People v. Williams
| Decision Date | 21 December 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 33,33 |
| Citation | 192 N.W.2d 466,386 Mich. 277 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rufus WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Robert F. Leonard Pros. Atty., Genesee County, by Donald A. Kuebler, Chief Asst. Pros. Atty., Flint, for plaintiff-appellee.
Refus Williaims, pro se.
Before the Entire Bench.
Like all recent cases of guilty plea review, Williams involves two problems. First, solution of the instant case on the basis of existing law. Second, resolution of the underlying problem of developing certain and viable guidelines for bench, bar and defendants. Such guidelines must define a procedure for plea taking that is just and understandable. At the same time it should reduce the necessity for review or simplify and expedite the process of review. The first problem involves this Court's judgment-making role; the second problem calls upon the exercise of this Court's constitutional responsibility for superintending the administration of justice.
The application of existing law to Williams is not too difficult as the principle issue is well defined and controlling precedent available, which does justice in the individual case but probably adds little or nothing to the resolution of the second problem of developing certain and viable guidelines.
The question of substantive law involved is whether the guilty plea of defendant Rufus Williams was lawfully taken. The specific question is whether Michigan law on taking guilty pleas requires that under all circumstances the trial judge personally question the defendant for purposes of ascertaining the facts of the crime and defendant's participation therein. 1
Williams was originally charged with first degree murder. With representation of counsel, he pled guilty to second degree murder. The plea was accepted and he was sentenced on October 19, 1959, to life in prison.
Approximately 7 years later, defendant petitioned the trial court to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the trial judge had failed to personally question him to ascertain whether a crime was committed and his participation therein, and on other grounds not relevant here. The trial court denied the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an opinion by Judge Charles Levin. 2
The facts of the alleged murder and the interrogation of the defendant by the court appear in the following excerpt from the proceedings on the taking of the guilty plea:
Q. You heard what the Prosecutor said Mr. Williams. Is it your desire to plead guilty to the charge that is included, that is, the charge of murder in the second degree?
THE RESPONDENT: Yes sir, it is.
Q. You have talked this over with your attorney have you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you plead guilty freely and voluntarily?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Have any threats or any promises been made in order to get you to plead guilty?
A. No sir.
Q. You plead guilty because in your own mind you are guilty of the crime of murder in the second degree?
A. Yes.'
Rufus Williams was 49 years old, had an extensive history of criminal convictions and incarceration going back over 20 years. In seeking to withdraw the guilty plea he did not claim innocence but rather that he was intoxicated at the time of the killing.
Because approximately 75 to 85 percent of our criminal cases are disposed of by the non-adversary process of the guilty plea 4 and because of the large number of appeals to the Court of Appeals 5 and to this Court 6 alleging errors in the plea-taking procedure, we granted leave to hear this case and the companion cases of People v. Taylor, People v. Johnson, People v. Jaworski, and People v. Butler 7 in order to formulate clear guidelines for lawfully taking a guilty plea that will comply with our construction of the provisions of the court rule on guilty pleas.
The leading case in this field is People v. Barrows, 358 Mich. 267, 99 N.W.2d 347 (1959). It establishes two criteria.
The first and most important criterion is as follows:
'. . . The direct questioning of a defendant by the trial judge on plea of guilty is required by the rule (35A) for the purpose of establishing the crime and the participation therein of the person pleading guilty . . .' (358 Mich. 267, 272, 99 N.W.2d 347, 350.)
The second criterion is found in the following quotation:
'. . . nor does this record convince us of the truth of the plea. . . . ' 358 Mich. 267, 273, 99 N.W.2d 347, 350.
Furthermore, Barrows noted that the defendant was only 19 years old and that this was his first appearance in a criminal court.
Applying these criteria to Williams, the above quoted excerpt from the Williams guilty plea taking begins with the court asking 'What, roughly, are the facts?' The defendant himself does not answer but the assistant prosecuting attorney in his presence does summarize what defendant did, covering the elements of the crime of which defendant is charged. Such action meets the requirement of 'establishing the crime and participation therein of the person pleading guilty' as required by Barrows. 8
As to the second criterion, being convinced that the defendant was or was not innocent, the facts in Williams are that the defendant did not claim to be innocent but rather he sought to exculpate himself on the grounds of drunkenness. Furthermore, the record beginning with the guilty plea taking proceedings is such as to justify the court in believing that the defendant was not innocent. As contrasted to the youth and first offender status of the defendant in Barrows, in Williams the defendant had a 20 year record of criminal convictions.
The requirements of Barrows and the statute and court rule are satisfied by the action in Williams. 9
Defendant contends that the failure to have counsel at the preliminary examination precludes using the testimony given at the examination to establish a factual basis for his plea conviction. Defendant cites Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970) for the proposition that he was entitled to court appointed counsel at the preliminary examination. The United States Supreme Court in Coleman concluded that under Alabama procedure the preliminary examination constituted a 'critical stage' of the prosecution at which indigent defendants were entitled to court appointed counsel. Coleman was decided on June 22, 1970. The preliminary examination of the defendant in the instant case was held on April 29, 1959. We will not attempt to anticipate the United States Supreme Court, 10 and therefore find that Coleman is prospective only. This same conclusion was reached in Kochel v. State, 10 Md.App. 11, 267 A.2d 755 (1970), and in Commonwealth v. Brown, 217 Pa.Super. 190, 269 A.2d 383 (1970).
Evidence of the United States Supreme Court's own feeling on this issue is present in Wetzel v. North Carolina, 399 U.S. 934, 90 S.Ct. 2250, 26 L.Ed.2d 805 (1970). In Wetzel, the majority of the Court declined to grant certiorari, with three justices dissenting on the ground that they felt Coleman should be retroactive in all cases.
Since defendant was represented by counsel at the time his plea of guilty was accepted, and since we hold that Coleman applies only prospectively, defendant's contentions on this issue must fail.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
The results of failure to observe proper procedures in the acceptance of guilty pleas are costly in dollars, public safety or public understanding of the judicial process, or most likely in all three. However, while less immediately injurious to public policy and respect for the law, erosion of a certain standard by hard case exceptions, however individually justifiable, creates greater injustice and brings the law into greater disrepute in the long run, because it both slows down the wheels of justice through a proliferation of cases for complicated review and corrupts the very concept of the law as a standard by which men can live.
The problem is first, to write a just And practicable rule; and second, to secure the cooperation of trial judges in following it and third, to enforce the rule strictly.
From the beginning there have been efforts to bring some certainty into the law and efforts to work out individual justice where there has been failure to follow the prescribed standards.
Legislation beginning in 1875 attempted to create some specific standards in taking pleas. The current relevant statute is M.C.L.A. 768.35; M.S.A. 28.1058:
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People v. Taylor
...in which review was begun in the trial court, though the issue of where such review should begin was not raised. See People v. Williams, 386 Mich. 277, 192 N.W.2d 466 (1971); People v. Johnson, 386 Mich. 277, 192 N.W.2d 482 (1971); People v. Goldman, 245 Mich. 578, 223 N.W. 124 (1929); Peop......
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People v. Mauch
...the plea-taking colloquy and defendant's acquiescence were held sufficient to support a Pre-Barrows plea in People v. Rufus Williams, 386 Mich. 277, 192 N.W.2d 466 (1971). In this case, the presentence report is not part of the record and, it appears, cannot be produced. There is no suggest......
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People v. Duffield
...the person pleading guilty' and secondarily '. . . does this record convince us of the truth of the plea.' People v. Rufus Williams, 386 Mich. 277, 284, 192 N.W.2d 466, 469 (1971). Both questions require examination of the same facts. As defendant's first point indicates, defendant's respon......
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People v. Warren
...with this Court's decision in Brown [.]"25 Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure, 422A Mich. 1, 113 (1985).26 People v. Williams , 386 Mich. 277, 293-295, 192 N.W.2d 466 (1971).27 Id. at 303, 192 N.W.2d 466.28 Id. at 303 n. 9, 192 N.W.2d 466 (emphasis added).29 In the Matter of the Amendment......