People v. Youngblood, Docket No. 88177

• Decision Date: 05 February 1988
• Docket Number: Docket No. 88177
• Citation: 418 N.W.2d 472,165 Mich.App. 381
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Deborah YOUNGBLOOD, Defendant-Appellant. 165 Mich.App. 381, 418 N.W.2d 472
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 472

418 N.W.2d 472

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Deborah YOUNGBLOOD, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 88177.

165 Mich.App. 381, 418 N.W.2d 472

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 22, 1987.

Decided Jan. 4, 1988.

Released for Publication Feb. 5, 1988.

[165 MICHAPP 383] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of the Crim. Div. Research, Training and Appeals and Jeffrey Caminsky, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the people.

Jack J. Kraizman, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Before KELLY, P.J., and SAWYER and KNOBLOCK, ^* JJ.

KNOBLOCK, Judge.

Defendant and Harold Jones were charged with first-degree murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548. Following a joint jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.317; M.S.A. Sec. 28.549. Jones was acquitted. Sentenced to a prison term of from ten to forty years, defendant appeals as of right from her conviction.

The victim was shot at Anthony Porter's residence. Porter was present inside the residence when the shooting occurred, but did not witness the shooting. According to Porter, defendant was his former girlfriend. She telephoned him the evening of the shooting and told him that she was coming over. Porter advised her not to come. When asked who else was in the residence, Porter refused to tell her. Approximately fifteen minutes after receiving defendant's call, Porter's doorbell rang. Porter spoke with the person at his door [165 MICHAPP 384] using an intercom system located in his back bedroom. Recognizing defendant's voice, Porter told the victim to let defendant into the residence. The victim was in the front part of the residence at the time. Porter started walking down the hallway leading from his bedroom to the living room when he saw defendant, Jones, and two unidentified men enter. Porter claimed that Jones was holding the victim and had a small caliber pistol pointed at the victim's head. The other two men were also carrying weapons, either shotguns or rifles. Porter went back to his bedroom and armed himself with a .38-caliber pistol and a .22-caliber pistol. When defendant called for Porter to come out of his bedroom, Porter started shooting from the door of his bedroom and shots were fired at him. At trial, Porter claimed that Jones and defendant had taken the victim into the kitchen before he started shooting. This testimony contradicted Porter's statement at the preliminary examination that Jones moved the victim into the kitchen after Porter fired.

Defendant and Porter had lived together for ten years before their recent breakup. While together, they had taken out life insurance policies naming each other as the primary beneficiary. Porter admitted that he had heard that defendant was seeing Jones. Porter also admitted that drug paraphernalia was found in his residence, but denied that he was a drug dealer. Porter claimed that he told police at the scene that defendant was involved in the shooting. He did not remember whether he also told them that Jones was involved. Porter claimed, however, that he identified Jones at the police station.

The police officers who questioned Porter at the scene testified that Porter described the person holding the victim as an unknown black male. [165 MICHAPP 385] They remembered Porter telling them that a female was involved in the shooting, but admitted that their reports did not include this information. One of the officers testified that Porter had said that an unknown black male had called for him to come out of his bedroom.

Porter's neighbor testified that she looked out her window after hearing gunshots and saw a woman she identified as defendant leaving Porter's residence. While it was dark, the neighbor claimed that she recognized defendant by her distinctive gait. The neighbor admitted that she had not previously identified defendant as the woman she saw leaving the apartment.

An evidence technician testified that the victim was found lying in the kitchen with his legs extending into the hallway. He had a single bullet wound through the right side of his head and was lying in a pool of blood. Because there was no blood trail, the technician opined that the victim had been shot close to where he had fallen. The technician further testified that bullet holes were found throughout the residence. Several of the bullets had been fired from the back bedroom in the direction of the dining room and kitchen. Shots were also fired towards the back bedroom. In his opinion, the victim could have been struck by a bullet coming from the back bedroom. The medical examiner testified that the fatal shot was fired from a distance of at least eighteen inches, as there was no gunpowder residue on the victim's head or in the wound. It was stipulated at trial that a single .22-caliber bullet was removed from the victim's body.

At the close of testimony, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the first-degree murder charge. The trial court denied the motion, finding that there was sufficient evidence from which a rational[165 MICHAPP 386] trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of first-degree murder. Defendant claims that this was error requiring reversal because there was no evidence introduced at trial which supported a finding that defendant or her codefendant Jones had acted with a premeditated and deliberate intent to kill the victim. Although she was found guilty of second-degree murder, citing People v. Vail, 393 Mich. 460, 227 N.W.2d 535 (1975), defendant asserts her change of acquittal on a valid charge was substantially reduced by the possibility of a compromise verdict.

Defendant was prosecuted for first-degree murder on the theory that she was an aider and abettor.

"The phrase 'aiding and abetting' describes all forms of assistance rendered to the perpetrator of the crime and comprehends all words or deeds which may support, encourage or incite the commission of a crime. People v Palmer, 392 Mich 370; 220 NW2d 393 (1974); People v Cortez, 131 Mich App 316; 346 NW2d 540 (1984); People v Turner, 125 Mich App 8; 336 NW2d 217 (1983). Mere presence, even with knowledge that an offense is about to be committed, is not enough to make one an aider or abettor. People v Burrel, 253 Mich 321; 235 NW 170 (1931); Turner, supra. To be convicted, the defendant must either himself possess the required intent or participate while knowing that the principal possessed the required intent. Turner, supra- ; People v. Karst, 118 Mich App 34; 324 NW2d 526 (1982); People v. Triplett, 105 Mich App 182; 306 NW2d 442 (1981), remanded on other grounds, 414 Mich 898; 323 NW2d 7 (1982)." People v. Vicuna, 141 Mich.App. 486, 495-496, 367 N.W.2d 887 (1985).

To convict of first-degree murder, the prosecution [165 MICHAPP 387] was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally killed the victim and that the...