People v. Widgren

• Decision Date: 29 May 1974
• Docket Number: Docket No. 15490--2,No. 1,1
• Citation: 220 N.W.2d 130,53 Mich.App. 375
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Andrew WIDGREN, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 130

220 N.W.2d 130

53 Mich.App. 375

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Andrew WIDGREN, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 15490--2.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 1.

May 29, 1974.

Released for Publication July 23, 1974.

James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Div., Luvenia D. Dockett, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before J. H. GILLIS, P.J., and HOLBROOK and VanVALKENBURG,* JJ.

J. H. GILLIS, Presiding Judge.

The facts in this case are essentially undisputed. In the early morning hours of January 1, 1972 three young woman, Kathleen Hannon, Debbie Perrin and Debbie Hennessey were traveling in Miss Hannon's automobile in suburban Detroit. Near the intersection of Ford and Inkster roads, the vehicle was stopped by the Garden City Police. Miss Hannon was issued a citation for speeding. Following the issuance of the ticket, the girls resumed their journey and were proceeding eastbound on Warren road when they noticed a car behind them flashing its bright lights. Assuming that she was again being followed by a police car, Miss Hannon pulled off onto a side street. The other vehicle came to a halt behind her car. A man, later identified as defendant, then approached the Hannon vehicle and asked if he could help 'fix' the ticket. After Miss Hannon replied, 'No,' defendant ordered the young woman to slide over. Following another negative response, defendant drew a knife and repeated the order. This time the girls obeyed. Defendant then climbed into the car, apologized for frightening them and drove away. For the next 20--25 minutes he drove aimlessly through residential areas, talking casually with Miss Hannon in the process. Miss Hennessey then told defendant that she had to meet her sister at a restaurant at Ford and Telegraph roads. He agreed to take her there.

When defendant got to within one block of Telegraph, he turned down a dimly lit side street. He apologized for making a wrong turn, but instead of turning around he stopped the car and ordered the three women to undress. Only Miss Hannon did so. When Miss Perrin and Miss Hennessey refused, defendant began stabbing them. Debbie Perrin was able to open the passenger door and she and Debbie Hennessey escaped. Defendant then drove off with Kathleen Hannon still inside. A short time later her body was discovered off Edward Hines drive in Dearborn Heights. Miss Hennessey and Miss Perrin recovered from their injuries. Based on information obtained from them defendant was arrested later the same morning when he returned to pick up his car.

Defendant was charged with six criminal offenses in three separate informations: three counts of kidnapping, one count of first-degree felony murder and two counts of assault with intent to commit murder. In early April 1972, defendant was committed to the Center for Forensic Psychiatry in Ann Arbor for a determination of his competency to stand trial. He was found competent by the Center, and on May 9, 1972 a Wayne County Circuit Judge made the same determination. Defendant filed a notice of insanity defense on May 23, and a consolidated trial of the three cases commenced June 5, 1972. Defendant was convicted by a jury of three courts of kidnapping (M.C.L.A. § 750.349, M.S.A. § 28.581); one count of second-degree murder (M.C.L.A. § 750.317, M.S.A. § 28.549); and two counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (M.C.L.A. § 750.84, M.S.A. § 28.279). He appeals all six convictions.

I

The trial court's jury instruction regarding the possible disposition of defendant on a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity was proper.

Upon defendant's request, a jury must be instructed on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. People v. Cole, 382 Mich. 695, 172 N.W.2d 354 (1969). Accordingly, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows:

'We have mentioned that the plea in this case by the defendant is one of insanity. I charge you that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity means that Mr. Widgren will be confined to a state hospital for criminally insane for the remainder of his natural life, or until such time as it is determined that he has recovered and would not be harmful to other persons or property.

'I further charge you, however, it is also the law that whether or not such a person has recovered his insanity (sic) can be questioned at any time by Writ of Habeas Corpus. Upon testimony by psychiatrists in open court that the defendant is then sane, such a finding can be entered by the court and the defendant released forthwith.'

Defendant argues that this is an improper Cole charge. He contends it was error to inform the jury of the relatively simple procedure by which a person adjudged insane can obtain his release.

Cole adopted the rationale of Lyles v. United States, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 254 F.2d 725 (1957):

"This point arises under the doctrine, well established and sound, that the jury has no concern with the consequences of a verdict, either in the sentence, if any, or the nature or extent of it, or in probation. But we think that doctrine does not apply in the problem before us. The issue of insanity having been fairly raised, the jury may return one of three verdicts, guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity. Jurors, in common with people in general, are aware of the meanings of verdicts of guilty and not guilty. It is common knowledge that a verdict of not guilty means that the prisoner goes free and that a verdict of guilty means that he is subject to such punishment as the court may impose. But a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity has no such commonly understood meaning. As a matter of facts its meaning was not made clear in this jurisdiction until Congress enacted the statute of August 9, 1955 (69 Stat. 710, D.C.Code § 24--301 (1951) (Supp. 5)). It means neither freedom nor punishment. It means the accused will be confined in a hospital for the meantally ill until the superintendent of such hospital certifies, and the court is satisfied, that such person has recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others. We think the jury has a right to know the meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it knows by common knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts." People v. Cole, Supra, 719, 720, 172 N.W.2d 365, 366.

Thus, the goal of Cole is to provide the jury with accurate information concerning the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. We think the charge here does exactly that. It informs the jury not only that a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity will be confined to a mental institution, but also that if certain conditions are met he will be released. As the trial judge stated in response to defendant's objection, the charge 'merely states both sides of the coin.' To have informed the jury of only 'one side of the coin,' as defendant argues should have been done, would have been to give an inaccurate charge contrary to the policy of Cole. The trial judge's instruction was proper.

II

The trial court did not err in permitting the prosecution's psychiatric expert to testify at trial after he had been afforded access to the Forensic Center's competency report.

During direct examination of the psychiatrist by the prosecutor, the following colloquy occurred:

'Q. After interviewing him, did you have any other material or facts prior to reaching a conclusion as to his mental state?

'A. I have a report of the Forensic Center in Ann Arbor. Apparently he had been sent there.'

Defendant argues that permitting this psychiatrist to have access to the Forensic Center report prior to his testimony violated the dictates of People v. Schneider, 39 Mich.App. 342, 197 N.W.2d 539 (1972). Schneider held:

'In the first place, the examining psychiatrist who signed the report of the forensic center should not even have been called as a witness in the case in chief. We disapprove the practice. It is to be discontinued in the trial courts.

'In this case, once called, the psychiatrist was absolutely barred from basing his opinion to any degree on the report of the center. We cite no authority. None is needed.' Schneider, supra, 345 197 N.W.2d 540.

We note that the case at bar differs in one significant respect from Schneider--the psychiatrist here did not participate in the preparation of the forensic report. However, we don't think this factual distinction is dispositive of the issue before us. We read Schneider as holding that no psychiatrist who testifies at trial, be he the one who prepared the forensic report or not, may base his opinion 'to any degree' on that report. We agree with that holding, and nothing we say here is intended to undercut it.

Schneider requires reliance. Unless a psychiatrist relies on the report in forming his opinion, there is no violation of Schneider. Here there is no indication of any such reliance. The psychiatrist examined defendant February 10, 1972. He testified that he did not see the forensic report until a couple of days before his June 13, 1972 trial testimony. We think the only reasonable conclusion is that the psychiatrist's opinion was formulated well before he saw the forensic report. Moreover, the doctor testified only that he 'had' the report in his file. There is no indication that he used the report as a basis for his expert opinion. We find no violation of the Schneider rule.

III

The trial judge's kidnapping instructions were not erroneous.

Originally the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

'I further charge you that as members of the jury, before you may find the defendant guilty of the crime of kidnapping, the following elements should be proven beyond...