People v. Youngs, 108096

• Decision Date: 12 September 2019
• Docket Number: 108096
• Citation: 110 N.Y.S.3d 73,175 A.D.3d 1604
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Joseph S. YOUNGS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

175 A.D.3d 1604
110 N.Y.S.3d 73

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Joseph S. YOUNGS, Appellant.

108096

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: January 15, 2019
Decided and Entered: September 12, 2019

110 N.Y.S.3d 75

John A. Cirando, Syracuse, for appellant.

William G. Gabor, District Attorney, Wampsville (J. Scott Porter of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Devine, Rumsey and Pritzker, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Rumsey, J.

110 N.Y.S.3d 76

175 A.D.3d 1604

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Madison County (McDermott, J.), rendered June 4, 2015, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of predatory sexual assault against a child, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child (two counts).

In January 2014, defendant was charged with predatory sexual assault against a child, criminal sexual act in the first

175 A.D.3d 1605

degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, promoting a sexual performance by a child, possessing a sexual performance by a child and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child based on two incidents that allegedly occurred in May 2013. During the first incident, defendant is alleged to have asked the victim – a cousin who was then 12 years old – to take pictures of her vagina with his cell phone. During the second incident, defendant is alleged to have put his mouth on the victim's vagina, touched her breast and had sexual intercourse with her. Defendant made a pretrial motion to suppress the oral and written statements he had made to law enforcement officers. County Court conducted a Huntley hearing, but did not issue a decision on the motion or "set forth on the record its findings of fact, its conclusions of law and the reasons for its determination" ( CPL 710.60[6] ).

On the first day of trial, defendant directed County Court's attention to the absence of a ruling on the suppression motion, to which the court erroneously replied by stating that it had ruled the statement admissible at the Huntley hearing. The People withdrew the charges of promoting a sexual performance by a child and possessing a sexual performance by a child. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the remaining charges. He was sentenced, as a second felony offender, to consecutive terms of incarceration on four convictions – 25 years to life for predatory sexual assault against a child, 12 years for criminal sexual act in the first degree, with five years of postrelease supervision, three years for sexual abuse in the first degree, with 15 years of postrelease supervision, and one year for one count of endangering the welfare of a child. He was also sentenced to a concurrent term of one year for the other count of endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant appealed, and this Court withheld decision and, as relevant here, remitted the matter for a ruling on defendant's suppression motion ( 169 A.D.3d 1155, 94 N.Y.S.3d 408 [2019] ). Upon remittal, County Court reviewed the record and issued a written decision setting forth the reasons it had determined that defendant's statements were admissible.

Initially, we find that County Court properly determined that defendant's oral and written statements were voluntarily made and, therefore, were admissible. The People bear the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant's statements are voluntary (see People v. Moore , 162 A.D.3d 1123, 1125, 78 N.Y.S.3d 486 [2018] ). Where Miranda warnings are timely administered, "the voluntariness of a statement is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances under which it

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was obtained ... [and] the requisite inference of voluntariness may be relatively easily drawn. Factual determinations of the suppression court are entitled to great weight and will

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not be overturned unless clearly contrary to the evidence" ( id. at 1126, 78 N.Y.S.3d 486 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v. Weaver , 167 A.D.3d 1238, 1240–1242, 90 N.Y.S.3d 359 [2018], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 955, 100 N.Y.S.3d 187, 123 N.E.3d 846 [2019] ).

Defendant provided statements to police officers on two dates. On May 26, 2013, defendant voluntarily reported to the Oneida City Police Department and agreed to be interviewed. A Miranda warning was given before questioning began, and defendant executed a written statement at the end of the interview, which lasted less than 70 minutes. On June 25, 2013, defendant again voluntarily appeared at the Oneida City Police Department and submitted to a polygraph examination conducted by a State Police investigator. A Miranda warning was given at the beginning of the second interview, which lasted approximately five hours. During the second interview, defendant was offered food and beverages and, during two breaks, he was permitted to leave the building to smoke cigarettes. There was no indication in either interview that defendant's statements were involuntary. Only one officer was present during each interview. Defendant was not restrained and he exhibited no signs of intoxication or other impairment. Further, defendant did not ask for counsel or that the officer end the interview, and at no point did he refuse to answer questions.

Defendant next contends that his convictions are not supported by legally sufficient evidence and are against the weight of the evidence. As defendant concedes, his legal sufficiency claim is unpreserved because his general motion for a trial order of dismissal did not include arguments directed at specific deficiencies in the proof (see People v. Chaneyfield , 157 A.D.3d 996, 996, 69 N.Y.S.3d 144 [2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 1012, 78 N.Y.S.3d 282, 102 N.E.3d 1063 [2018] ). "Nevertheless, as defendant also claims that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, this Court must determine whether each element of the charged crimes was proved beyond a reasonable doubt" ( id. [citations omitted] ). "When undertaking a weight of the evidence review, we must first determine whether, based on all the credible evidence, a different finding would not have been unreasonable and then[, if not,] weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence. When conducting this review, we consider the

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evidence in a neutral light and defer to the jury's credibility assessments" ( People v. Gill , 168 A.D.3d 1140, 1140–1141, 90 N.Y.S.3d 392 [2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ).

As relevant here, a person who is 18 years old or older commits predatory sexual assault against a child by engaging in sexual intercourse with another person who is less than 13 years old (see Penal Law §§ 130.35[4] ; 130.96). A person who is 18 years old or older is guilty of criminal sexual act in the first degree when he or she engages in oral sexual conduct with another person who is less than 13 years old (see Penal Law § 130.50[4] ). A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree "when he or she subjects another person to sexual contact ... [w]hen the other person is less than [13] years old and the actor is [21] years old or older" ( Penal Law § 130.65[4] ). Finally, a person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when he or she "knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less

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than [17] years old" ( Penal Law § 260.10[1] ).

It is undisputed that, in May 2013, defendant was 27 years old and the victim was 12 years old. The victim identified defendant at trial and stated that she knew him as her cousin. She testified that, on May 25, 2013, she went to a family party at her uncle's house and, during the party, defendant asked her to take pictures of her vagina with his cell phone. She stated that she went into the bathroom and complied with defendant's request because he was older, she was afraid of him and because she "had no one else to go to" as all other adults present at the party were drinking.

The victim further testified that her grandmother made plans for her to visit her female cousin, Tasha Meade, on May 26, 2013. Her uncle transported her to the home of her aunt, Mary Ann Houck, located in the City of Oneida, Madison County. The victim said that, when her uncle arrived, defendant was also in the car and that, despite what had happened with defendant the day before, she got in the car because she "was supposed to." According to the victim, when they arrived at Houck's house, she and defendant knocked on the door, but no one answered. She said that defendant stated that he had...