Perez-Sanchez v. Public Bldg. Authority

• Decision Date: 12 March 2007
• Docket Number: Civil No. 05-1396(FAB).
• Citation: 557 F.Supp.2d 227
• Parties: Juan B. PEREZ-SANCHEZ, et al., Plaintiffs v. PUBLIC BUILDING AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants,
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

557 F.Supp.2d 227

Juan B. PEREZ-SANCHEZ, et al., Plaintiffs v. PUBLIC BUILDING AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants,

Civil No. 05-1396(FAB).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 12, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ariel Hernandez-Santana, Jesus M. Hernandez-Sanchez, Hernandez Sanchez Law Firm, San Juan, PR, Raul Barrera-Morales, Raul Barrera Morales Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Nerylu Figueroa-Estasie, Sanchez Betances & Sifre, P.S.C., Yadhira Ramirez-Toro, Department of Justice, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Juan B. Perez-Sanchez, Rosa Vega-Padro, their conjugal partnership, and their daughter, Valerie Perez-Vega, brought suit against the Public Building Authority ("PBA"), Lillian Rivera-Correa, in her personal and official capacity as PBA's Executive Director, Angel Santiago-Bade, in his personal and official capacity as PBA's Caguas Regional Director, Dexter Passalaqua, in his personal and official capacity as PBA's Caguas Regional Director, Gerardo Suarez Roman, in his personal and official capacity as PBA's Labor Relations Director, Fernando Rodriguez-Fernandez, in his personal and official capacity as PBA's Caguas and Humacao Regional Security Director, and an unnamed insurance company. Plaintiffs allege violations of Perez-Sanchez's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence under Article 1802 of the Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141. Specifically, Mr. Perez-Sanchez claims he was subject to a string of discriminatory acts motivated by his affiliation with the New Progressive Party ("NPP"). Id.

On February 22, 2006, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to include a claim of conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against other defendants, Leila Hernandez-Umpierre, Angel Torres-Garau and Sandra Marrero-Reyes, both in their official and personal capacities. (Docket No. 33).

On November 30, 2006, defendants PBA, Lillian Rivera-Correa, Angel Santiago-Bade, Gerardo Suarez Roman and Fernando Rodriguez, in their official capacities, and Dexter Passalaqua, Leila Hernandez-Umpierre, Angel Torres-Garau and Sandra Marrero, in their official and personal capacities, moved for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiffs' claims (Docket No. 66).¹

For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismisses this suit.

A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND²

Plaintiff Juan B. Perez-Sanchez began working as an Auxiliary Regional Director of the Public Building Authority's regional office in Caguas in 1993. (Docket No. 64, Statement of Uncontested Material Facts "SUMF", 1, Exh. 1). Mr. Perez-Sanchez is an active member of the NPP in Puerto Rico and alleges that he has identified himself as such to his employer, supervisors, and others within the PBA. Indeed, his private automobile has many NPP political bumper stickers on it.

On September 1, 1995, Perez-Sanchez began to occupy the position of Administrative Services Supervisor at PBA's regional office in Caguas. (SUMF, 4, Exh. 1) In that same month, a job description form (known as OP-16) for the Administrative Services Supervisor was prepared. (SUMF, 7, Exhs. 1 & 5) It outlined Mr. Perez-Sanchez's duties and responsibilities. In 1999, a new OP-16 job description was prepared for the same position, again describing Mr. Perez-Sanchez's duties and responsibilities. (SUMF, 10, Exh. 5 and Docket No. 80) As described in the 1999 OP-16 form, Plaintiff's duties and responsibilities as an Administrative Services Supervisor encompassed some 18 areas. Plaintiff's supervisory and other responsibilities were varied. They included assisting the regional director at meetings with agency directors heads; helping in the preparation of the budget for the region; and preparing extraordinary projects such as: channeling of pluvial water, construction of walls and ornamental steel fences, and construction of the warehouse for the region. Id.

Following the Puerto Rico general elections of November, 2000, and while Perez-Sanchez was working as an Administrative Services Supervisor at PBA's regional office in Caguas, the Popular Democratic Party ("PPD") took control of the government. After the PPD assumed power in January 2001, defendant Dexter Passalaqua became the Regional Director of the PBA's office in Caguas. As such, he became Perez' immediate supervisor. (SUMF, Exh. 1 and Docket No. 74, 35)

After Mr. Passalaqua became the Caguas Regional Director, Perez-Sanchez practically performed no duties other than certifying the attendance of the office's employees. (SUMF, 36 Exh. 2)³

Perez-Sanchez alleges that he was demoted from his supervisory position and that a member of the PPD was appointed to replace him in January 2001. He also claims that Mr. Passalaqua ordered that Perez-Sanchez's telephone, parking space, and office be taken away, and assigned him to a "cubbyhole". Furthermore, Perez-Sanchez alleges that he currently has no regular duties and that he is frequently idle while at work. He also alleges that on June 4, 2001, Mr. Passalaqua incorrectly charged him with mishandling an agency credit card and that the card was then taken from him. (Docket No. 78, 1-7)

In addition, it is uncontested that Perez-Sanchez has not performed the first function listed in his OP-16 job description form since January 2001.⁴ (SUMF, p. 5, 17 and Docket No. 78, p. 4) Likewise, Perez has not performed the fourth,⁵ fifth,⁶ eighth,⁷ tenth,⁸ twelfth,⁹ thirteenth,¹⁰ fourteenth,¹¹ and seventeenth¹² functions listed in his OP-16 after January 2001. (Id., 17, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, Exh. 1, 5 and 7) Also, Perez-Sanchez stopped performing other functions, including functions number two,¹³ three,¹⁴ nine,¹⁵ and fifteen¹⁶ of his OP-16 at some point during 2001. (Id. 18, 19, 25, 31)

In November 2002, Santiago-Bade became PBA's Caguas Regional Director and became Perez-Sanchez's immediate supervisor. Santiago-Bade supervised Perez-Sanchez until 2005. (SUMF, 39, Exhs. 1, 2 and 9 and Docket No. 74, 39; Docket No. 78, 8). According to Perez-Sanchez, when Santiago Bade became PBA's Caguas Regional director, he basically did not assign any functions to him. Therefore, Perez-Sanchez continued doing nothing, just as he had since 2001. (SUMF, Exhs. 1-2 and Docket No. 74, 40)

Defendant Fernando Rodriguez was appointed internal security officer of the Caguas and Humacao Regions in January 2001. (SUMF, 38) After Mr. Rodriguez was appointed, Perez-Sanchez stopped performing the second and ninth functions listed in the OP-16 (supervise and certify services provided by private companies with contracts, and assist in the preparation of the budget of the region). Id., 18, 25.

In December 2004, the work schedule of the two PBA employees who used to start work at 8:00 a.m. was changed. Both now began work at 7:00 a.m. like the rest of the employees. The two employees whose schedules were changed were the regional director's secretary and Perez-Sanchez. (SUMF, 43, Exh. 3 and 10).¹⁷

On November 1, 2004 Perez-Sanchez was informed that he could not park his private car in PBA's parking facilities because of the political bumper stickers it displayed. (SUMF, 46, Exh. 4) The issue was referred by PBA to the Office of Governmental Ethics ("OGE") for an opinion. On April 1, 2005, the OGE sent a letter to Perez-Sanchez concerning the situation with the PBA's parking facilities. The letter indicated that, pursuant to Article 3.2(j) of the Law for Governmental Ethics and the Emblems Regulation, "... you have to remove the decals referred to from your vehicle when you are performing official business and you propose to claim for the reimbursement of expenses or payment of mileage." (SUMF, 44, Exh. 11, p. 8) (emphasis in original) The letter also warned Perez-Sanchez of the possible consequences that he could face in the event that he chose not to remove them. Id., p. 9.

On April 13, 2005, plaintiffs filed their original complaint and on July 19, 2005, an amended complaint. (Docket No. 1 & 16) On February 20, 2007, the Court granted defendants Lillian Rivera-Correa, Angel Santiago-Bade, Gerardo Suarez Roman and Fernando Rodriguez-Fernandez request to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against them in their personal capacities. (Docket No. 102)

B. Summary Judgment Standard

The court's discretion to grant summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56 states, in pertinent part, that the court may grant summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); See also, Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000); Morales, et al. v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital, et al., 328 F.Supp.2d 192, 195-196 (D.P.R.2004). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment has been presented, the opposing party has the burden of demonstrating that a trial-worthy issue exists that would warrant the court's denial of the motion for summary judgment. For issues where the opposing party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot merely rely on the absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute. See Suarez v. Pueblo Intl, Inc., 229 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2000).

In order for a factual controversy to prevent summary judgment, the contested facts must be "material" and the...