People v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 08 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. B109985,B109985
• Citation: 59 Cal.App.4th 1053,69 Cal.Rptr.2d 683
• Parties: , 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9207, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,811 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Holly Faye WILSON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 683

69 Cal.Rptr.2d 683

59 Cal.App.4th 1053, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9207,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,811

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Holly Faye WILSON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B109985.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Dec. 8, 1997.

Certified for Partial Publication. ^*

Review Denied March 25, 1998.

Mark D. Hammond, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Midvale, UT, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and B. Kathleen Blanchard, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

TURNER, Presiding Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant, Holly Faye Wilson, appeals after she was convicted of methamphetamine possession in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a) as a felony. On appeal, she contends that her motion to suppress the contraband and her statements should have been granted. The Attorney General argues defendant received an excessive grant of presentence credits. In the published portion of the opinion, we address the question of whether the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that defendant's inculpatory statements and the contraband be suppressed.

II. THE FACTS PERTINENT TO THE PENAL CODE SECTION 1538.5 SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE MOTION

Defendant argues that her motion to suppress her statements and the contraband pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 should have been granted. When the applicable standard of review is applied (Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 697, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1662, 134 L.Ed.2d 911; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221), the following was the evidence before the trier of fact. On March 10, 1995, Officer Charlton Vidal of the Glendale Police Department was driving a patrol car in the parking lot of the Capri Motel. He saw the registration tab on the license plate on a blue Cadillac had been "pulled away on all four corners." Officer Vidal was able to verify the registration was expired. He determined to conduct an investigation concerning a possible felonious violation of Vehicle Code section 4463, ¹ which involves an effort to falsify information concerning the payment of registration fees. Officer Vidal spoke with the manager and determined that the car belonged to the occupants of room 22 of the motel.

Officer Vidal summoned his supervisor, Sergeant Hodgman. She agreed with Officer Vidal that the occupants of room 22 should be interviewed. Officer Vidal knocked on the door and spoke to a man named John Patrick Walsh, who was a codefendant at the time of trial but who is not a party to this appeal. Mr. Walsh was dressed in his underwear. Mr. Walsh was asked by Officer Vidal who owned the blue Cadillac with the expired registration. Mr. Walsh was asked if he would mind going out to the parking lot to answer some questions about the Cadillac. Mr. Walsh agreed to go to the parking lot to but asked if he could dress first.

After dressing, Mr. Walsh walked to the parking lot with Officer Vidal. When asked about the registration, Mr. Walsh claimed he had "no idea" about it. Mr. Walsh then claimed the car belonged to a girlfriend. He then changed his story and claimed the Cadillac belonged to a friend. Then he changed his explanation again and stated he did not know who owned the Cadillac. Then, Mr. Walsh changed his story again. He stated that the Cadillac belonged to his "girlfriend," defendant, who remained in room 22.

Sergeant Hodgman remained with Mr. Walsh while Officer Vidal returned to room 22. Ten to twelve minutes had passed since Mr. Walsh accompanied Officer Vidal and Sergeant Hodgman to the parking lot from room 22. Officer Vidal knocked on the door of room 22 and it swung open "approximately a third" of the way. Prior to when he knocked on it, the door was described by Officer Vidal as being "in a closed position up against the jamb." Officer Vidal saw defendant. She was reaching under one of the two beds with her left hand. Her hand was underneath one of the two beds when the door swung open. Officer Vidal could not see defendant's left shoulder and arm which were under the bed. Officer Vidal then stepped into the room. He explained his reason for stepping into the motel room as follows: "Because of where she was, my not being able to see her hands, I wanted to get a position of advantage in case she came out with a weapon. You never know." Officer Vidal further testified: "We are trained in day one in the academy the only way a suspect can hurt you is with their hands. The position under the bed. [p] I was there for a registration investigation, so I have no idea what I have, why her hands are under a bed. I thought maybe it would be a weapon." Officer Vidal described his thoughts and movement into the room as follows, "Officer awareness kicks in and I opened the door a little further to see if there is anyone who can harm me and I stepped in."

When Officer Vidal stepped into the room, defendant then stood up and was extremely nervous. As she began to stand up, Officer Vidal entered the room. Officer Vidal asked her who owned the blue Cadillac. She responded that the car belonged to her boyfriend, Mr. Walsh. She then changed her story and said the Cadillac belonged to her. She then admitted that she knew the registration was false. She was asked if there were any drugs in the room. Defendant denied there were any drugs in the motel room. She was then asked what she was hiding under the bed. Defendant responded, " 'Okay it is only a little meth.' " Officer Vidal asked permission to retrieve the methamphetamine. She stated, "[Y]es." Officer Vidal recovered two syringes and methamphetamine. She was asked if there were any other drugs in the apartment and she said, "[N]o." She then gave Officer Vidal permission to search the remainder of the motel room and more syringes and drugs were recovered.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that when she was observed to be reaching under the bed by Officer Vidal as the door swung open and he stepped in to the room before the first question was asked concerning the drugs, no exigent circumstances warranted his entry. We disagree. This issue involves the application of the Fourth Amendment. Entry across the threshold into a motel room as occurred here normally requires a search warrant. (Stoner v. California (1964) 376 U.S. 483 486-490, 84 S.Ct. 889, 891-894, 11 L.Ed.2d 856; People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1297, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221.) However, if there is a sufficient exigency, the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement may be excused. (Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1689, 109 L.Ed.2d 85; Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 749-750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 732.) In People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 365, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729, a case involving a temporary detention of a person at gunpoint, Associate Justice Werdegar articulated the test to be applied in determining whether there has been a Fourth Amendment violation as follows: "To test the detention against 'the ultimate standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment' ( [Michigan v. ]Summers [ (1981) 452 U.S. 692,] 699-700 [101 S.Ct. 2587, 2592-2593, 69 L.Ed.2d 340]), we balance the extent of the intrusion against the government interests justifying it, looking in the final and dispositive portion of the analysis to the individualized and objective facts that made those interests applicable in the circumstances of the particular detention. (Terry [v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1,] 21 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889]; Summers, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 703 .)" The United States Supreme Court has mandated that we apply an objective test to the constitutional evaluation of the actions of Officer Vidal. (Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 U.S. 33, ----, 117 S.Ct. 417, 419-421, 136 L.Ed.2d 347; Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813-817, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774-1776, 135 L.Ed.2d 89; Scott v. United States (1978) 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168.)

With these thoughts in mind, we evaluate the appropriateness of the conduct of Officer Vidal by first examining the "character of the official intrusion." (Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2593; People v. Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 365-366, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729.) As noted previously, it is well established that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a motel room. The Attorney General rightly does not contest that an intrusion giving rise to constitutional protection occurred in the present case. Normally, absent exigent circumstances or a consent, a state official may not enter a motel room under these circumstances without securing the permission of a neutral and detached magistrate. The protection against arbitrary governmental action goes to the very essence of concepts of ordered liberty in a constitutional democracy. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, see Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) 521 U.S. 702, ----, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2268, 138 L.Ed.2d 772.) As in Glaser, though there are several factors that diminish the intrusiveness. To begin with, when he left the motel room with Officer Vidal and Sergeant Hodgman, Mr. Walsh did not completely close the door. The door was not entirely closed when Officer Vidal returned and knocked on it causing it to swing open. Further, Officer Vidal only took a single step into the room when he saw defendant reaching under the bed. This is different from cases where officer safety factors have been weighed and the entire premises were searched. (Cf. Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325, 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1098, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 [entire residence searched for other...