People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 20 February 1969
• Docket Number: Cr. 6905
• Citation: 269 Cal.App.2d 879,75 Cal.Rptr. 348
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Oren Reginald WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 348

75 Cal.Rptr. 348

269 Cal.App.2d 879

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Oren Reginald WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 6905.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Feb. 20, 1969.

Molly H. Minudri, San Francisco, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Robert B. Granucci, James A. Aiello, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

CHRISTIAN, Associate Justice.

This case vividly illustrates the hazards of confusion and unintended injustice which seem to be inseparable from active judicial participation in the process commonly known as 'plea bargaining.' Appellant originally pleaded not guilty to three counts of selling marijuana (Health & Saf.Code, § 11531) and two counts of selling dangerous drugs (Health & Saf.Code, § 11912). On the morning which had been set for trial, while the venire of prospective jurors waited in the courtroom, the judge conversed at length in chambers with the prosecutor and the defendant, who was attended by his wife and by counsel. The first hour of the conversation was not reported, but a summing up of the negotiations was put on record by the judge as follows:

'I understand that the defense of the case involves the issue of entrapment, and as I am sure Mr. Fitzgerald (defense counsel) has explained to you, the defense of entrapment is a difficult defense for the defendant to sustain. But, in any event, the Defense itself involves basically an admission of the transaction, an admission that a sale of these drugs took place.

'THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

'THE COURT: You understand this, do you not?

'THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

'THE COURT: I also understand that your principle (sic) concern, and I can well understand it since I am familiar with the background to some degree, your principle concern at the moment is the question of going back to state prison.' (Emphasis added.)

A few moments later, the judge added:

'THE COURT: * * * Now, under the law in this State, 'if you are convicted of any of these counts and have previously been convicted'--and I am reading it to you right out of the code book, 'of an offense of any of the laws of any other State which if committed in this State would have been punishable as a felony, then the Court cannot grant probation and must send you to state prison, but--' and it is a big but, That prior offense has to be charged in the Information in order to cause this mandatory prison provision of the law to operate. * * * Therefore, as matters now stand, if you were to plead to this Information to some of the counts that are contained therein, under the law as I interpret it, and the probation office agrees with this interpretation, and I believe counsel agree with it, the Court would have the power to grant probation and would not be compelled to send you to state prison, do you understand this?

'THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

'THE COURT: Now, I am willing to, and again, I want to do this carefully because I want you to understand that I am not trying to tell you what you should do, or persuade you to do anything. You must make up your own mind in this regard. But I am willing to tell you this much as I think a person in your position should have an appreciation of the possible consequences. I understand that the District Attorney's office will recommend that you be sent to state prison. I am willing to tell you that I will make no promises at this time to send you there or not to send you there. I will have the matter referred to the Probation Office, have a probation report prepared, examine it, consider their recommendation, and consider the recommendation of the District Attorney's office, and the statements of your defense counsel before any sentence is pronounced. In other words, The decision will be mine and it won't be a mandatory decision. Under the present state of this case, I am not compelled to send you to state prison if you are convicted. I will decide whether to do that just as I would in any other case. That's been the sum and substance of this discussion we have had in here for about an hour. * * *

'THE DEFENDANT: Well, in other words, if I go to trial and I am found guilty, then there is absolutely nothing that can happen except San Quentin?

'THE COURT: If you go to trial and If this prior conviction is charged, which I assume it will be, you are right and you are found guilty, the Court has no power to do anything other than send you to state prison; * * *' (Emphasis added.)

Appellant then withdrew his not guilty pleas to all five counts; he pleaded guilty to one marijuana count and one dangerous drugs count and the other three were dismissed. A probation report was filed; it concluded that appellant was ineligible for probation, apparently because he had been armed during one of his numerous prior offenses, or because of the number of prior convictions.

At the hearing on the application for probation the following discussion occurred:

'THE COURT: * * * At the time Mr. Williams entered a plea the record was in such shape that it was clear that no mandatory prison sentence would have to be imposed, that is, he would not be sentenced as a second-time narcotics offender. The understanding as I recall it at that time and I want to be sure that everyone has the same understanding, was the matter of the sentencing would be left in the sole discretion of the Court.

'Now, under the law, in view of the defendant's prior record, the Court must make a finding of unusual circumstances in order to avoid sentencing the defendant to state prison for this offense, and I understand from the position previously taken by the District Attorney's office that while they have recommended state prison sentence, and do presently recommend a state prison sentence, they are willing to leave the matter solely in the hands of the Court and concur in any findings the Court might be willing to make.

'MR. ZUNION (the prosecutor): That's correct, your Honor. When we had our discussion with Mr. Fitzgerald in chambers, I am sure everyone in chambers, including the defendant, was under the impression that the Court, in view of--or despite the defendant's plea to two felonies, two felony counts of sale, everyone felt that the Court would have discretion and that the basis on which he entered his plea, I am sure, and my recommendation is still that he be sentenced to state prison. However, in view of what we have discovered in the law in 1203, particularly, it appears that the Court does not have the discretion. However, the People are willing--I am willing and I will commit my office to a concurrence with whatever sentence this Court imposes in view of the circumstances under which the plea was originally taken.'

The judge expressed agreement with the prosecutor's statement; he then continued: 'I think I have read (the probation report) three times; I have read the preliminary transcript. * * * The apparent evidence in the case portrays Mr. Williams as a rather sophisticated dealer in narcotics. * * * I can't in this type of case where the law requires a finding of unusual circumstances, make a finding of unusual circumstances and as I see it, I have no choice but to sentence the defendant to state prison.'

Appellant had pleaded guilty, as he now points out, after he had received from the judge:

1. Erroneous, or at best incomplete, legal advice concerning the implications of an...