People v. Young
| Decision Date | 04 December 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 70693,70693 |
| Citation | 607 N.E.2d 123,153 Ill.2d 383,180 Ill.Dec. 229 |
| Parties | , 180 Ill.Dec. 229, 61 USLW 2381 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Brodie YOUNG, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield, Jack O'Malley, State's Attorney, Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago and Renee Goldfarb and David R. Butzen, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.
The defendant, Brodie Young, was indicted by a Cook County grand jury for the murder of Yankel Rudminsky. After his extradition from Wisconsin on the charge, the defendant made post-arrest statements to Illinois law enforcement authorities concerning the murder. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements on the ground that they were elicited in violation of his fifth and sixth amendment rights under the United States Constitution to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel. The trial court granted the motion. The appellate court reversed that decision. (201 Ill.App.3d 521, 146 Ill.Dec. 953, 558 N.E.2d 1287.) We granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315), and now affirm the appellate court.
On March 12, 1987, a fugitive warrant, approved by a Cook County assistant State's Attorney, was issued for defendant Brodie Young in connection with the murder of Yankel Rudminsky. At the time the warrant was issued, the defendant was in Wisconsin in violation of a $2,000 cash bond on an unrelated charge. Defendant was 17 years old.
On March 16, 1987, Lieutenant Robert Nelson of the Outagamie County, Wisconsin, sheriff's department received a teletype message regarding the outstanding warrant from the Chicago police department. Lieutenant Nelson then contacted Division 6, Violent Crimes, of the Chicago police department and spoke to Detective Larry Thezan. Detective Thezan informed Lieutenant Nelson that the Chicago police believed that the defendant was living with a relative in Oneida, Wisconsin, located in Outagamie County. After giving Lieutenant Nelson the address, he asked that the Outagamie sheriff's department apprehend the defendant on the warrant. Lieutenant Nelson agreed to pick up the defendant the next morning.
On March 17, Lieutenant Nelson went to the address supplied by the Chicago police. He and another member of the sheriff's department took defendant into custody. Lieutenant Nelson then contacted Detective Thezan and informed him that the defendant was in custody.
Later that day, the Outagamie district attorney's office filed a petition for temporary physical custody of the defendant on the ground that he was a fugitive from Illinois. A hearing was scheduled for the same day. Defendant was represented by Michael Dally, an assistant State public defender for Outagamie County. The circuit court granted the petition.
Because the Wisconsin trial court had applied the wrong provision of Wisconsin's extradition statute, a second hearing was On June 9, 1987, defendant's attorney informed the Outagamie County circuit court that the defendant would waive extradition to Illinois. The court then ordered the sheriff of Outagamie County to comply with the terms of the warrant and to surrender the defendant to the Illinois law enforcement authorities.
[180 Ill.Dec. 231] held on this matter the next day. Accordingly, the court vacated its previous order and entered a superseding order under a different section of the statute granting the district attorney's petition for temporary physical custody. Bail was set at $50,000 after evidence was introduced that the defendant had violated the terms of a $2,000 cash bond in an unrelated matter by leaving Illinois.
At the conclusion of the proceedings, the defendant's attorney advised the court that the defendant was asserting, for the present and future, his right to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel under the fifth and sixth amendments before any interrogation began. Defendant's attorney informed the court that defendant would be represented by the Cook County public defender's office. Counsel further stated that he was concerned the defendant would be coerced or subjected to duress on the return trip to Illinois in order to compel the defendant to make incriminating statements.
Defendant, when asked by counsel in open court whether he wished to assert his fifth and sixth amendment rights, responded "Right." Defendant's attorney then asked the Wisconsin trial court to inform the Illinois law enforcement authorities that defendant asserted his fifth and sixth amendment rights. Counsel further asked the court to enter an order for defendant to take with him directing the Illinois authorities to refrain from interrogating the defendant outside the presence of counsel.
The court agreed to enter the order, but noted that it might not be valid. The record does not indicate that any such order was ever entered by the court.
On June 12, 1987, after defendant had waived extradition, Chicago police Detective Thezan and his partner, Detective Yawger, went to Oneida, Wisconsin, to take the defendant into custody on the extradition order. Defendant does not claim that he was interrogated or questioned concerning the murder of Yankel Rudminsky before being transferred to the custody of the Chicago police officers.
Detectives Thezan and Yawger obtained custody of the defendant from the Outagamie sheriff's department. Neither Thezan nor Yawger were informed that the defendant had previously indicated that he wished to remain silent or that he had requested an attorney. No representative of the Outagamie County district attorney's office or the public defender's office was present when defendant was transferred to the Chicago authorities. No order concerning the defendant's assertion of his rights was presented to the detectives.
With defendant in their custody, Detectives Thezan and Yawger began the drive back to Chicago. The defendant sat in the backseat. Shortly after leaving Oneida, Detective Thezan initiated a conversation with the defendant. Thezan asked the defendant if he knew what this was about. After receiving an affirmative reply, Thezan asked the defendant if he wanted to talk about the charge, and defendant said he did.
Thezan then read the defendant his Miranda warnings and asked the defendant if he understood each of his rights. The defendant replied that he did. The defendant then, in narrative form, gave the detectives incriminating statements concerning the victim's death.
After arriving in Chicago at approximately 7:30 p.m., the defendant was taken to an interview room at the police station. At 8 p.m. the defendant was again read his Miranda rights and again replied that he understood them. Detective Thezan and the defendant then talked about the murder of Yankel Rudminsky.
At approximately 11:30 that evening, the defendant was once again read his Miranda rights by Assistant State's Attorney Nick Trutenko. Detective Thezan was also present. The defendant indicated that he The circuit court granted defendant's motion to suppress, finding that the defendant had effectively invoked his rights to remain silent and to counsel at the Wisconsin extradition hearing. The court further found that although the defendant invoked his rights to Wisconsin authorities, knowledge of that invocation was imputed to the Illinois law enforcement authorities.
[180 Ill.Dec. 232] understood his rights. At no time while he was in the custody of the Chicago authorities did defendant request an attorney, state that he had an attorney whom he wanted present at any questioning or indicate that he wished to remain silent. Once again, the defendant made incriminating statements concerning the murder of Rudminsky.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed. (201 Ill.App.3d 521, 146 Ill.Dec. 953, 558 N.E.2d 1287.) The court agreed that the defendant had invoked his Miranda rights in Wisconsin, but refused to impute knowledge of the invocation interstate to the Illinois authorities. The court also refused to impose a duty on the Illinois authorities to inquire whether defendant had invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel in Wisconsin. Accordingly, the court found that the defendant's fifth amendment rights were not violated. The appellate court also ruled that the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel had not been violated.
The defendant now asks this court to reverse the appellate court and affirm the circuit court's order to suppress the statements made by him concerning the murder of Yankel Rudminsky.
Several issues concerning defendant's assertion of his fifth and sixth amendment rights are presented in this appeal. The first issue is whether the defendant's assertion of his fifth and sixth amendment rights to the Wisconsin authorities should be imputed to the Chicago authorities such that the rule in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, prevented Illinois law enforcement authorities from initiating questioning. The second issue is whether the Illinois authorities had a duty to inquire of the Wisconsin authorities whether defendant had invoked his right to counsel in Wisconsin. The third and final issue is whether the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel had attached at the time he was questioned by Illinois law enforcement authorities, and if so, whether that right was violated.
This court has held that in Illinois a State law enforcement authority's knowledge of an accused's invocation of his fifth and sixth amendment rights will be imputed to other law enforcement authorities within the State. (See People v. Medina (1978), 71 Ill.2d...
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