People v. Wright
| Citation | 429 N.Y.S.2d 993,104 Misc.2d 911 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Charles WRIGHT, Defendant. |
| Decision Date | 24 June 1980 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (New York) |
Leon B. Polsky, New York City (Helen Sadow, of counsel), for the defendant at trial and amicus curiae at the persistent felony offender hearing.
Charles Wright, pro se, at the hearing.
The primary legal question in this highly publicized case is the constitutionality of section 400.20(5) of the Criminal Procedure Law, which expressly permits a court to consider evidence which would not be admissible at a trial as a factor in determining whether to sentence a defendant to life imprisonment as a persistent felony offender.
The persistent felony offender statute (Penal Law § 70.10) authorizes a term of imprisonment of a minimum of 15-25 years and a maximum of life in cases where the defendant has two prior felony convictions and the court "is of the opinion that the history and character of the defendant and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct are such that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision of the defendant are warranted to best serve the public interest." It is purely a matter of discretion whether or not to give the increased sentence to the defendant.
Specially at issue is whether confessions obtained in violation of Miranda to two murders for which defendant was never brought to trial can be considered by the court in a persistent felony offender proceeding as evidence of defendant's history and character that would warrant extended incarceration.
Since this proceeding involves complicated questions of constitutional law combined with highly discretionary findings, I believe it appropriate to recount the extensive history of this case.
The defendant was indicted in 1978 for attempted murder and assault in the first degree in that he stabbed a woman in the chest in an elevator in a building in the Washington Heights section of New York County.
During plea bargaining discussion before Justice James Leff, the defendant was offered a sentence of 71/2-15 years consecutive to a substantial amount of time he owed on a prior felony conviction. At the time of the plea offer Justice Leff was aware of the defendant's two prior felony convictions but was not aware of two murders allegedly committed by the defendant. The offer was rejected by the defendant and the case was assigned to Justice Morris Schwalb for trial. Over the strenuous objection of the District Attorney, Justice Schwalb agreed to sentence the defendant to 121/2 to 25 years concurrent with the time owed by the Judge Schwalb's proposed sentence was severely criticized, not only by the District Attorney, but in a number of newspapers. Prior to sentence the District Attorney filed a request for a persistent felony offender hearing and such a hearing was ordered by Judge Schwalb. During the hearing the allegations relating to the two murders allegedly committed by the defendant were litigated, and after the hearing the court found the defendant to be a persistent felony offender. As the original sentence promise could not be kept, the plea was vacated and the case scheduled for trial.
defendant, and the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder, based upon the sentence promise. That the District Attorney should not interpose an objection to a 71/2-15 year sentence (proposed by Justice Leff) but decry a 121/2-25 year sentence (promised by Justice Schwalb) may seem strange but in actuality reflects the anomalous state of the law at that time whereby a 121/2-25 year sentence concurrent with the time owed would result in a sentence substantially less than a 71/2-15 year sentence consecutive to the time owed.
The first trial of the indictment before Justice Morris Goldman ended in a hung jury, but on October 11, 1979, after a retrial before this court, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of assault in the first degree, a Class "C" felony ordinarily carrying a maximum sentence of 5-15 years for a first felony offender and 71/2-15 years for a predicate felony offender. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the attempted murder charge.
Following the conviction, a hearing was ordered pursuant to CPL 400.20 to determine whether Charles Wright should be sentenced as a persistent felony offender.
Preliminarily two issues, one raised by the People and one by the defendant, should be ruled upon.
The People contend that Judge Schwalb's finding that the defendant is a persistent felony offender should bind this court on the doctrine of "the law of the case". The People claim that Judge Schwalb found that defendant had in fact been constitutionally convicted of felonies on two prior occasions and that "defendant's background and character are such that he should be sentenced as a persistent felony offender." I agree that "a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction . . . ordinarily should not disregard an earlier decision on the same question in the same case." (Walker v. Gerli, 257 App.Div. 249, 251, 12 N.Y.S.2d 942, 944 (1st Dept. 1939); see also United States v. United States Smelting Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198, 70 S.Ct. 537, 544, 94 L.Ed. 750 (1949) (dictum); Martin v. Cohoes, 37 N.Y.2d 162, 165, 371 N.Y.S.2d 687, 332 N.E.2d 867 (1975).)
I hold that the finding by Judge Schwalb that the defendant has two prior felonies constitutionally obtained is binding on this court, since that is a pure legal determination; but I do not agree that I am bound by the finding that the defendant is a persistent felony offender. That determination is purely discretionary on the part of the sentencing court and may not be based on another judge's decision. Further, the key issue in this case, i. e., the constitutionality of the use of confessions, was not litigated before Judge Schwalb by either party; rather it was brought to the attention of the parties by this court sua sponte. The rule of the "law of the case" is a sound one, but should apply to legal rulings rather than discretionary findings.
The second issue, raised by the defendant, is that the sentence promise given by Judge Schwalb should be enforced since it was not kept solely because ". . . the People exerted unethical pressure on the court by exposing the defendant's case and background to the news media. It was the news media involvement in this case that persuaded Mr. Justice Morris Schwalb to reconsider his position on a sentence promise The defendant's contention is rejected. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Judge Schwalb's change of view was dictated by anything other than the extensive testimony before him at the hearing. The hearing unearthed material which was not known to him at the time of the plea negotiation and justified the change of position (see People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 318 N.E.2d 784 (1974), cert. den. 419 U.S. 1122, 95 S.Ct. 806, 42 L.Ed.2d 822 (1975)). Obviously no court should change its determination solely because what it believes to be an appropriate ruling is criticized by the press, prosecutor, or public. (See Matter of Fernandez v. Silbowitz, 59 A.D.2d 837, 399 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1977).) On the other hand, if criticism is justified it would be equally improper to stubbornly adhere to an inappropriate ruling solely to manifest judicial machismo.
made to this defendant in April 1979, because the People 'dislike' the sentence promise negotiated from that Court by this defendant." (Defendant pro se p. 3, May 28, 1980 submission.)
Charles Wright's criminal history dates back to June 3, 1960, when he pleaded guilty in the Court of General Sessions, New York County, at the age of sixteen, to attempted assault in the second degree. The basis for that conviction was the stabbing of thirty-four-year-old Thelma McDowell on February 19, 1960, in her apartment building at 560 West 151 Street at 11:30 p. m. The defendant was arrested and admitted his guilt, stating that he had had an urge to stab a woman. He was denied Youthful Offender treatment and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment, serving four years before being paroled on September 14, 1964.
Shortly thereafter in January of 1965, there began a "reign of terror" in the Washington Heights neighborhood. On January 9, 1965, the body of forty-one-year-old Gertrude Mason was found in the elevator of her apartment building at 47 Fort Washington Avenue. She had been stabbed eighteen times and was stripped from the waist down.
On February 14, 1965, at about 11:00 p. m., thirty-seven-year-old Annie Wallace was the victim of an attempted rape in the elevator of her apartment building at 628 West 151 Street.
On February 19, 1965, at approximately 1:00 a. m., fifty-year-old Sylvia Mondejar was grabbed in the elevator of her building at 564 West 160 Street and taken to the roof where she was raped.
On March 12, 1965, at about midnight, Geraldine Linder was assaulted in the hallway of her apartment building at 762 Riverside Drive.
The description given by the victims of the assailant was similar: a trim, light-skinned, young black man who was extremely neat and soft-spoken and who walked with a mild bounce. On the basis of their descriptions, a police sketch was drawn and circulated.
On May 21, 1965, at approximately 3:25 a. m., the body of Pauline Lubetsky was found stabbed to death in the sixth floor hallway of her building at 600 West 162 Street. She had been stabbed thirty-two times and was nude except for a brassiere. A trail of blood led from the elevator into the hallway where the body was found.
On June 1, 1965, Charles Wright was picked up as...
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