People v. Wingfield
| Decision Date | 31 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 12CA1287 |
| Citation | 411 P.3d 869 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Joshua Elliot WINGFIELD, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Patricia R. Van Horn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Martinez Law, LLC, Esteban A. Martinez, Longmont, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN
¶ 1 Defendant, Joshua Elliot Wingfield, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree possession of contraband, dangerous instrument. We affirm.
¶ 2 Wingfield shared a cell with two other inmates at the Arapahoe County Jail. Deputies received a report of a possible escape attempt. Through an intercom, they heard "scraping" and "banging" sounds coming from the cell. As one deputy approached the cell, other deputies monitoring the intercom heard Wingfield say: When deputies entered the cell, they discovered a trench had been dug around the perimeter of the window. They further found a crutch that had a flattened end, metal bars, a portion of a metal drain or grate, and a shank.
¶ 3 Wingfield was charged with first degree possession of contraband, attempted escape with a pending felony, conspiracy to commit escape, and three habitual criminal counts. The court ultimately granted Wingfield's motion for judgment of acquittal on the escape counts because the prosecution had not presented any evidence that Wingfield was in custody for a felony offense.
¶ 4 At a July 16, 2007 hearing, the prosecutor informed the court that a doctor at the jail had recommended that Wingfield undergo a psychiatric evaluation at the state hospital. The court made a preliminary finding of incompetency and set a competency review hearing.
¶ 5 That hearing was held on October 11, 2007, but Wingfield was unable to attend because he was being held in the Pueblo County Jail on assault charges. Defense counsel waived Wingfield's appearance, and the court found Wingfield competent to proceed.
¶ 6 Wingfield subsequently requested a second competency hearing on January 9, March 12, and April 23, 2008, on April 27 and April 29, 2009. The trial court denied Wingfield's request for a second competency hearing on each occasion. At a hearing on February 11, 2011, Wingfield moved for a new trial based on his alleged incompetence throughout trial, and the trial court denied that motion.
¶ 7 On March 12, 2009, Wingfield informed the prosecution that he wished to pursue a choice of evils defense. According to Wingfield, he was placed in a cell with two inmates, Matthew McGary and Brandon Hoyt, who had already started to effectuate an escape from the prison by knocking off chunks of concrete around their cell's window. McGary and Hoyt informed Wingfield that they were members of a white supremacist gang. McGary allegedly told Wingfield that if he did
¶ 8 After this threat, Wingfield allegedly began pursuing alternatives to going along with the escape, filing several inmate request forms with the Arapahoe County sheriffs, requesting his removal from the cell. In the filings, Wingfield did not specify his reasons for seeking removal. Only when Wingfield's requests were denied did he decide to go along with his cellmates' escape plan.
¶ 9 The prosecution subsequently filed a motion in limine in which it argued that defense counsel had not submitted a factual basis supporting the choice of evils defense and, therefore, the court should not allow Wingfield to pursue it.
¶ 10 The trial court granted the prosecution's motion, finding that, although Wingfield faced an imminent threat, he could have reached a point of safety by telling jailers at any time what was going on and requesting to be removed from his cell.
¶ 11 Wingfield was convicted of possession of contraband. The court adjudicated him a habitual offender and he was sentenced to eighteen years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
¶ 12 Wingfield contends that the trial court erred when it allowed defense counsel to waive his presence at the competency hearing. We discern no reversible error.
¶ 13 Whether a trial court violated a defendant's right to be present is a constitutional question that is reviewed de novo. People v. Price, 240 P.3d 557, 560 (Colo. App. 2010).
¶ 14 Wingfield contends that his claim should be reviewed under the constitutional harmless error standard. See Luu v. People, 841 P.2d 271, 274–75 (Colo. 1992). Constitutional harmless error requires the reversal of a defendant's conviction that occurred as a result of the trial court's error unless the reviewing court finds the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Blecha v. People, 962 P.2d 931, 942 (Colo. 1998).
¶ 15 The People disagree, arguing that the plain error standard applies to unpreserved constitutional claims. See People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 748 (Colo. 2005).
¶ 16 Although we note that Wingfield's absence from the competency hearing made it impossible for him to object to defense counsel's waiver of his right to presence, we need not resolve this issue because we conclude that the trial court did not violate Wingfield's constitutional rights.
¶ 17 A defendant has a right to be present at every critical stage of a criminal trial. People v. Ragusa, 220 P.3d 1002, 1009 (Colo. App. 2009). Although no Colorado appellate court has addressed the issue, every federal court of appeals to address the issue, as well as various state courts, has held that competency hearings are such "critical stages" for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2012) ; Raymond v. Weber, 552 F.3d 680, 684 (8th Cir. 2009) ; United States v. Collins, 430 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2005) ; Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2001) ; United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ; United States v. Barfield, 969 F.2d 1554, 1556 (4th Cir. 1992) ; Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 1986) ; State v. Giles, No. CA–977, 1991 WL 271698, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1991) (unpublished opinion) (); State v. Heddrick, Nos. 57420–5–I, 57469–8–I, 2007 WL 2411354 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2007) (unpublished opinion); see also Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Being There: Constructive Denial of Counsel at a Competency Hearing as Structural Error under the Sixth Amendment, 56 S.D.L.Rev. 238, 242 (2011) (). We join these courts in holding that a competency hearing is a critical stage of a criminal prosecution.
¶ 18 However, the right to presence at critical stages is not absolute. Due process only requires a defendant's presence " ‘to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his [or her] absence.’ " Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) ). Due process does not require the defendant's presence when his or her presence would be useless. Luu, 841 P.2d at 273–75.
¶ 19 Further, the right to presence may be waived. In such instances, the trial court is responsible for ensuring that the defendant's waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–18 & n.24, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) ; Price, 240 P.3d at 560. However, defense counsel cannot waive a defendant's right to presence at critical stages of criminal proceedings. People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 511 (Colo. 1984).
¶ 20 Here, the trial court improperly allowed Wingfield's defense counsel to waive his right to presence at the October 11, 2007, competency hearing. The trial court made no efforts to ensure that Wingfield knew of his right to be present at the competency hearing and voluntarily waived it. See Price, 240 P.3d at 560 ().
¶ 21 However, although we conclude that competency hearings are critical stages of criminal proceedings, Wingfield has failed to show how his presence would have been useful to his defense. See Luu 841 P.2d at 275 .
¶ 22 A defendant is competent to stand trial or be sentenced if he or she is capable of understanding the nature and course of the proceedings against him or her, participating and assisting in the defense, and cooperating with defense counsel. People v. Corichi, 18 P.3d 807, 810 (Colo. App. 2000).
¶ 23 Wingfield asserts that, had he been present, his words and conduct would have demonstrated his incompetence. However, in Wingfield's subsequent court appearances, the trial court had ample opportunity to observe Wingfield and concluded that although he often rambled, he understood the court proceedings and was not incompetent.
¶ 24 Wingfield further argues that he could have assisted his counsel at the competency hearing. However, Wingfield himself argues that he was incompetent to proceed to trial, casting doubt on any useful role he could have played at the competency hearing and lessening the importance of his presence at that hearing. Further, Wingfield does not explain how he could have assisted his attorney at the competency hearing.
¶ 25 Therefore, the trial court did not violate Wingfield's constitutional rights by...
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