People v. Ziobro
| Decision Date | 21 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 110085.,110085. |
| Citation | 242 Ill.2d 34,949 N.E.2d 631,350 Ill.Dec. 839 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,v.James ZIOBRO et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney, of Joliet (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Erin M. O'Connell, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Terry A. Mertel and Thomas D. Arado, of the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.Ted P. Hammel, Sarah M. Vahey, Frank P. Andreano and David P. Smith, of Brumund, Jacobs, Hammel, Davidson & Andreano, LLC, of Joliet, for appellees.
This case comes to us as a consolidated appeal. Defendants James Ziobro, Michael Lemoine, and Todd Wambsganss were each issued a citation for driving under the influence (625 ILCS 5/11–501(a) (West 2006)), among other traffic violations. In each instance, the first appearance date listed on the citation was beyond the period prescribed by Supreme Court Rule 504 (ill. s.ct. r. 504 (EFF.JAN.1, 1996)). THE DEFENDANTS' ATTORNeys filEd appearances with the court and each demanded a trial in accordance with the procedure laid out by Supreme Court Rule 505 (Ill. S.Ct. R. 505 (eff.Jan. 1, 1996)). No defendant was given a new appearance date or a trial date before his original first appearance date arrived, and each appeared in the circuit court of Will County and filed a motion to dismiss the charges at that time due to the violation of Rule 504. In each case, the charges were dismissed and the State was barred from refiling.
The appellate court upheld the dismissals on the basis that the defendants announced ready for trial when they appeared on the initial appearance date, but were not tried at that time because the State was not ready. 397 Ill.App.3d 831, 838–39, 337 Ill.Dec. 126, 921 N.E.2d 1264. The State filed a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff.Feb.26, 2010)), which we allowed.1
For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rules 504 and 505 govern the procedures to be used in setting and rescheduling
[350 Ill.Dec. 841 , 949 N.E.2d 633]
first appearance dates for traffic violations. Rule 504 states, in pertinent part:
“The date set by the arresting officer or the clerk of the circuit court for an accused's first appearance in court shall not be less than 14 days but within 60 days after the date of the arrest, whenever practicable.” Ill. S.Ct. R. 504 (eff.Jan.1, 1996).
Rule 505 directs an officer to issue a written notice to the accused when issuing a traffic citation that provides:
Ill. S.Ct. R. 505 (eff.Jan.1, 1996).
When the accused complies with this time frame and timely submits notice of an intent to plead “not guilty,” the rule directs the clerk to “set a new appearance date not less than 7 days nor more than 60 days after the original appearance date set by the arresting officer or the clerk of the circuit court, and notify all parties of the new date and the time for appearance.” Id. Rule 505 further provides that “[i]f the accused demands a trial by jury, the trial shall be scheduled within a reasonable period.”
In each of the consolidated cases, an error was committed by both the arresting officer in failing to schedule the first appearance within the 14– to 60–day time frame and the clerk of the court in failing to set the new appearance date before the original appearance date arrived.
On June 6, 2008, following a traffic accident, defendant James Ziobro was issued citations for driving under the influence (625 ILCS 5/11–501(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2006)), failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident (625 ILCS 5/11–601(a) (West 2006)), and operating an uninsured vehicle (625 ILCS 5/3–707 (West 2006)). The arresting officer set the initial court appearance date for August 7, 2008–62 days after the arrest. Defendant filed an appearance, along with a demand for jury trial and a speedy-trial demand, on July 23, 2008. Because the case had not yet been set for trial and a new appearance date had not yet been set, defendant appeared on August 7 (the original appearance date set on the ticket), announced “ready for trial,” and filed a motion to dismiss the charges based on the violation of Rule 504, which requires that a defendant's first appearance be set no later than 60 days after the date of arrest. The motion to dismiss was granted on August 28, and the cause was dismissed with prejudice. The record reflects that the trial court found “that Section 504 was violated and, therefore, [granted] the motion to dismiss by the defendant,” citing People v. Walter, 335 Ill.App.3d 171, 269 Ill.Dec. 116, 779 N.E.2d 1151 (2002), and People v. Alfonso, 191 Ill.App.3d 963, 139 Ill.Dec. 67, 548 N.E.2d 452 (1989). The court then concluded that, because the State had not moved to nol-pros during the 60–day window, which would have allowed it to refile the action, there was no reason to allow a refiling in this case. The court therefore dismissed the cause with prejudice.
Defendant Michael Lemoine was issued citations for driving under the influence (625 ILCS 5/11–501(a)(2) (West 2006)) and
[350 Ill.Dec. 842 , 949 N.E.2d 634]
improper lane usage ( 625 ILCS 5/11–709 (West 2006)) on April 26, 2008. His initial court appearance was set for June 26, 2008—61 days after arrest. Defendant entered an appearance on June 11, 2008, along with demands for a speedy trial and a jury trial. As no new appearance date or trial date had been set, defendant appeared in court with his attorney on June 26, 2008. He announced ready for trial and filed a motion to dismiss for violation of Rule 504 when the State did not also announce ready for trial. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed with prejudice, noting that there was no showing of impracticability. The State filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied, finding that Rule 504 requires dismissal when a first appearance date is more than 60 days after arrest.
Defendant Todd Wambsganss was issued citations for driving under the influence (625 ILCS 5/11–501(a)(2) (West 2006)) and speeding (625 ILCS 5/11–601(b) (West 2006)) on September 18, 2008. The first court appearance was set by the arresting officer for November 20, 2008—63 days after arrest. Defendant's attorney entered his appearance on November 5, along with speedy-trial and jury-trial demands. Defendant was not provided with a new appearance date or a trial date before November 20, when he appeared and announced ready for trial. When the State was unable to announce ready for trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The circuit court granted the motion, stating:
“[T]he plain language of Rule 504 provides that the setting of a first appearance date outside of the prescribed period of Rule 504, which is over 60 days, is excusable only upon evidence of the impracticality of setting the date within the prescribed period.
I heard no evidence of any impracticality of setting that date within the prescribed period. So by case law I think it's necessary that I, I order the dismissal of this case.”
When the State moved to clarify this order, the circuit court specified that the dismissal was with prejudice.
The appellate court affirmed the dismissals, concluding that the circuit courts did not abuse their discretion in dismissing the charges, as “the State did not present any evidence that it was impracticable to comply with Supreme Court Rule 504's time limitations.” 397 Ill.App.3d at 838, 337 Ill.Dec. 126, 921 N.E.2d 1264. The court upheld the “with prejudice” aspect of the dismissals because each of the three defendants announced “ready for trial” on his respective appearance date and, the court concluded, the State's failure to proceed to trial at that time constituted a failure to prosecute, which is a disposition on the merits and bars further proceedings. Id. at 838–39, 337 Ill.Dec. 126, 921 N.E.2d 1264.
The parties focus on the circuit courts' discretion to dismiss the charges against the defendants and their authority to dismiss with prejudice. We find the first issue dispositive and, therefore, limit our analysis to the propriety of the dismissals in these cases for violations of Rule 504.
Supreme Court Rule 504 requires an arresting officer or the clerk of the court to set the first appearance in court “not less than 14 days but within 60 days after the date of the arrest, whenever practicable.” Ill. S.Ct. R. 504 (eff.Jan.1, 1996). In each of the cases before this court, the arresting officer set the date of appearance beyond this 60–day time frame and
[350 Ill.Dec. 843 , 949 N.E.2d 635]
the State presented no evidence that complying with this time frame would have been impracticable. The State first argues that the circuit courts did not have the authority, under Rule 504, to dismiss the charges against the defendants unless the defendants were able to demonstrate that they were prejudiced by the Rule 504 violation. The defendants argue in response that if the circuit court finds that it was...
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