People v. Wright
| Decision Date | 06 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | 12699/93 |
| Citation | 145 N.Y.S.3d 312,71 Misc.3d 964 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Jermaine WRIGHT, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney (Arieh Schulman of counsel), for plaintiff.
Robert C. Reuland, Esq., for defendant.
In October 1993, during a daytime party of some 50 to 100 teenagers in an apartment in Brooklyn, Jonathan Fields, 17 and armed with a gun, yelled, "Fuck that, don't nobody move because everybody is going to get wet," after which Jermaine Wright, 16, pulled out a gun and joined Fields in spraying the partyers with gunfire. In the living room, Wade Trotman, 19, grabbed two girls, threw them onto a sofa and jumped on top of them. He was shot; they were not. He expired before he reached the hospital. In the kitchen, a 15-year-old girl was shot in the back. Although she was treated in a hospital, a bullet remained lodged inside her, limiting her ability to engage in normal activities and causing her pain. She was expected to have the bullet inside her for life.
After their joint jury trial, both Fields and Wright were convicted of murder in the second degree on a theory of depraved indifference to human life, for the death of Wade Trotman, assault in the first degree, for the shooting of the girl, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
Wright (hereafter, "defendant") was sentenced to 25 years to life imprisonment on the murder conviction, a consecutive term of 5-to-15 years imprisonment on the assault conviction, and a concurrent term of 5-to-15 years imprisonment on the weapon conviction — effectively a sentence of 30 years to life imprisonment (Marrus, J.). 1 His judgment of conviction was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division ( People v. Wright , 236 A.D.2d 567, 654 N.Y.S.2d 637 [2d Dept. 1997] ). The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal ( People v. Wright , 90 N.Y.2d 899, 662 N.Y.S.2d 442, 685 N.E.2d 223 [1997]).
Defendant's criminal history at the time of these crimes included a juvenile delinquency adjudication for his having committed an assault in the second degree when, at the age of 13, he stabbed an 11-year-old in the stomach.
In 2003, while serving his sentence, defendant was convicted of yet another felony, attempted promoting prison contraband in the first degree, "after he was found to be in possession of a plexiglass shank" ( People v. Wright , 40 A.D.3d 1314, 836 N.Y.S.2d 368 [3d Dept. 2007] ). For this he was sentenced to another consecutive term of 1½ to 3 years prison. That conviction was also affirmed ( id. ).
Defendant is eligible for parole in April 2025 ( see http://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/ [last accessed Apr. 2, 2021]), when he will be 47 years old.
In September 2020, defendant filed the present motion, pro se , to set aside his sentence, claiming that it was "unauthorized, illegally imposed, or otherwise invalid as a matter of law" ( CPL § 440.20 [1] ). Defendant argued that the "Raise the Age" legislation ( see L 2017 ch 59 Part WWW, §§ 1-106; CPL Article 722), which, among other things, provides a defense of infancy to some 16- and 17-year-olds and changes the way some cases of other 16- and 17-year-olds are adjudicated, should be applied retroactively to him. The People opposed.
The Raise the Age legislation does not purport to affect sentences that were already final when the law became effective. 2 Nor does it alter the adjudication and punishment of murder in the second degree, which remains a felony for which a 16-year-old must be tried and sentenced as if he were an adult. 3 In other words, even if this ameliorative legislation had been in effect on the day of defendant's crimes, it would not have had the impact defendant says it has. Defendant would not have had recourse to the defense of infancy ( see PL § 30.00 [3] [a]). The charges against him would not have been subject to removal to Family Court ( see CPL § 722.23 ). And defendant would still have been subject to trial in Supreme Court with the same sentencing range that applies to an adult ( see PL § 60.10-a). Accordingly, to the extent that his motion relies on Raise the Age, it must be denied.
But the court cannot stop there, for in his pro se papers, defendant also presented an argument that merits more lengthy attention. He argued that society's view of the culpability of adolescents vis-à-vis adults has evolved to the point that his sentence may now be understood to violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Citing Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 [2012], which ruled that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for those under 18 at the time of their crimes contravenes the Eighth Amendment, defendant rhetorically, and also poignantly, asked:
Is the Defendant entitled to a hearing so that his youth may be taken into consideration in determining whether to leave his sentence for the felonies [for] which he was sentenced manditorily [ sic ] as an adult?
The Court of Appeals has previously ruled that a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment for a 17-year-old convicted of a drug sale does not run afoul of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause ( see People v. Thompson , 83 N.Y.2d 477, 611 N.Y.S.2d 470, 633 N.E.2d 1074 [1994] ). Specifically: an " older adolescent['s] youth was alone insufficient to establish gross disproportionality for constitutional purposes" ( id. at 485, 611 N.Y.S.2d 470, 633 N.E.2d 1074 [emphasis supplied]).
From Thompson , this court might easily infer that the sentencing scheme upheld there could not be cruel or unusual as applied here to an older adolescent's conviction for murder. But to assure that defendant's argument was fully explored, particularly inasmuch as Thompson predated Miller by 18 years and might therefore not sufficiently reflect "contemporary standards of decency" ( id. ), this court assigned defendant an attorney for this motion. Counsel has made a submission, to which the People have responded.
Arguments akin to defendant's have been considered and rejected by courts of coordinate jurisdiction in other cases involving 16- and 17-year-olds whose sentences were imposed, as here, for multiple felonies with minimum terms that ran consecutively and with maximum terms of life imprisonment ( see PL §§ 70.00 [2], [3] [a] [1]; 70.25; 70.30). 4
For example, in People v. Matias , 68 Misc. 3d 352, 123 N.Y.S.3d 792 [Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. 2020] and People v. Aponte , 42 Misc. 3d 868, 981 N.Y.S.2d 902 [Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. 2013], the courts reviewed the sentences of defendants who were 16 (Matias) and 17 (Aponte) at the time of their crimes and who had been sentenced to a minimum term of 50 years and 42½ years, respectively, up to a maximum of life in prison. 5 In both cases, the courts concluded that each defendant had been afforded a particularized sentencing determination that had considered his individual characteristics, including his youth, and that his sentence was not disproportionate to or incommensurate with his crimes. Both Matias and Aponte therefore rejected challenges under Miller .
Two observations of the Matias court are particularly worth highlighting. First, because Matias would be eligible for release when he was 66 years old, he was not serving a life sentence ( accord People v Ruffin , Sup Ct, Oneida County, Dec 1, 2015, Dwyer, J., indictment No. 09-127, slip op at 13 []). Second, the laws under which he had been sentenced had allowed for discretion on the part of the judge and therefore attention to his youth. As such, his sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment, as understood by Miller , because it was not a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment ( see Matias , 68 Misc. 3d at 363-65, 123 N.Y.S.3d 792 ).
In People v. Lora , 70 Misc. 3d 181, 133 N.Y.S.3d 412 [Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2020], another court of coordinate jurisdiction did, however, find that a 17-year-old's combined sentences totaling 83? years to life imprisonment (based on an aggregate sentence of 58? years to life imprisonment comprised of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life and another of 8? to 25 years and another consecutive sentence of 25 years to life) were tantamount to life without parole. Notwithstanding that the sentencing laws under which Lora had been sentenced also allowed for discretion by the courts that had sentenced him, the CPL § 440 court found that the record was not "unequivocal[ ]" as to whether the "sentencing courts considered his youth, and its attendant circumstances, when they imposed sentence." Lora therefore ordered a Miller hearing to determine whether the "diminished culpability" and "heightened capacity for change" implied by Lora's youth required resentencing him ( id. at 193-94, 197, 133 N.Y.S.3d 412 ). After conducting that hearing, the court ruled that defendant's first sentence, "58? years of imprisonment, is appropriate for the crimes herein and is not tantamount to a life sentence," thereby rejecting the Miller challenge ( People v. Lora , 71 Misc. 3d 221, 140 N.Y.S.3d 390, 395 [Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2021] [hereafter, " Lora II "]). But as to the second consecutive sentence of 25 years imprisonment, which Lora would begin to serve when he was 75 years old, the court held that the "aggregate sentence is a de facto life sentence without the possibility of parole," and, because the court could not "conclude that the second sentencing court engaged in the proper analysis," resentencing was required ( id. ).
No appellate court has specifically instructed when (if ever) a Miller hearing would be necessary on a CPL § 440.20 motion to set aside a 16- or 17-year-old's murder sentence where the sentencing laws did not require a sentence of life without the possibility of...
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