People v. Woods, Cr. 17305

• Decision Date: 07 May 1970
• Docket Number: Cr. 17305
• Citation: 86 Cal.Rptr. 508,7 Cal.App.3d 382
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Anthony Eugene WOODS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 508

86 Cal.Rptr. 508

7 Cal.App.3d 382

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Anthony Eugene WOODS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 17305.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

May 7, 1970.

Kathleen J. Kirkland, Alhambra, for appellant under appointment by Court of Appeal.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Kenneth C. Young, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

LILLIE, Acting Presiding Justice.

The trial court found defendant guilty of possession of marijuana (§ 11530, Health & Saf. Code). He appeals from the judgment and order denying his motion to suppress the evidence under section 1538.5, Penal Code.

Three or four times during the two months prior to arrest Los Angeles Police Officers Celmer and Burke had received information from several reliable confidential informants ¹ that defendant 'was dealing heroin and marijuana from his residence on Butler Street in Compton' and kept large quantities of narcotics there, in his back yard and on his person; the night before the arrest the last informer gave Officer Celmer defendant's address as '15811 Butler Street in Compton,' and said he had purchased narcotics from him at those premises. Sergeant Burke told Officer Celmer that he had previously arrested defendant and knew he had served time for a federal violation (smuggling marijuana) and that he had also been present at a trial in Inglewood where he had been found guilty of possession of marijuana.

On September 19, 1968, Officers Celmer and Burke went to 15811 Butler Street, which is in the County of Los Angeles within the geographical limits of the Sheriff's office, Firestone Substation; there was a six-foot high fence around the back yard. From the second story of a church next door they watched through a window overlooking defendant's back yard. Shortly before noon Officer Burke observed defendant come out of an area next to the garage, walk out on the lawn in the back yard, for several minutes look around and in several directions, walk back toward the rear of the yard to the north side where there appeared to be a fence, some trash cans, a little dog house and some stacked up lumber, dig in soft dirt in that area, stand with a brown paper bag in his hand, remove something from the bag and put it in a white cardboard box, lay the box on the ground, bury the brown paper bag in the soft dirt, walk around the yard for a minute or two, then toward the side of the garage and disappear carrying the white carboard box. Officer Celmer saw defendant leave the rear door, walk to the corner of his back yard, bend over, place his hand beneath some rubble in the corner of the yard and remove a brown paper bag, stick his hand in the bag, remove an object, place it in a small bag lying in the back yard and walk into the house. Officer Celmer then proceeded to the front and Officer Burke to the back yard. As Officer Celmer approached the front door he met a man who told him he was there to repossess defendant's car; he identified himself, and the repossessor, upon being told by the officer he was going to the door to talk to defendant, asked if he could go too and talk to defendant because he wanted to find out about his car. The repossessor knocked first; defendant appeared at the window to the officer's left; defendant asked 'What do you guys want?' and there followed a conversation between defendant and the repossessor after which defendant said, 'Go away. I don't have any car.' Meanwhile Officer Celmer saw defendant point a gun at him, thus he then identified himself, displaying his badge and I.D., saying, 'I am a police officer, open the door; I want to talk to you'; defendant, still pointing the gun at the officer said, 'You are going to have to kick it down,' then moved away from the window and ran; Officer Celmer heard running to the back of the house, and kicked the front door down; as he did so he heard the toilet start to flush and found defendant in the bathroom next to the toilet with the revolver still pointed at him. He took the gun (which was loaded) away from defendant and arrested him for assault with a gun. Asked why he kicked the door in, the officer testified that defendant continued to point the gun at him after he identified himself as a police officer and he knew defendant was an ex-convict; he also had information defendant was dealing in narcotics and had a large quantity inside and outside the house and had just seen him go outside and remove a paper bag he had buried. A search of defendant's person revealed heroin and hashish and in a closet was found a sawed-off double-barreled shotgun; neither the narcotics nor the gun was admitted in evidence. In the back yard and from under soft dirt, Officer Burke removed a brown paper bag containing four plastic bags on marijuana, the only exhibit in evidence (Exh. 4).

Defendant neither testified nor presented a defense. His only contentions on appeal relate to the authority of the police officers to arrest him in county territory.

Appellant's first claim that the arresting officers acted outside their jurisdiction, thus their entry on the premises, his arrest and the search and seizure of marijuana were unlawful, is based on the asserted theory that since Officer Celmer was under the 'impression' that he arrested defendant in the City of Compton, the testimony of Deputy Rudolph that he gave permission to Officer Burke to work in county territory was untrue. Primarily this is a factual argument. It is undisputed, and defendant conceded in the court below, that while part of Butler Street is in the City of Compton, defendant's residence thereon is actually located in county territory and the arrest was made in the County of Los Angeles. Nothing in the record demonstrates that Officer Celmer was under the 'impression' that he arrested defendant in the City of Compton; his sole reference to 'Compton' related to what his informants had told him, i.e., that 'defendant was dealing heroin and marijuana from his residence on Butler Street in Compton' and that defendant lived 'at 15811 Butler Street in Compton.' Sergeant Burke testified that before going to the address he called first, the Compton Police Department and told Sergeant Schofield he was conducting a narcotic investigation on a dope peddler and asked him to accompany them but he said he was busy and could not; asked if they had his permission to work out there, Schofield said, 'Certainly'; that then he called Firestone Sheriff's Station and gave the same information to Deputy Rudolph, asked him to accompany them to Butler Street but Rudolph said he had to be in court, and then asked the deputy if they had his permission to work in the county and the deputy answered, 'Yes.' Deputy Rudolph testified that Sergeant Burke called him and said he had just called Sergeant Schofield and found out the address was in the county not in the City of Compton; that 15811 Butler is in county territory and that he gave Sergeant Burke permission to conduct a narcotic investigation at that address. From the foregoing the inference is reasonable that when Officers Celmer and Burke went to the premises and Celmer arrested defendant at his residence he knew the same to be located not in the City of Compton but in the County of Los Angeles. Finally, the conviction of defendant carries the implied finding of the trial judge that Officer Celmer knew the residence was in county territory and that he had permission to work therein; this finding is here conclusive. (People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 392, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202.)

Section 817, Penal Code, ² in effect at the time of arrest provided that 'The authority of a peace officer extends to any place in the state * * * (b) if he has the prior consent of * * * the sheriff or person authorized by him to give such consent if the place is...