People v. Winslow

• Citation: 545 N.Y.S.2d 405,153 A.D.2d 965
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Leroy D. WINSLOW, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 14 September 1989
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 405

545 N.Y.S.2d 405

153 A.D.2d 965

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Leroy D. WINSLOW, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Sept. 14, 1989.

Dwyer & Dwyer (Paul F. Dwyer, of counsel), Albany, for appellant.

David A. Wait, Dist. Atty., Ballston Spa, for respondent.

Before KANE, J.P., and CASEY, MIKOLL, YESAWICH and HARVEY, JJ.

HARVEY, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Saratoga County (Williams, J.), rendered October 20, 1987, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of assault in the second degree and resisting arrest.

On July 10, 1986, Richard Crannell, Police Chief of the Village of Corinth, Saratoga County, was punched, kicked and allegedly threatened by defendant as Crannell attempted to execute a warrant for defendant's arrest. Crannell had been pursuing defendant for some time with his lights and sirens activated before defendant finally stopped outside his brother's residence beyond the Village limits. Police backup called by Crannell did not arrive until after the alleged assault upon Crannell occurred. As a result of these events, defendant was convicted after a jury trial of the crimes of assault in the second degree and resisting arrest. Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of 1 1/2 to 4 1/2 years on the assault conviction and one year on the resisting arrest conviction, the sentences to be served concurrently. This appeal by defendant ensued.

Initially, defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence introduced at trial to establish the crimes of assault in the second degree and resisting arrest. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, as we must (see, People v. Gemmill, 146 A.D.2d 951, 537 N.Y.S.2d 80), we cannot agree. First, in order to be convicted of assault in the second degree, the People were required to present proof that defendant intended to prevent Crannell from performing a lawful duty and that he caused physical injury to Crannell (see, Penal Law § 120.05[3]. Crannell's testimony that defendant attacked and injured him after he told him he had a warrant for his arrest adequately supported the proof required. A jury could reasonably infer from this testimony that defendant attacked Crannell in order to avoid being arrested (see, People v. Allah, 126 A.D.2d 778, 510 N.Y.S.2d 725, lv. denied, 69 N.Y.2d 876, 515 N.Y.S.2d 1023, 507 N.E.2d 1093; People v. Johnson, 115 A.D.2d 330, 495 N.Y.S.2d 847). The fact that defendant testified that Crannell initially attacked defendant without first telling him of the arrest warrant only provided a credibility question for the jury to decide (see, People v. Alhadi, 151 A.D.2d 873, 543 N.Y.S.2d 175).

Despite defendant's contentions otherwise, it is well settled that Penal Law § 120.05(3) does not require proof that the defendant intended to injure the police officer. Instead, it need only be shown that the defendant intended to prevent the officer from performing his duty (see, People v. Johnson, 115 A.D.2d 330, 331, 495 N.Y.S.2d 847, supra; People ex rel. Gray v. Tekben, 86 A.D.2d 176, 178, 449 N.Y.S.2d 276, aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d 651, 454 N.Y.S.2d 66, 439 N.E.2d 875). In view of the fact that County Court dismissed the first count of the indictment (violation of Penal Law § 120.05[1], defendant's contention that the People were required to prove intent to cause a serious physical injury is without merit. Instead, the People were only required to prove under Penal Law § 120.05(3) that Crannell had sustained a "physical injury" defined as "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain" (Penal Law § 10.00[9]. Here, Crannell sustained several injuries, including large bruises on his face and thigh, several cuts inside his mouth and a severe headache that lasted several days. He also suffered a blurring in his left eye that required repeated medical treatment. The jury found these injuries sufficient to sustain the assault conviction and we find no reason on this record to dispute that finding (see, People v. Williams, 112 A.D.2d 176, 177, 490 N.Y.S.2d 854; People v. Williams, 105 A.D.2d 465, 480 N.Y.S.2d 626; People v. Fife, 39 A.D.2d 780, 331 N.Y.S.2d 545).

Next, we similarly find no reason to disturb defendant's conviction for resisting arrest. Again, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we find adequate proof that defendant intentionally attempted to prevent Crannell from effectuating an authorized arrest of defendant (see, Penal Law § 205.30).

Defendant also contends that his conviction for resisting arrest should be reversed because the arrest warrant was defective, and for that reason the arrest was not "authorized" (Penal Law § 205.30). ^* We do not agree. The arrest warrant was based upon an information signed by a different police officer, David Howard, who personally viewed defendant operating a motor vehicle after he had previously learned that defendant's license was revoked. When that officer finally was able to stop defendant after a pursuit of several miles and requested to see his license, defendant refused and drove away. Howard then filed informations alleging upon personal knowledge that defendant violated various provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511[1][a]; § 1102). Based upon this information, there was ample basis for the subsequent issuance of the arrest warrant (see, Davis v. State of New York, 124 A.D.2d 420, 507 N.Y.S.2d 520) which was properly signed by the local Town Justice (CPL 100.40, 120.20). Althou...