People v. Wytcherly

• Decision Date: 23 November 1988
• Docket Number: Docket No. 94371
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stephen Jay WYTCHERLY, Defendant-Appellant. 172 Mich.App. 213, 431 N.W.2d 463
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 463

431 N.W.2d 463

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stephen Jay WYTCHERLY, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 94371.

172 Mich.App. 213, 431 N.W.2d 463

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 2, 1988.

Decided Oct. 17, 1988.

Released for Publication Nov. 23, 1988.

[172 MICHAPP 215] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Harold F. Closz, III, Pros. Atty., and Judith K. Simonson, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

State Appellate Defender by F. Michael Schuck, for defendant-appellant on appeal.

Before SULLIVAN, P.J., and MacKENZIE and SCHNELZ, ^* JJ.

[172 MICHAPP 216] SCHNELZ, Judge.

Defendant was convicted after a jury trial in Muskegon Circuit Court of assault with intent to commit murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.83; M.S.A. Sec. 28.278, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. Sec. 750.227b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(2). He subsequently pled guilty to being an habitual offender, fourth offense, M.C.L. Sec. 769.12; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1084. Defendant was sentenced to 50 to 250 years' imprisonment for the assault conviction, to be served consecutive to the mandatory two-year sentence for the felony-firearm conviction. He appeals as of right from his conviction and sentence. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

The charges giving rise to defendant's conviction arose from a December 30, 1985, shooting incident involving defendant and Muskegon County Sheriff's Detective Ernest Heikkila. Detective Heikkila had questioned defendant about a breaking and entering case on two occasions prior to the shooting, and was attempting to arrest defendant on the day of the shooting. Heikkila testified that, while waiting for another deputy to assist him in executing the arrest warrant, he saw defendant and a female companion leave the building where defendant was staying and get into a car parked on a lot adjacent to the building. Heikkila approached the car from the rear, and was noticed by defendant, who squirmed around in the passenger seat. Heikkila drew his gun, because he thought defendant was either trying to hide a gun or get to one in the car. Defendant got out of the car, fired twice at Heikkila, and jumped back into the car. Heikkila fired through the back window of the car two or three times. Defendant came out of the car again, and Heikkila fired one more shot at him. Heikkila was hit in the lower abdomen at some point during the exchange of fire.

Defendant asserted at trial that he fired his gun [172 MICHAPP 217] in self-defense after Heikkila shot at him first. After getting into the car and rubbing his coat to create some heat, he looked out the back window and saw Heikkila pointing a gun at him. He saw the back window "crystallize," ducked out the passenger door, and drew his gun, firing four or five times. Heikkila fired six times, hitting defendant in the head, chest and arm. Defendant denied any intent to kill Heikkila. He further testified that he was afraid of Heikkila prior to the shooting because the detective had threatened to "burn your ass good" after their second meeting.

On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal when it made improper ex parte communications to the jury and in declining the jury's requests to review certain testimony. We agree.

During deliberations, the jury sent the trial judge a note indicating, "We are down to two people from reaching a total agreement. We would welcome any input concerning this decision process. We feel we haven't enough info. Would you reply?" The trial judge responded by writing, "Keep working." This note was sent back into the jury room, presumably with the court clerk. Although there is no record of what occurred, it is undisputed that neither defendant nor his counsel were present in chambers or in the jury room to observe or approve of the communication.

Our Supreme Court has established a strict rule prohibiting communication with a deliberating jury outside of the courtroom and outside of the presence of counsel. See People v. Cain, 409 Mich. 858, 294 N.W.2d 692 (1980), reversing 94 Mich.App. 644, 288 N.W.2d 465 (1980); Zaitzeff v. Raschke, 387 Mich. 577, 579, 198 N.W.2d 309 (1972); People v. Kangas, 366 Mich. 201, 206-207, 113 N.W.2d 865 (1962). Such communications or instructions by the court to the jury, [172 MICHAPP 218] in the absence of the parties or their counsel, are grounds for a new trial regardless of whether the communications or instructions were prejudicial. Kangas, supra. In People v. Lyons, 164 Mich.App. 307, 416 N.W.2d 422 (1987), this Court granted a new trial where the trial judge, without consulting the parties, told the jury to "keep on working" after receiving a note that the jury could not reach a decision.

We find the present case to be indistinguishable from People v. Lyons, supra, and the cases cited above. Here, the trial judge communicated with the jury concerning its deliberations outside the presence of defendant or his counsel. The communication intruded upon the absolute sanctity of the jury's deliberation, thereby resulting in error requiring reversal.

We also note that the trial judge's negative response to a second jury note stating, "Would it be possible to see and review the transcripts used to varify [sic] testimonies" was error. Although the judge's response was correct to the extent that the jury sought information from improper sources, the judge foreclosed the proper alternative of reading back to the jury portions of the trial transcript. Although discretionary, requests for reading should normally be granted absent unusual circumstances. People v. Howe, 392 Mich. 670, 675-676, 221 N.W.2d 350 (1974). Here, we find no unusual circumstances which would justify the court's refusal to have part of the trial transcript read back to the jury. After consulting with the parties, the court should have informed the jury of this possibility.

We now consider those remaining issues raised by defendant which may arise on retrial.

Defendant argues that the circuit court erred in determining that statements made by defendant to [172 MICHAPP 219] the police from his hospital bed were voluntary. Defendant was questioned by a police officer in the hospital approximately eighteen hours after he returned from surgery. The officer was accompanied by two additional officers and a prosecutor. Before answering questions, defendant was given warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Defendant answered some questions, but when asked whether he intended to kill Detective Heikkila, defendant stated, "It's too incriminating to answer that without legal representation." At this point, the questioning ceased. The interview lasted between five and ten minutes.

We find that, because defendant's statements were admissions of fact, rather than a confession of guilt, no finding of voluntariness by the trial court was necessary. An admission of fact is distinguished from a confession of guilt in that an admission does not by itself show guilt in the absence of proof of other facts not admitted by the defendant. People v. Porter, 269 Mich. 284, 290, 257 N.W. 705 (1934). There is no need for a determination of voluntariness pursuant to People v. Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965), unless the defendant has confessed. People v. Drielick, 56 Mich.App. 664, 667, 224 N.W.2d 712 (1974), aff'd. 400 Mich. 559, 255 N.W.2d 619 (1977). Here, defendant's statements to the police did not indicate his guilt of the charged offense absent facts disproving his defense of self-defense. Defendant's statements were admissible at trial for impeachment purposes without a prior determination of voluntariness. See also People v. Claybon, 124 Mich.App. 385, 399, 335 N.W.2d 493 (1983).

Defendant also argues that a pretrial motion for a change of venue should have been granted. We disagree. Defendant's pretrial motion for a change [172 MICHAPP 220] of venue was based on a single newspaper article appearing about six weeks before trial in the Muskegon Chronicle. On appeal, this Court will review based on the totality of the circumstances, including the content of news accounts and the voir dire examination transcript. People v. Duby, 120 Mich.App. 241, 246-247, 327 N.W.2d 455 (1982). Upon a review of the newspaper account and the voir dire transcript, we find that defendant has not met his burden of showing actual jury prejudice or an atmosphere surrounding the trial such as to create a probability of prejudice. See People v. Bloom, 15 Mich.App. 463, 468-469, 166 N.W.2d 691 (1969), lv. den. 382 Mich. 770 (1969). Nor has defendant shown preconceived notions of guilt by the jurors resulting from actual prejudice, strong community feeling or a pattern of deep and bitter...