Perry v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.
Decision Date | 26 October 1962 |
Docket Number | No. 16357,16357 |
Citation | 362 S.W.2d 213 |
Parties | Zella Rose PERRY et vir, Appellants, v. BANKERS LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Harry N. Ward, Fort Worth, for appellants.
Hudson, Keltner, Jordan, Smith & Cunningham, and Walter E. Jordan, Fort Worth, for appellee.
Zella Rose Perry and her husband, L. W. Perry, appeal from an adverse summary judgment in their suit on an insurance policy on the life of Cora Lee Cox. Mrs. Perry being the beneficiary.
The question presented is whether fraud in an application for reinstatement of a lapsed policy may be urged as a defense after the expiration of the contestable period.
The policy was issued on May 6, 1959. It lapsed for nonpayment of premiums on July 6, 1959, and was reinstated on September 14, 1959, on the basis of a reinstatement application executed by the insured on September 3, 1959. The application stated that the insured was in sound health and had not during the past five years suffered any illness or undergone any medical or surgical treatment. At that time the insured was in a hospital and was being treated for cirrhosis of the liver, for which she had been undergoing treatment since May 21, 1959. She knew her condition at the time the application was made She died of that disease on June 20, 1960. It was stipulated that had appellee known of the condition of the insured's health the policy would not have been reinstated. The policy stated that it would be incontestable after two years from the date of issue, except for nonpayment of premiums.
Appellants furnished proof of insured's death and made demand for payment late in July, 1960. Appellee refused to pay. This suit was filed on September 22, 1961. Appellants say that time does not cease to run against the incontestable clause because of the insured's death; that appellee's denial of liability within the two year period did not in law amount to a contest; and that although a new incontestable period began at the time of the reinstatement, it was necessary for appellee, within such two-year period, to institute a court proceeding to cancel the policy to avail itself of the defense of fraud in the application for reinstatement. There seems to be authority for each proposition. American National Insurance Company v. Welsh, Tex.Civ.App., 3 S.W.2d 946, affirmed, Tex.Com.App., 22 S.W.2d 1063; Scharlach v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 9 F.2d 317; State Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Rosenberry, Tex.Civ.App., 175 S.W. 757, reversed on other grounds, Tex.Com.App., 213 S.W. 242; note, 134 A.L.R. 1525; Appleman, insurance Law and Practice, Vol. 1, p. 374, sec. 320.
It is appellee's position that the incontestable clause has no application when fraud would otherwise have vitiated the reinstatment, and relies on the rule announced in State Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Rosenberry, supra. $:The Commission of Appeals in the Rosenberry case very clearly stated that in case of fraud in a reinstatement application the incontestable rule does not apply. We quote from the opinion as follows:
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...of premiums * * *.' The contestable period applies to a renewal policy as well as to the original policy. Perry v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., Tex.Civ.App., 362 S.W.2d 213. Defendant seeks to avoid the effect of Art. 3.44 by the following stipulation made in the trial court: 'It is stipu......
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...may review are those the movant actually presented to the trial court.). 8. Costello also cites Perry v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 362 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Universal Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 368 S.W.2d 878 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1963,......
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Cardenas v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.
...Neither Rosenberry's facts nor its language suggests such an interpretation. Further, Perry v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 362 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex.Civ.App.–Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.), casts serious doubt on any such reading. Rather, Rosenberry provides that in cases of fraud, an ......