People v. Charles

• Decision Date: 23 August 1985
• Citation: 217 Cal.Rptr. 402,171 Cal.App.3d 552
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Savior CHARLES, Defendant and Appellant. A022571.

Page 402

217 Cal.Rptr. 402

171 Cal.App.3d 552

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Savior CHARLES, Defendant and Appellant.

A022571.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Aug. 23, 1985.

Review Denied November 14, 1985.

Kent A. Davidson, Oakland, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van De Kamp, Atty. Gen., Herbert F. Wilkinson, Blair W. Hoffman, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

ANDERSON, Associate Justice. ^*

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction entered after appellant pled guilty to numerous criminal offenses.

Background

The victim of the crimes was a 70-year-old widow who lived alone in East Oakland, California. The crimes were perpetrated in the late evening hours of May 17, 1981. The victim, lying in bed and ready to sleep, heard the crashing noise of the front door glass breaking. When she got out of the bed to investigate, she was met by two intruders who gained entry into the house by kicking open the door. One of them was appellant, the other Vernell Owens, his codefendant.

Owens, who was wearing brass knuckles, demanded money from the old lady. When she answered that all the money she collected had been given to charities, Owens hit her in the head, knocked her on the floor and stepped on her hand and feet.

While Owens searched the house looking for money, appellant dragged the victim to the bed and threatened, "I'm not through yet" and "I have got to have a taste of this white bitch." He ordered the victim to undress and put up her legs, and then appellant raped her. Thereupon he knifed her in the hand and abdomen, tied her neck, wrists and ankles with a telephone cord he had ripped out of the wall and humiliated her further by breaking eggs over her face. Before leaving the home, appellant set a bunch of newspapers on fire and threw them on the victim's bed where she still lay nude and tied. After her assailants left, the victim struggled to loosen her bonds and miraculously escaped from her blazing home, running naked up to the street to her neighbor's home. Before being taken to the hospital, she described her ordeal to the police and detailed her losses--jewelry and coins stolen from her home. While her home was significantly damaged by fire, the victim lay in the hospital for almost two weeks nursing burn and stab wounds.

Appellant was charged with attempted murder (PEN.CODE §§ 187/674¹, count I); first degree burglary ( § 459, count II); rape ( §§ 261 and 264.1, count III); attempted robbery ( §§ 211/664, count IV); arson causing great bodily injury ( § 451, subd. (a), count V); and damaging telephone wires ( § 591, count VI). In addition, as to some counts the information alleged use of a deadly weapon, infliction of great bodily injury and great bodily injury on the aged in violation of sections 12022, subdivision (b), 12022.3, subdivision (a), 12022.7, 12022.8, 1203.09 and 1203.075. The information further alleged a prior felony conviction.

Shortly after appellant's motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5 was granted as to a medallion only and denied as to all other evidence seized, ² jury trial commenced. After trial was completed and during jury deliberations, it became apparent that there had been jury misconduct. During a recess in deliberations but before a determination of whether a mistrial should be granted, appellant pled guilty to all charges and nolo contendere to all the enhancing allegations. In return for his plea, appellant's prior conviction was stricken and the trial court promised him a prison sentence of only 12 years (instead of a much more severe possible sentence) on condition that appellant waive his right to appeal the court's prior ruling denying his suppression motion. Thereafter, in full compliance with the plea negotiations, appellant was sentenced to state prison to the agreed term of 12 years. ³

His express waiver notwithstanding, appellant filed a notice of appeal pursuant to section 1538.5, subdivision (m), ⁴ challenging the legality of the search and seizure. The crucial issues thus arise whether a criminal defendant may validly waive his right to appellate review as a part of the plea negotiation and whether the waiver in the present case was valid. For reasons which follow, we answer both questions in the affirmative and uphold the trial court's judgment.

Discussion

It is well settled that the right of a criminal defendant to appeal his conviction is purely statutory in California inasmuch as neither the federal nor the state Constitution provides such right. (Abney v. United States (1977) 431 U.S. 651, 656, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2038, 52 L.Ed.2d 651; Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811.) By entering a guilty plea the defendant waives his right to appeal any error in the pretrial proceedings. (Lefkowitz v. Newsome (1975) 420 U.S. 283, 288, 95 S.Ct. 886, 889, 43 L.Ed.2d 196; People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895-896, 135 Cal.Rptr. 786, 558 P.2d 872.) The general rule in this country is that he cannot ever, with the consent of all parties, enter a plea of guilty conditioned upon retaining the right to challenge in the appellate courts, the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. (State v. Losieau (S.D.1978) 266 N.W.2d 259.) For, "by his plea of guilty he had admitted the facts establishing the essential elements of the crime with which he was charged and thus has waived his right to appeal nonjurisdictional defects." (Id., at p. 262). California codified an exception to the general rule when it adopted section 1538.5, subdivision (m) in 1967. That this statute is an exception to the general rule that all errors prior to the entry of the guilty plea are waived (except jurisdictional ones) is clear. (People v. Lilienthal (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891, 897, 150 Cal.Rptr. 910, 587 P.2d 706; People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 9, 136 Cal.Rptr. 409, 559 P.2d 1028.) Significantly enough, prior to the enactment of this section a defendant could not appeal the search and seizure issue following a guilty plea because as the court put it "the right at stake here is not the fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, but a much narrower right--to appeal from an adverse ruling on a suppression motion...." (In re David G. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 247, 254, 155 Cal.Rptr. 500.)

The limited issue before us therefore is whether the statutory, nonfundamental right accorded by section 1538.5, subdivision (m), may be waived by a defendant in return for the benefits granted by a plea agreement. While this issue has neither been raised nor decided by any California case, there are cogent policy considerations and persuasive legal authorities compelling the conclusion that such waiver must be upheld by reviewing courts.

It is, of course, commonplace that plea negotiating has become an accepted practice in American criminal jurisprudence, "an integral part of the administration of justice ..." (Barber v. Gladden (D.Ore. 1963) 220 F.Supp. 308, 314) and "essential to expeditious and fair administration of justice" (People v. Williams (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 879, 884, 75 Cal.Rptr. 348). The great majority of criminal cases are disposed of by pleas of guilty. As the court remarked in Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742, 752, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1471, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, statistical data show that over three-fourths of the criminal convictions in this country rest on guilty pleas.

Both the People and the defendant may profit from plea negotiations. The benefit to the defendant is lessened punishment by way of reducing the charges, dismissing or refraining from bringing other charges or presenting the court with favorable sentence recommendation. (Staton v. Warden (1978) 175 Conn. 328, 398 A.2d 1176, 1178; see also 69 Nw.U.L.Rev. 663-664; 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1387, 1389-1390.) The benefit to the People lies in saving the costs of trial, increased efficiency of the procedure and added flexibility of the criminal process. As widely recognized, plea negotiation is an indispensable element in the efficient administration of criminal justice. (Brady v. United States, supra, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463; People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 604, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409; In re Hawley (1967) 67 Cal.2d 824, 828, 63 Cal.Rptr. 831, 433 P.2d 919.)

Due to the obvious importance of guilty pleas the courts recognize that in order to obtain the mutual benefits flowing from such pleas the criminal defendant may waive such crucial constitutional rights as the privilege against self-incrimination, trial by jury, and confrontation and cross-examination of incriminating witnesses. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449.) Starting from this premise, the conclusion is inescapable that if constitutional rights of utmost significance may be surrendered by the defendant in order to achieve the well-recognized benefits of the plea agreement, a statutory and less fundamental right (such as the right to appeal from an adverse ruling on the legality of search) may also be validly waived provided such waiver is knowing, free and intelligent.

This proposition is supported not only by plain logic and common sense, but also by a vast array of cases and legal authorities from sister state jurisdictions. In People v. Williams (1975) 36 N.Y.2d 829, 370 N.Y.S.2d 904, 331 N.E.2d 684 (cert. den. 423 U.S. 873, 96 S.Ct. 141, 46 L.Ed.2d 104), a case very similar to the case at bench, the defendant was asked to waive his right of appeal from the denial of his suppression motion as a condition to the acceptance of his guilty plea. On appeal, the defendant contended that as a matter of law there could be no valid waiver of his statutory right to appeal from the preconviction denial of the motion to suppress. The reviewing court rejected defendant's contention...