People v. Yeadon
| Decision Date | 26 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 15CA1811 |
| Citation | 468 P.3d 50 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gerald Adrian YEADON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Inga K. Nelson, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by JUDGE FURMAN
¶ 1 A jury found Gerald Adrian Yeadon guilty of driving under restraint, failure to report an accident or return to the scene, and possession of less than two grams of a controlled substance—methamphetamine.
The district court sentenced Yeadon to sixteen months in the custody of the Department of Corrections and eleven days later imposed a drug offender surcharge of $1250.
¶ 2 On appeal, Yeadon contends that (1) the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession; (2) certain statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument constituted misconduct; and (3) the district court's late imposition of the drug offender surcharge violated his right against double jeopardy. Because we disagree with each of Yeadon's contentions, we affirm his judgment of conviction and sentence, but we remand for the district court to give Yeadon the opportunity to show that he is financially unable to pay any portion of the surcharge. See § 18-19-103(6)(b), C.R.S. 2017.
¶ 3 The jury heard the following evidence. One morning, police officers responded to a report of a rollover crash involving a 2007 Pontiac G6. The driver had abandoned the Pontiac in a field along a highway. A search of the vehicle identification number revealed that the car had been reported stolen about two weeks earlier. The officers did not find a set of keys in the car, and the vehicle's steering column did not appear to have been hot-wired.
¶ 4 The officers concluded that, earlier that morning, the Pontiac left the highway while traveling northbound and rolled over twice before coming to a rest. An officer testified that, based on the tire marks, the vehicle had been "partially airborne and traveling at a high rate of speed." The officer noted that only the driver's side airbag had deployed.
¶ 5 Inside the Pontiac, the officers observed, among other things, a scale on the front passenger seat used to measure, in grams, very small quantities; and a smaller baggie in a compartment of the driver's side door, which contained a substance later confirmed to be 0.46 grams of methamphetamine.
¶ 6 An officer also found a black toiletry bag near the rear of the vehicle that contained a pawn receipt with Yeadon's name and birthdate on it.
¶ 7 The investigating detective testified that the small baggie of methamphetamine in the driver's side door compartment was "open to view upon approach" of the vehicle. Although the prosecutor presented a photograph of the driver's side door compartment to the jury, the small baggie of methamphetamine had already been removed at the time the picture was taken.
¶ 8 The detective testified that he recovered the driver's side airbag, a baseball hat, and gloves from the back seat during an inventory of the vehicle. He explained that he cut out and secured the airbag because—based on his training and experience—he believed there would be DNA evidence on the airbag from "whoever was in the driver's side seat of that car" at the time of the crash. When asked why he recovered the hat and gloves, the detective testified that "there was no one on scene," he "needed to find out who was in that car," and he was "looking for any type of identifying information that [he] could use as a lead for the case."
¶ 9 When asked if a 2007 Pontiac G6 has a passenger side airbag, the detective testified that, while he was not an expert and did not know "a hundred percent," he "would believe it does" based on the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration requirements. When asked if there had only been one person in the vehicle, the detective could only speculate.
¶ 10 The Pontiac's owner told the police that he thought his ex-girlfriend, C.D., had stolen his car. The owner reported that he and C.D. had broken up, but the car did not appear to have been forcibly entered. C.D. possessed the only other set of keys to the car, and the owner asked her to return the keys the night before he reported the car stolen.
¶ 11 A detective who interviewed C.D. two weeks after the incident testified that he did not observe any obvious injuries that would have indicated C.D.’s recent involvement in an automobile crash.
¶ 12 The detective also interviewed Yeadon about two months after the incident based on the receipt found in the toiletry bag. The detective testified that he did not observe any injuries to Yeadon at the time. The prosecutor played a recording of this interview to the jury.
¶ 13 During the interview, Yeadon said that he had had a prior sexual relationship with C.D., that he believed the Pontiac belonged to her, and that she had previously picked him up in that car. He admitted that he had left some of his belongings in the car, but claimed that he had not retrieved these items because he and C.D. had ended their relationship. Yeadon also admitted to the detective that he occasionally drove the Pontiac, but denied both knowing that the vehicle had been in a crash and being in the vehicle when it crashed. He told the detective that his DNA would not be found on the driver's side airbag.
¶ 14 The detective sent the driver's side airbag, the baseball hat, and the gloves to the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) for DNA testing. The detective also submitted to the CBI a buccal swab obtained from Yeadon for comparison.
¶ 15 At trial, the prosecutor qualified a CBI forensic scientist as an expert in serology and DNA. This expert testified as follows:
¶ 16 The expert admitted that she could not "totally eliminate" the possibility that Yeadon's DNA could have been deposited on the airbag if he had been seated in the vehicle's passenger seat and had moved across the driver's seat to exit through the driver's side door. But she opined that, based on the large amount of DNA on the airbag, it was not likely that the DNA had been deposited in this manner.
¶ 17 When asked how an airbag could identify the person sitting behind the wheel of a vehicle, the expert explained that because of the force generated on the airbag's deployment, the individual sitting in front of the airbag at the time of impact would deposit a lot of cellular material onto the airbag.
¶ 18 Much of the dispute in this case centers on whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support the "knowingly" element of possession of less than two grams of a controlled substance. We conclude that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence.
¶ 19 It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess a controlled substance. § 18-18-403.5(1), C.R.S. 2017 ( certain exceptions). The knowingly element applies to "knowledge of possession and to knowledge that the thing possessed is a controlled substance." People v. Perea , 126 P.3d 241, 244 (Colo. App. 2005) (citation omitted). "A person acts ‘knowingly’ ... with respect ... to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he [or she] is aware ... that such circumstance exists." § 18-1-501(6), C.R.S. 2017.
¶ 20 We review the record de novo to determine whether the evidence before a jury was sufficient in quantity and quality to sustain a conviction. Dempsey v. People , 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 2005). In doing so, we employ the substantial evidence test, which considers "whether the relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." Clark v. People , 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010) (quoting People v. Bennett , 183 Colo. 125, 130, 515 P.2d 466, 469 (1973) ).
¶ 21 "An appellate court is not permitted to act as a thirteenth juror and set aside a verdict because it might have drawn a different conclusion had it been the trier of fact." People v. McIntier , 134 P.3d 467, 471-72 (Colo. App. 2005). Instead, we afford the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference that might fairly be drawn from the evidence and, where reasonable minds could differ, deem the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction. See People v. Padilla , 113 P.3d 1260, 1261 (Colo. App. 2005) ; People v. Carlson , 72 P.3d 411, 416 (Colo. App. 2003). This is so because it is the fact finder's task to determine "the weight to be given to all parts of the evidence" and to resolve "conflicts, inconsistencies, and disputes in the evidence." Padilla , 113 P.3d at 1261.
¶ 22 We conclude that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence that Yeadon was the driver of the Pontiac at the time of the crash. We reach this conclusion because the CBI expert testified that Yeadon was the major source of the DNA found on the driver's side airbag and that such evidence suggested that he was sitting in the driver's seat when the airbag deployed. See People v. Warner , 251 P.3d 556, 564 (Colo. App. 2010) ().
¶ 23 Even so, we must determine whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that...
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