People v. Williams
| Decision Date | 09 December 1994 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Gralin WILLIAMS, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Charles J. Hynes, Dist. Atty., James Lamb, Asst. Dist. Atty., of counsel, for plaintiff.
The People move for an order removing defendant's case to Family Court or, in the alternative, dismissing the indictment on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction to proceed further. The People seek removal or dismissal in order to prevent this court from deciding a suppression motion.
In determining this motion, the court has considered the affirmations and memoranda of law presented by the People and the defendant.
Defendant was charged in a multi-count indictment with several counts of robbery in different degrees, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and fourth degrees. The robbery counts relate to an armed robbery that occurred on September 5, 1993. The Grand Jury testimony was that defendant used a revolver in the alleged robbery, while the co-defendant used a pistol. The weapon counts relate to the alleged possession of a .380 semi-automatic handgun on September 15, 1993. There was no testimony before the Grand Jury that this was the same gun possessed by the defendant or the co-defendant on the day of the robbery.
The indictment was filed on September 27, 1993. On October 6, 1993, the indictment was amended to "read J.O.".
As part of his omnibus motion, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment but did not question the court's jurisdiction over the weapon counts. Although the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, it granted defendant's motion for a Dunaway, Payton, Mapp and Wade hearing. During the hearing, which was commenced on November 18, 1993, defendant requested that the Court sever the weapon counts. The court reserved decision on severance until the conclusion of the hearing. At the completion of the hearing on February 2, 1994, the court suppressed the lineup identification of the defendant. The court reserved On February 4, 1994, the court severed the weapon counts. The defendant was thereafter tried and acquitted of all robbery counts. The Court still has not decided the suppression motion as it relates to the weapon counts.
decision on whether to suppress the gun relating to the weapon counts.
In July 1994 the People requested that the court remove the weapons count to Family Court. This court asked the parties for briefs on the court's jurisdiction over the decision on suppression with regard to the weapon counts. In their brief, the People submit that the court lost jurisdiction over the weapon counts at the time of severance and that it must now remove those counts to Family Court or dismiss the case without taking any further action. Defendant contends that CPL 210.20(5) does not mandate removal, and the People's request should be denied.
Although courts have consistently concluded that the age of a defendant goes to the jurisdiction, * they do not discuss the type of jurisdiction at issue (see, People v. Stevenson, 17 N.Y.2d 682, 269 N.Y.S.2d 458, 216 N.E.2d 615 []; People v. Murch, 263 N.Y. 285, 290, 189 N.E. 220; People v. Ennis, 94 A.D.2d 746, 747, 462 N.Y.S.2d 499; Rodriguez v. Myerson, 69 A.D.2d 162, 166-170, 418 N.Y.S.2d 936; People v. Chin Min Foo, 144 Misc.2d 589, 595, 545 N.Y.S.2d 55; People v. Alouisa, 120 Misc.2d 968, 970, 466 N.Y.S.2d 1007; People v. Eric T., 89 Misc.2d 678, 679, 392 N.Y.S.2d 552).
In People ex rel. Harrison v. Jackson, 298 N.Y. 219, 82 N.E.2d 14, the court of appeals did not resolve the impact of age. Three members of the Court, and the judge concurring in the result did not reach the issue based on their resolution of the case. The three dissenters found that age went to the subject matter jurisdiction of a court (id. at 233-234, 82 N.E.2d 14). Since a majority of the court did not rule on the point, Jackson has no precedential value on whether age goes to subject matter jurisdiction. (See James v. Patten, 6 N.Y. 9, 16; see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2307, 110 L.Ed.2d 112).
Even if the dissenters in Jackson were correct in finding that age went to subject matter jurisdiction at the time of the decision, amendments to the CPL have since affected the court's power over persons under 16.
In 1978 the legislature created a class of designated offenses for which 13-14, and 15-year-old "juvenile offenders" are criminally liable (CPL 1.20, 190.71; Penal Law 30.00[2];--L.1978, ch. 481). In 1980, the legislature gave grand juries power to indict juvenile offenders for non-designated offenses if the offense is properly joinable to a designated offense under CPL 200.20(6) (CPL 190.71; L.1980, ch. 136).
A non-designated offense may be joined if it is part of the same criminal transaction as a designated offense, or if the proof of the non-designated offense is "material and admissible as evidence in chief" in the trial of the designated offense (or vice-versa) (CPL 200.20[6][b]. This power to indict and join was added in order to resolve double jeopardy concerns raised by separate proceedings for related offenses, and to promote judicial economy by avoiding duplication of proceedings (Bellacosa, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 11A, CPL 200.20 at 399-400 [1982 Ed.]; People v. Joshua, 142 Misc.2d 842, 844, 538 N.Y.S.2d 684). By adding this power to indict and join non-designated offenses, the legislature gave the Supreme Court subject matter jurisdiction over offenses that formerly had been dealt with as juvenile delinquency proceedings in Family Court (see Rodriguez v. Myerson, supra, 69 A.D.2d at 166-169, 418 N.Y.S.2d 936).
The general rule is that a court may not acquire subject matter jurisdiction by waiver, consent, estoppel, or laches (Matter of Anthony J., 143 A.D.2d 668, 669, 532 N.Y.S.2d 924; see also Lacks v. Lacks, 41 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 390 N.Y.S.2d 875, 359 N.E.2d 384). There is an exception to this general rule where a court has jurisdiction over the general subject matter, but the challenge relates to a court's jurisdiction over a particular case (Matter of Rougeron, 17 N.Y.2d 264, 271, 270 N.Y.S.2d 578, 217 N.E.2d 639, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899, 87 S.Ct. 204, 17 L.Ed.2d 131; Matter of Anthony J., supra, 143 A.D.2d at 669, 532 N.Y.S.2d 924). This exception applies to Supreme Court jurisdiction over non-designated offenses, since the court now has jurisdiction over non-designated offenses, but this jurisdiction depends on the facts of a particular case (i.e. whether it is properly joined to a designated offense). Jurisdiction in such a situation can be born through waiver, consent, or estoppel (Matter of Rougeron, supra ). Implicit in this exception is that a court retains the power to act in such a case at least until the issue of jurisdiction is decided by the court.
This conclusion is supported by provisions providing that proceedings prior to removal to family court are deemed to have been made by the Family Court (CPL 725.10).
In this case, the robbery and the weapon counts were unrelated in time and place. The evidence of one offense would not have been admissible at the trial of the other, since there was no indication that the same weapon was involved. The court was thus required to sever the weapon counts (People v. Gadsden, 139 A.D.2d 925, 926, 528 N.Y.S.2d 955; People v. Connors, 83 A.D.2d 640, 641, 441 N.Y.S.2d 523). This conclusion, however, was not apparent from the face of the indictment. More importantly, the issue of defendant's age was not before the Grand Jury, and only became an issue at the time the indictment was amended to reflect defendant's juvenile status. Defendant did not raise the issue of proper joinder of the weapon counts as part of his motion to dismiss the indictment. The issue of proper joinder was not brought to the court's attention until November 18, 1993, during the suppression hearing. A couple of days later, at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court severed the weapon counts and reserved decision on the issue relevant to the weapon counts. The issue of the court's jurisdiction was not raised until the People requested that the court remove the case to Family Court in July of 1994.
On these facts, the court had jurisdiction over the weapon counts until it decided defendant's request to sever them from the robbery counts. Although the weapon counts were not related to the robbery counts on any issue relevant at trial, they were related on issues relevant to suppression (see CPL 200.20[6]. Given that the hearing has already been held, deciding the suppression issue before removal fulfills the statutory purpose of CPL 200.20[6] by avoiding duplicity of proceedings.
Of course, if age is merely a trial defense (Penal Law § 30.00), or relates to general personal or trial jurisdiction, the People's action in this matter would constitute waiver of such a claim.
The court at least has jurisdiction to decide the suppression matter, hearings for...
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