People v. Wilks

• Decision Date: 30 May 1978
• Docket Number: Cr. 19773
• Citation: 578 P.2d 1369,146 Cal.Rptr. 364,21 Cal.3d 460
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 578 P.2d 1369 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kinnon WILKS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 364

146 Cal.Rptr. 364

21 Cal.3d 460, 578 P.2d 1369

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kinnon WILKS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 19773.

Supreme Court of California,In Bank.

May 30, 1978.

Henry P. Crabtree, Lakewood, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Juliet H. Swoboda and David R. Chaffee, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

BIRD, Chief Justice.

Appellant, Kinnon Wilks, appeals from a judgment of conviction for two felony offenses and four prior convictions. He contends the following errors were made by the superior court: (1) the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to conduct appellant's jury trial because a timely motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 had been filed to disqualify that judge; (2) appellant's motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 was erroneously denied; (3) the court abused its discretion in permitting appellant to represent himself; (4) appellant was improperly denied disclosure of the identity of an informant; (5) appellant was improperly found to have suffered four prior felony convictions when, in fact, he had suffered only two.

This court has determined that none of these contentions has merit. Therefore, with one modification, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

I

An information was filed on July 15, 1975, in the South District of the Los Angeles Superior Court, charging appellant with two felonies, Health and Safety Code section 11351 (possession for sale of heroin) and Penal Code section 12021 (possession of a concealable firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony). Subsequently, the prosecutor filed an amended information alleging prior felony convictions, pleas of not guilty were entered, and the priors were denied.

On October 9th, the case was transferred from Department South J, the department of the master calendar judge, to Department South D "for 1538.5 and trial." When the matter was called in Department South D, it was continued because appellant stated that he no longer wanted to be represented by the public defender and thought he might be able to retain private counsel. When the case was called on October 10th, appellant indicated he had been unable to hire private counsel. The court proceeded with the section 1538.5 hearing, and a deputy public defender represented appellant.

Several witnesses were called by the prosecution, and they testified to the following events. The Long Beach Police Department received information that the occupants of apartment 5 of the Ho Hum Motel were trafficking in narcotics supplied to them by a person whose description was also given. Two officers were dispatched to watch that apartment. During the surveillance, the police saw four or five individuals enter the apartment, remain a short time, and leave. Appellant was the last visitor. When he left the apartment, he walked in the direction of a second motel. The officers, believing appellant matched the description of the supplier, requested that a patrol unit contact him.

Two uniformed officers responded to the call. They observed appellant walking into a parking lot at the second motel and drove their patrol car toward him. Appellant turned, looked toward the patrol car, and ran into apartment 6 of that motel. As the officers were parking their car, appellant came out of the apartment. At the officers' request, appellant produced identification. During the course of the conversation, one officer concluded that appellant "was possibly under the influence of an opiate." The officer asked permission to enter apartment 6, and appellant replied, "Go ahead." Appellant and the two officers entered the apartment.

At this point, the two surveillance officers from the Ho Hum Motel arrived, and one of them asked appellant for permission to search the apartment. The officer "advised (appellant) that he did not have to give . . . permission, that if he wished to refuse he could," and "if he did not wish to give . . . permission (the officers) would attempt to obtain a search warrant." According to the officers, appellant agreed to this search of his apartment which revealed nine balloons of heroin, various narcotic paraphernalia, and a revolver.

Appellant and the occupants of apartments 3 and 5 of the Ho Hum Motel testified for the defense at the hearing. Their testimony indicated that appellant had spent the afternoon in apartment 3 and had not gone into apartment 5 on the day of his arrest. Further, appellant testified the officers did not ask for, and he did not give, consent to enter to search his apartment.

After hearing this evidence, the judge in Department South D denied the motion to suppress and set the trial for October 14th. The prosecutor was not ready to proceed on that date, and appellant reiterated his desire to remove his deputy public defender, stating he wished "to go pro per." The judge transferred the case back to Department South J for hearing "forthwith" on the motion regarding representation and for trial on November 20th.

In Department South J, the hearing on the representation motion was continued by the master calendar judge several times before it was heard on October 28th. Appellant again stated he wished "to go pro per." The court discussed at length the problems of self-representation, and appellant acknowledged he understood but stated he was "willing to gamble." The court allowed him to proceed in propria persona after finding a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.

On January 5, 1976, after additional continuances of the trial, the master calendar judge transferred the case to Department South D "for trial forthwith." The judge who presided at the motion to suppress was still sitting in that department. Appellant's case was called in Department South D and, after some brief proceedings, was adjourned to the following day for jury selection. Directly after adjournment, appellant filed with the clerk in Department South D a declaration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 to disqualify the judge in that department. On January 6th, that judge denied the section 170.6 motion as "not filed timely," and the trial commenced.

Appellant was convicted of the weapon offense and of possession of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, an offense necessarily included in possession for sale of heroin), and the prior convictions were found to be true. The court sentenced appellant to consecutive state prison terms for these offenses.

II

Appellant contends initially that the trial judge erred in ruling his motion to disqualify was "not filed timely." ¹ This contention lacks merit.

Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 generally provides for the automatic disqualification of any "judge . . . of any superior, municipal or justice court . . . when it shall be established as (herein) provided that such judge . . . is prejudiced against any party or attorney or the interest of any party or attorney appearing in (any) action or proceeding." Prejudice is "established" when an oral or written affidavit is timely ² filed by a party or an attorney declaring, in "substantially" the words of the statute, that the party or attorney "cannot or believes he cannot have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before such judge . . . ." (Code Civ.Proc., § 170.6, subds. (2), (5) and (6).) If disqualified, the judge may neither try the case nor "hear any matter therein which involves a contested issue of law or fact." However, the judge may participate in any non-trial proceeding that does not involve such an issue. (Thompson v. Superior Court (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 702, 708-709, 23 Cal.Rptr. 841, 843.)

The Attorney General contends that appellant's motion to disqualify should have been made before the master calendar judge at the time he assigned the case out for trial on January 5th. This contention is based on the third sentence of subdivision (2) of section 170.6: "If directed to the trial of a cause where there is a master calendar, the motion (to disqualify under section 170.6) shall be made to the judge supervising the master calendar not later than the time the cause is assigned for trial."

From the record in the present case, it is clear the superior court was operating with a "master calendar department system" on January 5th when this case was assigned to Department South D for trial "forthwith." Since the motion to disqualify was not made before the master calendar judge, the motion was untimely. ³

III

Appellant's next contention is that his motion to suppress was improperly denied in that his consent to search was involuntarily obtained. Although he concedes there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's implied determination that consent was requested by the officers and given by appellant, he argues that "the evidence of duress (was) more than adequate to overcome the weight of evidence offered in support of a conclusion of free and voluntary consent."

Recently, this court held in a similar case that a trial court did not err when it held consent was voluntary. In People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135, four police officers went to an individual's home to arrest him for robbery. When he responded to their knocking, the officers asked him to step outside, arrested him, handcuffed him, and requested permission to search his house. The police did not advise him of his right to refuse to agree to the search. The trial court found that consent was voluntary.

Appellant's consent was given under less coercive circumstances than in James. Appellant was under detention rather than arrest, was not handcuffed, and had been advised of his right to refuse to consent. Appellant fails to show why James does not control under these facts.

IV

Appellant contends further...