cal.App.4th 950] William J. Arzbaecher III, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, San Francisco, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Joel E. Carey, Susan J. Orton and Doris A. Calandra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

MARTIN, Acting Presiding Judge.

Following the denial of her motion to suppress evidence (Pen.Code, § 1538.5) ¹ appellant Cora Whitfield, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded nolo contendere to one count of possession of cocaine base (Health & Saf.Code, § 11351). The court sentenced appellant to the lower term of two years.

On appeal, appellant contends the court, for two reasons, erred in denying her suppression motion. First, she argues evidence was seized as a result of her arrest for which there was no probable cause, and therefore the seizure violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Second, she argues evidence was seized in violation of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 In the published portion of this opinion, we will conclude that although evidence was seized as a result of a custodial interrogation violative of Miranda principles, exclusion of such evidence is not required by federal law and therefore such evidence may not be excluded under California law. In the unpublished portion, we will hold that appellant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Accordingly, we will affirm.

S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ("Miranda ") and therefore should have been suppressed.

I. FACTS

On September 30, 1994, Bakersfield Police Officer Greg Williamson conducted a surveillance of apartments B and D in the apartment complex located at 1109 Monterey Street in Bakersfield. Officer Williamson had previously obtained a search warrant to search those apartments, based on information he had obtained that "narcotics activity" involving cocaine base was occurring in those apartments. While engaged in this surveillance, over the course of 45 minutes Officer Williamson observed, on three separate occasions, persons arrive at the apartment complex, make contact with appellant and, on each occasion, make an "exchange" with appellant. The officer could not see what was being exchanged. ² Officer Williamson had extensive training and experience in detecting the sale of narcotics, particularly cocaine base, and based thereon, he formed the belief that the exchanges he had seen were narcotics transactions involving cocaine base.

After observing this activity, Officer Williamson left the area and returned with other police officers ³ to execute the search warrant. All the officers were dressed in "raid gear" and were clearly identifiable as police officers. Appellant and two other female subjects "were sitting in the breezeway as [the officers] were attempting to [enter]" apartments B and D. ⁴ Immediately upon the officers making contact with the appellant and the other two subjects, the police handcuffed all three. The officers, including Officer Williamson, then entered apartment B. Officer Williamson came back out of the apartment approximately 20 to 30 seconds later, at which time he asked appellant if she had any narcotics on her person. Appellant "said yes." When asked if that response to his question was "accompanied by some movement[,]" Officer Williamson testified, "Yes. Her handcuffs were behind her back and she reached down between her skin and her pants[,] ... pulled out a napkin" and "Handed it to [Officer Williamson]." The officer examined the napkin and found that it contained 18 pieces of what he believed to be cocaine base.

Appellant was placed under arrest for possession of cocaine base. Shortly thereafter, incident to that arrest, she was searched by another officer, who found a quantity of marijuana on appellant's person. Officer Williamson advised appellant of her Miranda rights approximately one hour later.

One of the subjects detained was appellant's sister; she was an occupant of one of the apartments named in the search warrant. Appellant was not an occupant of either apartment.

Appellant moved to suppress, inter alia, the cocaine base and marijuana seized by the police.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Miranda

Appellant contends the seizure of the cocaine base and marijuana occurred as a result "Miranda requires that a criminal suspect be admonished of specified Fifth Amendment rights. But in order to invoke its protections, a suspect must be subjected to custodial interrogation ...." (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 197, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949, original emphasis.) "Thus two requirements must be met before Miranda is applicable; the suspect must be in 'custody,' and the questioning must meet the legal definition of 'interrogation.' " (U.S. v. Perdue (10th Cir.1993) 8 F.3d 1455, 1463.) The prosecution has the burden of proving that a custodial interrogation did not take place. (People v. Rucker (1980) 26 Cal.3d 368, 386, 162 Cal.Rptr. 13, 605 P.2d 843.)

of a "custodial interrogation" that was not preceded by Miranda warnings, and therefore the court erred in denying her suppression motion.

A person is in custody for purposes of Miranda if he is "deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived." (People v. Taylor (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 217, 225, 223 Cal.Rptr. 638.) "Interrogation consists of express questioning or of words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." (People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1224, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1, citing Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300-301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297.) In the instant case, we conclude, and the People do not dispute, that appellant was subject to custodial interrogation at the time Officer Williamson asked her if she had any narcotics in her possession.

We now turn to the People's contention that under United States Supreme Court precedents, the failure to administer Miranda warnings to a suspect subject to custodial interrogation does not violate a suspect's constitutional rights, and therefore evidence seized as a result of such failure is not the "fruit" of a constitutional violation and should not be suppressed.

In Tucker (1974) 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182, the court was asked to extend the doctrine announced in Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, applying the exclusionary rule to evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, to suppress the testimony of a prosecution witness whose identity was discovered as a result of information elicited from the defendant without the benefit of Miranda warnings. (Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 308, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292, 84 L.Ed.2d 222.) The court concluded that the police failure to give the Miranda admonitions did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights; rather it " 'departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege.' [Citation.] Since there was no actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights, the case was not controlled by the doctrine expressed in Wong Sun that fruits of a constitutional violation must be suppressed.... The unwarned confession must, of course, be suppressed, but the Court ruled that introduction of the third-party witness' testimony did not violate Tucker's Fifth Amendment rights." (Ibid., quoting Michigan v. Tucker, supra, 417 U.S. at p. 446, 94 S.Ct. at p. 2364-65.)

In Elstad, the defendant, a burglary suspect, made incriminating statements while subject to custodial interrogation, without having been given Miranda warnings. A short time later at the police station, after police gave defendant his Miranda warnings, which he indicated he understood, defendant gave a written statement describing his involvement in the burglary. Relying in large part on Tucker, the court held that the failure to administer Miranda warnings during a custodial interrogation, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise free will, does not violate a suspect's constitutional rights and does not mandate the exclusion of a subsequent statement voluntarily made by the defendant after he was given Miranda warnings and agreed to speak to police; therefore, the second statement was not excludable. In reaching this conclusion, "[T]he Supreme Court differentiated between a Miranda violation of nonconstitutional dimension and a more serious infringement of a suspect's constitutional rights. What the Court called 'procedural' or 'technical' violations of Miranda [citation]- The court, however, despite the fairly sweeping statement quoted immediately above, expressly left open the question of whether physical evidence seized as a result of an unwarned but noncoercive statement by a suspect during custodial interrogation must be excluded; the court stated that the "reasoning [of Tucker ] applies with equal force when the alleged 'fruit' of a noncoercive Miranda violation is neither a witness nor an article of evidence but the accused's own voluntary testimony." (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 308, 105 S.Ct. at p. 1293, emphasis added.)

--which is apparently how it viewed the failure to give the requisite admonishments to Elstad--were equated with 'noncoercive' Miranda violations [citation]. Improprieties of this nature call into operation...