People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 08 July 1980
• Citation: 50 N.Y.2d 1043,431 N.Y.S.2d 698
• Parties: , 409 N.E.2d 1372 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Lester WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 698

431 N.Y.S.2d 698

50 N.Y.2d 1043, 409 N.E.2d 1372

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Lester WILLIAMS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 8, 1980.

Gary E. Divis and William E. Hellerstein, New York City, for appellant.

Eugene Gold, Dist. Atty. (William C. Heffernan, Asst. Dist. Atty., of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division, 70 A.D.2d 957, 417 N.Y.S.2d 765, should be affirmed.

Viewing the testimony in a light most favorable to the defendant (People v. Steele, 26 N.Y.2d 526, 311 N.Y.S.2d 889, 260 N.E.2d 527), the failure to grant the request to charge the jury on innocent possession of a firearm does not constitute reversible error. It is settled that possession-an essential element of criminal possession of a weapon-does not turn upon physical handling of the prohibited weapon alone. There are instances, therefore, in which possession might result unavoidably from the performance of some lawful act and would not constitute a crime. (People v. La Pella, 272 N.Y. 81, 4 N.E.2d 943; People v. Persce, 204 N.Y. 397, 402, 97 N.E. 877; see, also, People v. Furey, 13 A.D.2d 412, 217 N.Y.S.2d 189). While it would be unwise to detail here those instances in which an innocent possession charge might be warranted, it suffices to note that the underlying purpose of the charge is to foster a civic duty on the part of citizens to surrender dangerous weapons to the police (People v. La Pella, supra). Thus, to trigger the right, there must be proof in the record showing a legal excuse for having the weapon in his possession as well as facts tending to establish that, once possession has been obtained, the weapon had not been used in a dangerous manner (People v. La Pella, supra; People v. Persce, supra).

In the present case, the evidence is utterly at odds with any claim of innocent possession. Upon discovering the gun, defendant removed the weapon and secreted it in a new hiding place, removing it when it suited his own purpose and handling it in a manner which may be charitably characterized as reckless. Hence, giving an innocent possession charge in these circumstances was not warranted.

FUCHSBERG, Judge (dissenting).

On the facts of this case, defendant had the right to have the jury consider his defense of innocent possession. Accordingly, the court's refusal to so charge was reversible error.

At trial, Williams took the stand and testified that, while he was moving his friend's furniture to her new apartment, he discovered a handgun lying under the cushions of a couch. Without advising anyone of its presence, he immediately placed the revolver deep into a crevice in the couch and continued transporting the furniture to the new residence. Upon arriving, defendant removed the gun from the couch and placed it in the kitchen under the stove. Later, when he and the others who had volunteered to help were relaxing after their labors, Williams retrieved the weapon from under the stove to show it to another member of the group. He had been holding the pistol for no more than two or three seconds, spinning it playfully like a cowboy, when it suddenly went off, hitting the woman they had helped move. Defendant further testified that he did not know the gun was loaded, did not intend for it to fire, had no intention to keep it and, indeed, had never owned or fired a handgun in his life.

In view of these facts, counsel requested a charge on innocent possession, but the court refused. I would hold this was grievous error.

It is a fundamental principle of our system of criminal justice that the record be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant when ruling on a request to charge (People v. Steele, 26 N.Y.2d 526, 529, 311 N.Y.S.2d 889, 260 N.E.2d 527). This is no mere empty cliche. Since the jury is free to credit any portion of the prosecution's or the defendant's evidence, only when there is no view of the facts that supports the defense, no "possible hypothesis" under which it is applicable, may a court refuse an appropriate request (cf. People v. Asan, 22 N.Y.2d 526, 529-530, 293 N.Y.S.2d 326, 239 N.E.2d 913). Moreover, the rule has constitutional overtones, particularly in a case such as this where the People have the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt (see Penal Law, § 25.00, subd. 1) and its subject matter is intimately intertwined with the definition of "possession" itself, an essential element of the crime charged (see, generally, Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281; Criminal Procedure, 1978 Ann.Survey Am.L. 17).

These cautions in mind, a fair reading of the authorities demonstrates that defendant's testimony put him within the compass of the innocent possession defense. The two threads running through each of the cases holding the defense available are the inadvertence of defendant's original acquisition of the item and the brevity of his exercise of control over it.

Thus, in People v. La Pella, 272 N.Y....