Perro v. State

• Decision Date: 24 July 1915
• Citation: 94 A. 950,113 Me. 493
• Parties: PERRO v. STATE. BLAIS v. SAME.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

94 A. 950

113 Me. 493

PERRO

v. STATE.

BLAIS

v. SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 24, 1915.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Penobscot County, at Law.

Forfeiture proceedings against certain intoxicating liquors; Augustus G. Perro and Joseph G. Blais, claimants. Judgment of forfeiture, and claimants bring error. On report. Judgments reversed.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and SPEAR, CORNISH, BIRD, HALEY, HANSON, and PHILBROOK, JJ.

E. P. Murray and Charles J. Hutchings, both of Bangor, for plaintiffs. William B. Peirce, of Bangor, for the State.

HALEY, J. Two writs of error, wherein the plaintiff in each case alleges that in a certain judgment of the Bangor municipal court upon libels praying for the forfeiture of certain intoxicating liquors, in which proceedings the plaintiffs had filed claims for the liquors libeled, and had been admitted as parties, as provided by section 51, c. 29, Revised Statutes, there appears upon the record an error that deprived the court of jurisdiction to give judgment in the causes. The error alleged is that:

"During the progress of the hearing in said matter said hearing was indefinitely postponed before the termination thereof, and was finally adjourned before any judgment of the matter was rendered by said court, and by said indefinite postponement, and by said final adjournment before judgment was rendered, said Bangor municipal court lost jurisdiction of said causes."

Both writs assign the same error, and the cases are before this court upon report. The record shows that both cases were heard at the same time by the judge of the municipal court of Bangor, and the record introduced to support the allegation of error reads, as far as material to these cases:

"On May 19, A. D. 1914, hearing had. Evidence closed. Arguments of counsel made, and ease taken under advisement for a decision, and hearing adjourned without day."

May 20, A. D. 1914, decision was rendered as follows:

"The liquors ordered forfeited to state.

"Ralph P. Plaisted, Judge."

And it is contended that, by adjourning the hearing May 19, 1914, "without day," the Bangor municipal court lost jurisdiction of the causes. Although the proceedings complained of were against the liquors only, the cases were criminal cases and governed by the rules of criminal law (State v. Robinson, 49 Me. 286; State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 80 Me. 57); and, if the proceedings of the Bangor municipal court were unauthorized by law, the plaintiffs, being parties to the process, can maintain their writs of error (Barnett v. State, 36 Me. 198). The Bangor municipal court, as all other inferior courts, has only such powers as are conferred upon it by statute. It is provided by section 10, c. 211, Private and Special Laws of 1895:

"Said court [Bangor municipal court] may adjourn from time to time, but shall be considered in constant session for the trial of criminal offenses."

The act creating the Skowhegan municipal court contains the same provision, and was considered by the court in Tuttle v. Lang, 100 Me. 125, 60 Atl. 892, as follows:

"This municipal court has no stated terms for criminal causes. As to these, it is a temporary court for each case, exercising limited jurisdiction by prescribed methods. It has no jurisdiction to suspend and revive at its will a case before it."

And it was held the provision that said court may adjourn from time to time was not in conflict with section 10, c. 134, R. S., which provides:

"A magistrate may adjourn an examination before him, from time to time, but not more than ten days at a time."

In the proceedings the Bangor municipal court had the same jurisdiction that trial justices have in this state in similar cases. The Bangor municipal court was authorized by section 10, c. 134, R. S., to adjourn the hearings for not more than 10 days, and, if the parties requested, it might adjourn beyond 10 days. State v. Miller, 48 Me. 576. It is the design of the law that parties whose causes are pending in court shall have the right and opportunity to be present when any action is taken in their case. It is necessary for them, to protect their rights, to know when any action will be taken that may affect their rights. In the judgments complained of the present plaintiffs were allowed by statute 24 hours to appeal from a judgment adverse to them, and also upon the question of cost, and by adjournment without day they could not know when to be present to protect their rights, and the authorities are unanimous that a magistrate of an inferior court,...