People v. Young

• Decision Date: 07 April 1992
• Parties: , 591 N.E.2d 1163 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jeffrey YOUNG, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 977

582 N.Y.S.2d 977

79 N.Y.2d 365, 591 N.E.2d 1163

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jeffrey YOUNG, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 7, 1992.

[79 N.Y.2d 366] [591 N.E.2d 1164] Mitchell J. Briskey and Philip L. Weinstein, New York City, for appellant.

Charles J. Hynes, Kings County Dist. Atty. (Caroline R. Donhauser and Jay M. Cohen, Brooklyn, of counsel), for respondent.

[79 N.Y.2d 367] Robert M. Morgenthau, New York County Dist. Atty. (Mark Dwyer and Patrick J. Hynes, New York City, of counsel), pro se, amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

TITONE, Judge.

In this case, the Appellate Division relied on what it perceived to be the "commonsense limits" of the Rosario rule as a basis for affirming a conviction notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to disclose an "unusual occurrence report." The issue is whether the report contained statements of a trial witness that would constitute Rosario material. Defendant's appeal also requires us to consider whether a "commonsense" exception to the Rosario-Consolazio- Jones doctrine should be recognized when the reviewing court deems the information in the undisclosed putative Rosario material too insubstantial or trivial to warrant the reversal of a conviction.

Defendant was charged with murdering an individual named Booker, ostensibly to prevent Booker from revealing another crime that the two men had committed together. The People's primary witness, Marie Somie, defendant's girlfriend, testified that defendant and his brother killed Booker in the house that she and defendant shared and then sent the family to a movie while he disposed of the body. According to Somie, who had not personally seen the killing or the deceased's body, defendant had described the details of the crime to her and then, when she returned from the movie, told her of how he had wrapped Booker's body in a plastic bag and taken it to the dump. The body was subsequently discovered at the dump by a passerby, and the police were immediately contacted.

Several police officers, including Officer Serra and Detective Daniel, both of whom testified at trial, responded to the call. Daniel, who was the detective assigned to investigate the crime, attempted unsuccessfully to obtain fingerprints from either the bag or the body. Daniel subsequently arrested defendant after speaking with Somie. Daniel also executed a search warrant at the house where the murder was supposed to have occurred and took samples from the carpet in an effort to assist in the forensic aspects of the investigation.

The defense took the position at trial that Somie had fabricated the entire story because she was angry with defendant for refusing to leave his wife for her. According to the defense witnesses, defendant had been at home enjoying his seven-year-old son's birthday party on the day Somie claimed Booker was killed.

The jury rejected defendant's alibi defense and found him guilty of second degree murder. He was sentenced on April 25, 1989 to a 25-year-to-life term of imprisonment.

While defendant's appeal to the Appellate Division was pending, the prosecutor discovered a document entitled "unusual occurrence report addendum" that had not been turned over to the defense during trial. ^* The document, which purports to be an "unofficial" "confidential" report of information that the author "feel[s] [the commanding officer] should know," was signed by a Sergeant Maisano and contained the results of a "[f]urther investigation at the scene by the investigating officer " (emphasis supplied), including that officer's observations of marks on Booker's body that were possibly indicative of rope burns.

After the document's existence was revealed, the parties entered into a stipulation whereby it was agreed that the document had not been made available at trial and that it would become part of the record on appeal. Defendant thereafter filed a supplemental brief in which he argued that his conviction should be reversed because his rights under CPL 240.45 and the Rosario doctrine had been violated. In response, the People argued, among other things, that no Rosario violation had been proven because it was unclear whether the "investigating officer" whose statements were referred to in the report was one of the police officers who testified for the People at the trial.

Upon hearing the appeal, the Appellate Division ruled that the prosecution's failure to disclose Maisano's "unusual occurrence report" did not require reversal. The court did not find it necessary to determine whether the "investigating officer" was one of the two responding police officers who testified at trial, because, in its view, the material in the report was duplicative of statements contained in other documents that had been provided to the defense. Further, because, in the court's view, the report "in no way affected the credibility of the police officers who testified at trial, much less the defendant's guilt or innocence," " 'the commonsense limits attendant to the Rosario rule militate against reversing [this] murder conviction' " (172 A.D.2d 790, 791, 569 N.Y.S.2d 162, quoting People v. Velez, 161 A.D.2d 823, 824, 556 N.Y.S.2d 147). In reaching this conclusion, the court relied, in part, on People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56, 63, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580, 503 N.E.2d 1011, and People v. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 446, 454, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62, 354 N.E.2d 801, cert. denied 433 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2986, 53 L.Ed.2d 1100, in which this Court recognized other "commonsense limits" to the Rosario rule of mandatory disclosure (see also, People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 644, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483, 585 N.E.2d 795). However, we conclude that the exception to the Rosario rule that the Appellate Division has posited accords with neither "common sense" nor the principles that inform the long-standing Rosario doctrine. Consequently, assuming that the undisclosed report was, in fact, Rosario material, there should be a reversal.

Initially, contrary to the Appellate Division's conclusion, the undisclosed report was not merely the "duplicative equivalent" of other material that the defense had been given. While we have recognized an "exception" to the Rosario rule of mandatory disclosure for material that is duplicative (see, People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 551, n. 3, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53, 517 N.E.2d 865; People v. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 446, 454, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62, 354 N.E.2d 801, supra ), there continues to be a "strong presumption of * * * discoverability" (People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56, 63, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580, 503 N.E.2d 1011, supra ) and, consequently, the "exception" has been narrowly circumscribed.

Two documents cannot be "duplicative equivalents" if there are variations or inconsistencies between them (id., at 65, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580, 503 N.E.2d 1011). Further, "[s]tatements are not the 'duplicative equivalent' of previously produced statements * * * just because they are 'harmonious' or 'consistent' with them" (id., at 63, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580, 503 N.E.2d 1011). Indeed, a statement that is consistent with other disclosed material but omits details or facts cannot be considered the "duplicative equivalent" of the disclosed material, since omissions often furnish important subjects for cross-examination (id., at 64, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580, 503 N.E.2d 1011). Finally, since the purpose of Rosario disclosure is to provide the defense with material for cross-examining specific prosecution witnesses, the fact that withheld information was available through another disclosed document embodying someone else's statements is irrelevant and cannot serve to remedy the harm caused by the prosecution's failure to disclose.

Here, assuming that the withheld report contained statements made by one of the police officers who testified, it cannot be considered duplicative of other material in the defense's possession because none of Daniel's disclosed statements mentioned the rope-burn marks that were mentioned in the withheld report. Although the rope-burn marks were mentioned in the autopsy report, that report was not prepared by an investigating police officer and was therefore not a "duplicate" of the statements made in the undisclosed police report. The withheld document also omitted several details contained in the other reports prepared by Detective Daniel, one of the testifying officers. Consequently, the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the exception for "duplicative equivalents" is applicable.

Turning now to the Appellate Division's alternative rationale, we hold that it too was erroneous. Since this Court...