People v. Williams

• Citation: 222 Cal.Rptr. 527,175 Cal.App.3d Supp. 16
• Court: United States Superior Court (California)
• Decision Date: 18 October 1985
• Parties: 175 Cal.App.3d Supp. 16 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Pamela Elaine WILLIAMS, Defendant and Respondent. Crim. A. 11142. Appellate Department, Superior Court, Monterey County, California

Page 527

222 Cal.Rptr. 527

175 Cal.App.3d Supp. 16

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Pamela Elaine WILLIAMS, Defendant and Respondent.

Crim. A. 11142.

Appellate Department, Superior Court, Monterey County, California.

Oct. 18, 1985.

William D. Curtis, Dist. Atty., and Marie Aronson, Deputy District Atty., for plaintiff and appellant

[175 Cal.App.3d Supp. 20] David W. Brown, Monterey, for defendant and respondent.

SILVER, Presiding Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Appeal from an order of the Municipal Court of Monterey County. Reversed.

The People of the State of California appeal from an adverse judgment entered upon the order of the municipal court sustaining Williams' demurrer, without leave to amend, to the People's complaint. Williams was cited for travelling 65 miles per hour, 10 miles per hour faster than the maximum speed limit in violation of California Vehicle Code section 22348, subdivision (a). The demurrer raised two constitutional objections to this state's 55 miles per hour maximum speed law:

(1) California adopted the maximum speed limit as the result of federal coercion and in violation of the Tenth Amendment to the federal Constitution; and

(2) California impermissibly delegated its legislative authority to Congress by conditioning repeal of the state speed limit upon federal repeal of the national speed limit.

For reasons discussed below, we reject respondent's constitutional challenge and reverse the decision of the trial court.

The constitutional issues raised by Williams in the instant action are not novel. The extent to which Congress may in the exercise of its delegated powers utilize the states and their political machinery to pursue federal policy goals has been the subject of much litigation and commentary. The issues are complex and the courts have experienced difficulty in striking an appropriate balance between the federal interest in establishing uniform national policy and local concerns of states necessitating peculiarly local resolution. (Compare National League of Cities v. Usery (1976) 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 with Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016.) We respect the trial court's concern over these issues and recognize the constitutional importance of striking an appropriate balance between federal and state power.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

On January 2, 1974, during the embargo of oil sales to the United States by Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the the United States Congress established a national 55-mile-per-hour speed limit in the Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act (Pub.L. No. 93-239, 87 Stat. 1046). The law was an emergency measure designed to reduce the nation's fuel consumption during the embargo. (1973 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 3344, 3345.) Section 2(a) of the act conditioned the receipt of federal funds upon each state establishing a 55 miles per hour maximum speed limit upon the public highways within its jurisdiction. ¹ California quickly followed suit, enacting Vehicle Code section 22348, subdivision (a) by emergency legislation on January 1, 1974. (Stats.1973, ch. 1218, section 1, p. 2935.) Section 4 of the legislation declared its purpose to be the institution of "more realistic reduced speed limits as a measure to help alleviate serious and far-reaching fuel shortages...." (Id., § 4, p. 2935.) Section 1 of the 1973 legislation provided that Vehicle Code section 22348 would remain in effect only until June 30, 1975, unless extended by a later enactment.

                1  Section 2(e) provided that the emergency act was subject to termination by executive order when the President had determined that the fuel shortage crisis had passed or, alternatively, automatic termination on June 30, 1975, whichever date occurred first.  (1973 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 1170, 1171.)   Section 3 made available to the states 90-percent federal funding for approved demonstration projects designed to encourage the use of car pools in urban areas.  (Id., at pp. 1171-1172.)
                

One year later (January 4, 1975) Congress acted to make permanent a national 55-miles-per-hour speed limit by continuing an incentive's approach which barred federal highway aid to states which failed to enact a maximum state speed limit of 55-miles-per-hour (Pub.L. No. 93-643, 88 Stat. 2281, § 114.) "The legislative history of this bill clearly shows that Congress sought this more permanent 55 m.p.h. speed limit for both highway safety and fuel conservation reasons." (Marks v. Mobil Oil Corp., (E.D.Penn.1983) 562 F.Supp. 759, 771, aff'd 727 F.2d 1100.) As the House Public Works Committee stated in its report on the bill: "The benefits of the lower maximum speed limit has [sic] been so substantial that the Committee is proposing that it be continued until such time as the Congress declares by concurrent resolution that it is no longer necessary. [p] According to reports from the Federal Energy Administration, over five million gallons of fuel have been saved daily as a result of the reduction in speeds and travel on the highways. This should be reason enough to maintain the lower speed limits; however, there has also been a sharp reduction in highway fatalities. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has estimated a 20-percent drop in traffic fatalities, which represents 1,000 fewer Americans being killed each month. [p] ... Results of a National Safety Council study indicate that 46 percent of the reduction is the result of reduced speeds.... A recent study by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials found that approximately half of the reduction in traffic fatalities is the result of reduced speeds and more uniform speeds ...." (House Report No. 93-1567, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News, at p. 8019.)

The bill added section 154 to chapter 1 of title 23 of the United States Code providing that the Secretary of Transportation could not approve any project under section 106 of title 23 ² in any state which has a maximum speed limit on any public highway within its jurisdiction in excess of 55-miles-per-hour. (Pub.L. No. 93-643, § 114, reprinted at 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, at p. 2657.) The bill also added section 141 which requires states to certify annually that they were enforcing the 55-miles-per-hour speed limit. (Pub.L. No. 93-643, § 107, reprinted at 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, at p. 2654.)

Due to the impending repeal of the California legislation on June 30, 1975, the California Legislature by emergency legislation extended the date of repeal until June 30, 1978. (Stats.1975, ch. 153, § 1, p. 285.) The federal legislation no longer had a termination date. Three years later, the Accordingly the Legislature added subdivision (c) to California Vehicle Code section 22348 which provided that section 22348 "shall remain in effect 120 days from the date that the 55-mile-per-hour national maximum speed limit, as specified in section 154 of Title 23 of the United States Code, is repealed." (Stats.1978, ch. 217, § 1, p. 466).

California Legislature, facing automatic repeal of section 22348, again acted to preserve the 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. In apparent response to the permanency of the federal legislation they enacted section 2 of Statutes 1978, chapter 217 (at p. 467) as follows: "It is the intent of the Legislature, in enacting this act, to recognize that the 55-mile-per-hour national maximum speed limit, as specified in Section 154 of Title 23 of the United States Code, which, when originally enacted would have terminated on June 30, 1975, no longer contains an automatic termination date. In recognition of this, the Legislature finds it appropriate to amend Section 22348 of the Vehicle Code accordingly. [p] It is the further intent of the Legislature that if such 55-mile-per-hour maximum speed limit is ever revised by either increasing or decreasing such limit, the Legislature will review the provisions of Section 22348 of the Vehicle Code to ascertain whether it would be appropriate to amend such provisions."

The Enactment of Vehicle Code Section 22348, Subdivision (c) Did Not Constitute a Delegation of Legislative Power to the Federal Government.

Article IV, section 1 of the California Constitution provides that: "[t]he legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature...." The power to declare whether or not there shall be a law, to determine the general purpose or policy to be achieved by the law and to fix the limits of its operation cannot be delegated.

" 'An unconstitutional delegation of legislative power occurs when the Legislature confers ... unrestricted authority to make fundamental policy decisions.' [Citations.] In order to avoid an unlawful delegation of its authority, the Legislature must first resolve the 'truly fundamental issues,' and must then 'establish an effective mechanism to assure the proper implementation of its policy decisions.' (Kugler v. Yocum, [ (1968) ] 69 Cal.2d [371,] at pp. 376-377 [71 Cal.Rptr. 687, 445 P.2d 303].)" (Wilkinson v. Madera Community Hospital (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 436, 442, 192 Cal.Rptr. 593)

The fact that a third party, whether private or governmental, performs some role in the application and implementation of an established legislative scheme does not render the legislation invalid as an unlawful delegation. (Kugler v. Yocum (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371, at pp. 379-380, 71 Cal.Rptr. 687, 445 P.2d 303; Salmon Trollers Marketing Assn. v. Fullerton (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 291, 299, 177 Cal.Rptr. 362.) "In order to hold a statute invalid as an unlawful delegation of legislative power, it must be clear that without the exercise of legislative power by the person or body to whom the delegation has been made, the statute remains incomplete so that the legislative will has not been fully made known." (16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §...