People v. Yates

• Decision Date: 23 July 2018
• Docket Number: B279863
• Citation: 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 756,25 Cal.App.5th 474
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David YATES, Defendant and Appellant.

25 Cal.App.5th 474

235 Cal.Rptr.3d 756

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.David YATES, Defendant and Appellant.

B279863

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Filed July 23, 2018

Rudy G. Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Steven E. Mercer, and Corey J. Robins, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

LUI, P.J.

This case presents the following issue: May an expert relate as true the case-specific content of documents which were neither admitted into evidence nor shown to be covered by a hearsay exception? We conclude under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 684–686, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102, 374 P.3d 320 ( Sanchez ), that such testimony is inadmissible.

A jury found David Yates (Yates) to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (the SVP Act or the Act). ( Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq. )¹ Yates contends the jury’s finding must be overturned because the trial court committed numerous prejudicial errors under Sanchez , including erroneously permitting the experts to testify to a massive amount of inadmissible case-specific hearsay. We agree that the trial court misapplied Sanchez and erroneously allowed the People’s experts to relate as true case-specific facts contained in hearsay statements, which were not covered by a hearsay exception or independently proven by competent evidence. ( Sanchez , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 686, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102, 374 P.3d 320.) Because that testimony was prejudicial, we reverse.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 21, 2011, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a petition to commit Yates as a sexually violent predator under the SVP Act. The trial court found probable cause to hold Yates over for trial, and a jury trial commenced on November 8, 2016. The jury returned a verdict finding Yates to be a sexually violent predator as alleged in the petition. The trial court ordered him committed to the California Department of Mental Health for an indeterminate term.

DISCUSSION

I. The SVP Act

The SVP Act allows for the involuntary civil commitment of certain offenders following the completion of their prison terms who are found to be sexually violent predators. ( People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 984, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 861, 62 P.3d 97 ( Roberge ).) An alleged SVP is entitled to a jury trial, at which the People must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the person has suffered a conviction of at least one qualifying "sexually violent offense," (2) the person has "a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others," and (3) the mental disorder makes it likely the person will engage in future predatory acts of sexually violent criminal behavior if released from custody. ( §§ 6600, 6603, 6604 ; People v. Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th 109, 126, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 774, 331 P.3d 147 ; People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1185, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 427, 223 P.3d 566.)

Under section 6600, subdivision (a)(3), the People may prove the first element—the existence and details underlying the commission of the predicate offense(s)—"by introducing ‘documentary evidence, including, but not limited to, preliminary hearing transcripts, trial transcripts, probation and sentencing reports, and evaluations by the State Department of State Hospitals.’ "² ( People v. Burroughs (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 378, 403, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 656 ( Burroughs ); Roa , supra , 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 443, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 604.) The Act thus contains a broad hearsay exception for the documentary evidence described in the statute as well as for the multiple-level hearsay statements contained in such documents in order "to relieve victims of the burden and trauma of testifying about the details of the crimes underlying the prior convictions," which may have occurred many years in the past. ( People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 208, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 327, 26 P.3d 1061 ( Otto ); Roa , supra , at pp. 443–444, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 604.)

The Act defines the diagnosed mental disorder required for the second element as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the person a menace to the health and safety of others." ( § 6600, subd. (c) ; Roa , supra , 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 444, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 604.) To establish this element, the People will have one or more experts evaluate the person, review documentary evidence (such as state hospital records, police and probation reports, and prison records), and render a diagnosis. ( § 6603, subd. (c)(1) ; Roa , supra , at pp. 444–445, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 604.) This process may be repeated multiple times over several years in order to satisfy the requirement that, at the time of trial, the person has "a currently diagnosed mental disorder." ( § 6600, subd. (a)(3) ; see People v. Landau (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1, 26, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [an SVP case "requires a current mental condition"].)

For the third element, the People must show that, if released, the alleged SVP will likely engage in sexually violent criminal behavior due to the diagnosed mental disorder. ( § 6600, subd. (a)(3) ; People v. Shazier , supra , 60 Cal.4th at p. 126, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 774, 331 P.3d 147.) The Act requires proof of a clear link between the second and third elements; that is, the finding of future dangerousness must be shown to derive from "a currently diagnosed mental disorder characterized by the inability to control dangerous sexual behavior." ( Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1158, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584 ; People v. White (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 433, 448, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 1.) Again, in the SVP trial the People will present expert testimony—usually based on diagnostic tools that predict future violent sexual behavior—to establish the alleged SVP’s dangerousness and likelihood to reoffend. ( Roa , supra , 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 445, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 604.)

II. The Relevant Background

A. Pretrial proceedings

Prior to trial, Yates’s counsel filed a motion in limine under Sanchez to preclude the People’s experts from relating to the jury as the basis for their opinions the contents of state hospital records, the opinions and conclusions of non-testifying experts including hospital staff, hearsay statements regarding other allegations of criminal conduct by Yates, and hearsay information relating to a parole violation. At the hearing on Yates’s motion, the trial court inquired about the People’s anticipated expert testimony in this case. The district attorney responded that she intended to elicit testimony from her experts limited to material that would be presented under section 6600, subdivision (a), the business or official records exception to the hearsay rule, and matters that arose from the experts’ own conversations with Yates.

The prosecutor argued that the hospital records that had been subpoenaed were business records and their content was admissible. Defense counsel responded that the hospital records were extremely voluminous and may not all qualify for admission under the business or official records exception. The court indicated it was uncertain about the extent to which multiple layers of hearsay could be admitted simply because it "happened to be in a business record," but noted, "We’re talking in a vacuum generally. But if it comes up, counsel, I’m sure you’ll object." The trial court and parties then moved on to discuss other evidentiary issues, and the court never clearly ruled on the admissibility of the documents or the permissible scope of the expert testimony under Sanchez . During trial, the People did not establish that any of appellant’s records from which the experts had obtained their information were covered by a specific hearsay exception.

B. Expert testimony at trial

The People called two licensed psychologists to testify as expert witnesses in Yates’s SVP trial: Dr. Wesley Maram and Dr. Douglas Korpi. Both experts opined that Yates qualifies as a sexually violent predator based on interviews with him, his scores on sex offender risk assessments, and the experts’ review of his extensive state hospital file and criminal and juvenile records going back over 40 years.

Dr. Maram

Dr. Maram testified that appellant was convicted of four qualifying offenses when he was 18 years old in 1982, including two counts of oral copulation by force and two counts of sodomy by force against a 16-year-old boy. The expert described the details of the incident and opined that the crimes qualified under California law as sexually violent offenses. Appellant was convicted, served part of an eight-year prison sentence, and was paroled. According to appellant’s criminal records, he violated parole by hitting a woman over the head with a bat. Dr. Maram also described the details of a 1988 qualifying offense in which appellant forced oral copulation and sodomized a 13-year-old boy when appellant was 24. Appellant was sentenced to prison for 21 years for that offense. Dr. Maram reported that appellant threatened his victims on both occasions with a knife. The expert then summarized details of appellant’s social history and other criminal offenses, including the facts underlying a sustained juvenile petition which alleged appellant had forced oral copulation and sodomized two nine-year-old boys. Dr. Maram also informed the jury that Yates’s other criminal history includes "burglary and one or two thefts."

Dr. Maram diagnosed appellant with "pedophilic disorder," defined as "intense and persistent[ly] occurring sexually arousing fantasies and behaviors towards [prepubescent] children generally under age 14." He founded this diagnosis on appellant’s "young history of molesting children"...