People v. Yarger

• Decision Date: 06 April 1992
• Docket Number: Docket No. 114287
• Citation: 485 N.W.2d 119,193 Mich.App. 532
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph Thomas YARGER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 119

485 N.W.2d 119

193 Mich.App. 532

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph Thomas YARGER, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 114287.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 8, 1992, at Lansing.

Decided April 6, 1992, at 10:30 a.m.

Released for Publication June 22, 1992.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., Norman W. Donker, Pros. Atty., and J. Dee Brooks and Stephen E. Durance, Asst. Pros. Attys., for the People.

State Appellate Defender by Norris J. Thomas, Jr., Chief Deputy Director, and Penny R. Beardslee, Sp. Asst. Defender, for defendant-appellant on appeal.

Before SULLIVAN, P.J., and WAHLS and FITZGERALD, ^* JJ.

WAHLS, Judge.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520d(1)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(4)(1)(a), and pleaded guilty of being an habitual offender, second offense, M.C.L. Sec. 769.10; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1082. He was later sentenced to a term of eight to fifteen years' imprisonment, and now brings this appeal as of right. Of the numerous allegations of error that defendant argues on appeal, we find that one is meritorious and requires that his conviction be reversed.

I

Defendant was charged in a single-count information that alleged, in part, that defendant, "on or about between September 23rd and October 22nd, 1985 ... did engage in sexual penetration with another person, to-wit: [the complainant], age 15 years, said person being at least 13 years of age, but under 16 years of age contrary to the law." The complainant was a friend of defendant's daughter, Sally, and had developed an intimate relationship with him. At trial, which was essentially a contest of credibility, Sally recounted two incidents involving the complainant and defendant that occurred before the charged conduct and involved kissing and touching. The complainant testified that, one night in the fall of 1985, she had consensually performed fellatio on defendant at his family's home, after which defendant penetrated her vagina with his penis. The complainant's testimony regarding the second penetration was somewhat contradictory to her testimony at the preliminary examination, at which she had stated that she and defendant "had intercourse," but that "nothing went inside" her and that defendant placed his penis "by" her vagina. Defendant impeached the complainant with this prior testimony, and also with evidence of prior false accusations of rape and her earlier denials that any impropriety had occurred between them. Defendant denied that any act of sexual penetration had ever occurred.

The jury was given the following instructions regarding the first element of the offense and the need for a unanimous verdict:

[The Court ]: First, that the defendant engaged in a sexual act which involved some actual entry into the genital opening of the complainant's body. And in this case it is alleged that the sexual act was committed by the penetration into the complainant's body, specifically, the defendant placing his penis into the vagina of the complainant.

The first element can also be met--and this is in either situation. The prosecution doesn't have to prove both of these. He only need prove one of these. The one I just indicated and, secondly, that the defendant engaged in an oral sexual act with the complainant, that is, the touching between the mouth of one party and sex organs of the other. 1 In this case, it's specifically alleged that the sexual act was the touching of the mouth of the complainant with the penis of the defendant.

So either of those two sexual acts, if you find them from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, would meet the first element under the statute.

* * * * * *

A verdict in a criminal case must be unanimous. In order to return a verdict, all 12 jurors must agree on that verdict.

* * * * * *

There are two possible verdicts in this case. There is one criminal charge. The criminal charge is criminal sexual conduct in the third degree, and the possible verdicts are guilty of criminal sexual conduct or not guilty.

After the jury began its deliberations, it requested further instructions regarding the definition of reasonable doubt. The additional instructions were given, and the jury resumed its deliberations. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Although the jury was polled, the jurors were not asked to state which acts they believed were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

II

Defendant first claims that the information improperly charged him with only one act of sexual penetration. We disagree. The information comported with the evidence brought out at the preliminary examination. People v. Stricklin, 162 Mich.App. 623, 633, 413 N.W.2d 457 (1987). Defendant did not request that the trial court amend the information after the prosecutor's proofs or request that an appropriate jury instruction be given. Id. This argument is therefore not preserved for appellate review, People v. Charles Wilson, 27 Mich.App. 171, 174, 183 N.W.2d 368 (1970), and, in any event, the alleged error did not prevent defendant from defending against a second act of penetration, Stricklin, supra.

Defendant's second argument is more troubling, however. Defendant also claims that the jury instructions that were given suggest the possibility that his conviction was not the result of a unanimous jury verdict. We agree. Although defendant failed to object to the jury instructions, we may still review this argument if our failure to do so would result in manifest injustice. People v. Crawford, 187 Mich.App. 344, 352, 467 N.W.2d 818 (1991). We agree with defendant that, in light of the quantum and nature of the evidence produced against him, there is at least a possibility that manifest injustice would result if we declined to review this argument.

The complainant's trial testimony, if accepted as true, would have supported two separate convictions of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, each based on a separate sexual penetration. See People v. Dowdy, 148 Mich.App. 517, 384 N.W.2d 820 (1986). The jury instructions allowed the jury to convict defendant on the single sexual penetration charge if it believed that the evidence proved either penetration, or both, beyond a reasonable doubt. While we find nothing objectionable in the instruction itself, because only a single count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct was submitted to the jury, error occurred when the jury was not instructed that it must unanimously agree on which act(s) was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, a possibility exists that, for example, six jurors were convinced that fellatio had occurred, but not intercourse, while the other six jurors held the opposite view.

Unless waived by a defendant, the right to a jury trial includes the right to a unanimous verdict. People v. Burden, 395 Mich. 462, 468, 236 N.W.2d 505 (1975) (opinion by Kavanagh, C.J.); People v. Miller, 121 Mich.App. 691, 329 N.W.2d 460 (1982). In this case, we find it impossible to discern of which act of penetration defendant was found guilty. This problem has been previously alluded to in dicta by this Court. People v. Pottruff, 116 Mich.App. 367, 375-376, 323 N.W.2d 402 (1982). See also People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305, 326-329 (1858), and People v. Thorp, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided March 7, 1991, (Docket No. 112554). We now conclude that the error requires that defendant's conviction be reversed. If this case is retried, defendant should either be charged with two separate counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct or else an appropriate instruction should be given to the jury. Finally, People v. Johnson, 187 Mich.App. 621, 468 N.W.2d 307 (1991), does not compel a contrary result. Unlike Johnson, the proofs in this case do not involve a single offense that could be committed by alternative means, but rather two distinct offenses, each alleged to have been committed by an alternative method.

III

The trial court's decision regarding the admissability of evidence of four allegedly false prior accusations of rape by the complainant was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court allowed into evidence two prior accusations in which the complainant had initially told the authorities that she had been molested by her cousin and her uncle, but had later recanted while under oath in a court proceeding. We agree with the trial court that defendant's offer of proof with regard to the two other incidents was insufficient to show that those accusations were false. People v. Hackett, 421 Mich. 338, 348-351, 365 N.W.2d 120 (1984); People v. Mikula, 84 Mich.App. 108, 115-116, 269 N.W.2d 195 (1978). The bare facts that one of the subjects of an accusation was not bound over for trial and that no...