People v. Wilkerson, C053633 (Cal. App. 12/18/2007)
| Decision Date | 18 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | C053633 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WAYNE THOMAS WILKERSON, Defendant and Appellant. |
Appeal from the Super. Ct. No. MF029625A.
The question in this case is whether police officers acted reasonably when they entered defendant's home without a warrant because they suspected there was a methamphetamine laboratory on the premises. We conclude that the officers' entry was objectively reasonable given the circumstances and the dangers associated with methamphetamine laboratories in residential neighborhoods. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.
Around 12:00 noon on April 18, 2006, Manteca Police Officer Marnix Lub and Detectives Sam Gallego, Mike Sexson, and Sean Cavin arrived at defendant's residence. They were investigating an anonymous tip concerning suspected drug activity and a possible methamphetamine lab in a motor home on the property or at the residence. Defendant's home is a small apartment located behind another house in a residential neighborhood. When the officers arrived, there was a truck and a motor home parked near the apartment. As the officers approached defendant's home, they noticed a video surveillance camera near the front door, angled in the direction of the truck and motor home.
The police knocked and defendant appeared in the doorway, but remained behind a wrought iron security screen door. Defendant identified himself to the officers and Officer Lub asked him about the surveillance system. Defendant responded that he kept the video camera pointed toward his truck and motor home so he could see if anyone tried to steal the vehicles. Officer Lub then asked defendant to open the security screen door and defendant complied.
While the security screen door was open, Officer Lub began to notice an unusual odor from inside the residence. As the odor became stronger, Officer Lub distinguished the chemical odor as similar to the smell of ether, or paint thinner, or some form of solvent. The longer the security screen door was open, the more pungent the odor became. The solvent odor was consistent with those odors Officer Lub associated with methamphetamine labs. Detective Cavin asked defendant if defendant was painting something in the house. Defendant said he was not. The officers asked defendant for permission to search his residence and defendant refused. Officer Lub told defendant he believed the odors coming from defendant's home were due to a methamphetamine lab. Defendant then stated that he was painting. At this point, Officer Lub believed there was a methamphetamine lab in the residence. According to his training and experience, he knew the presence of a methamphetamine lab and the resulting toxic odors could cause harm to the surrounding neighbors and potentially result in an explosion.
Officer Lub informed defendant that the officers were going to secure the residence for public safety purposes. He asked defendant if there was anyone else in the residence and defendant said there was not. Officer Lub and Detective Sexson entered defendant's apartment while defendant remained on the front porch with the other detectives. At the motion to suppress hearing, the parties stipulated that this entry was not pursuant to a warrant.
Officer Lub walked through the rooms of the small apartment, then entered the kitchen and looked inside the refrigerator and freezer. He saw an unknown substance on a shelf in the freezer which he thought could be crystallized methamphetamine. Detective Sexson entered the bathroom and found a two-liter Pepsi bottle with a hole in the cap in the trash can, which Officer Lub believed to be related to methamphetamine manufacturing. The officers also seized a nine-millimeter handgun that was in plain view on defendant's couch. Eventually, the chemical odor in the house became so overpowering that Officer Lub and Detective Sexson had to go outside. The officers did not locate the source of the odor, nor did they open any windows, extinguish the water heater's pilot light, call the fire department, or notify or evacuate nearby residents.
Officer Lub left the residence around 12:30 p.m. to obtain a search warrant. Pursuant to the search warrant, the police later reentered defendant's apartment and seized various items.
Defendant was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance and possession for sale of a controlled substance. Both charges were enhanced with an allegation that defendant was personally armed with a firearm while committing the offenses. Defendant filed a "hybrid" motion to suppress all evidence obtained during the officers' warrantless entry as well as the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, and to quash and traverse the search warrant because it was based on statements that were deliberately false or in reckless disregard for the truth. After the motion to suppress hearing on the matter, the trial court ruled that there were exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the officers' initial warrantless entry into defendant's home to conduct a "safety sweep." However, the court suppressed the Pepsi bottle found in the bathroom garbage can and the substance found in defendant's freezer, explaining that the officers' search for evidence exceeded the scope of the safety sweep. The court then redacted portions of the search warrant affidavit that were supported by those pieces of evidence. The court did not suppress the officers' observations and sensory perceptions realized while they were in defendant's residence.
The court declined to decide the second part of the hybrid motion which requested the court quash and traverse the search warrant. The court decided it would transfer the case to the magistrate who had issued the warrant for a final determination as to whether there was still probable cause for the warrant despite the suppressed evidence. Defendant filed a motion objecting to the court's procedure of transferring the case.1 While counsel and the court were working on a resolution of the procedural matters, and prior to a final decision on the motion to quash and traverse the search warrant, defendant entered a change of plea.
During the change of plea hearing, the court asked defendant, "Have you had enough time to discuss your case with your attorney, including your constitutional rights, the elements of the charges, possible defenses you have, and the consequences of your plea?" Defendant responded, The court agreed, Defendant pled guilty to a charge of possession of a controlled substance in exchange for dismissal of the charge of manufacturing a controlled substance and the arming enhancement.
After entering his change of plea, defendant filed this timely appeal contending that the trial court erred when it found exigent circumstances existed which enabled the officers to enter defendant's residence without a warrant.
The People argue that defendant "forfeited" his rights to appeal the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress when he entered his guilty plea. The case law offered by the People, however, is inapposite. Although defendant entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, he expressly and statutorily retained the right to challenge the adverse ruling on the motion to suppress. Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m) explains, "A defendant may seek further review of the validity of a search or seizure on appeal from a conviction in a criminal case notwithstanding the fact that the judgment of conviction is predicated on a plea of guilty." Although the trial court suppressed some physical evidence, the court's ruling was partially adverse to defendant because the court found that the warrantless entry was lawful and refused to suppress the officers' observations and other sensory perceptions resulting from that entry. Accordingly, we cannot say that the court's ruling on the motion did not prejudice defendant. Therefore, defendant's change of plea did not waive his right to appeal.
The Warrantless Entry
"In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We then decide for ourselves what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure. (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922.) "When the admissibility of evidence is challenged as being the `fruit' of an unlawful search and seizure, article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution requires [California courts] to follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court." (People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 390.)
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it found that the officers' warrantless entry did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. He asserts that no exigent circumstances existed which justified excusing the warrant requirement. Therefore, the officers' warrantless entry into his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights and all observations, sensory perceptions, and physical evidence obtained from that entry should have been suppressed. We disagree.
"It is axiomatic that the `physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'" (Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 748 quoting United States v. United States District Court (1972) 407 U.S. 297, 313 .) "It is a `basic principle of Fourth...
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