Personal Finance Co. of Missouri v. Day

• Decision Date: 08 September 1942
• Docket Number: 38158
• Parties: Personal Finance Company of Missouri, a Corporation, and Beneficial Management Corporation, a Corporation, v. Richard H. Day, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

164 S.W.2d 273

349 Mo. 1139

Personal Finance Company of Missouri, a Corporation, and Beneficial Management Corporation, a Corporation, v. Richard H. Day, Appellant

No. 38158

Supreme Court of Missouri

September 8, 1942

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court; Hon. Albert A. Ridge Judge.

Motion to dismiss sustained.

Sebree Shook & Gisler for respondents; Jackson R Collins of counsel.

The appeal should be dismissed because the question is moot. Fugel v. Becker, 2 S.W.2d 743; State ex rel Myers v. Shinnick, 19 S.W.2d 676; Hicks v. St. Louis, 234 Mo. 647, 138 S.W. 342; Electric Light & Power Co. v. St. Louis, 253 Mo. 592; State ex rel. Mount Pleasant v. Hall, 304 Mo. 82, 262 S.W. 720; State ex rel. Ridenour v. Adsit, 195 Mo.App. 572; Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 40 L.Ed. 293.

Harry P. Thomson, Jr., and Henry M. Shughart for appellant.

(1) Even if the only issue before this court involved that part of the decree which dealt solely with the injunction, which is not the case, respondents' motion to dismiss should not be granted. Fugel v. Becker, Sec. of State, 2 S.W.2d 743; Wisconsin Ice & Coal Co. v. Lueth, 213 Wis. 42, 250 N.W. 819; Lewis v. Kaplan, 5 S.W.2d 699; Herman v. Kaiser, 85 S.W.2d 928. (2) The appellant's attack on that portion of the decree of the circuit court granting an injunction is only a part of the actual controversy now before this court, as the appellant has questioned the complete decree and especially that part which held the entire employment contract valid and subsisting, when such contract contains provisions still in force vitally affecting the appellant's private rights. Miller v. Incorporated Town of Milford, 224 Iowa 753, 276 N.W. 826; Lee v. Shide, 69 N.D. 541, 288 N.W. 556; Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Assn., 331 Pa. 241, 200 A. 646; Carstensen v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 111 P.2d 565; Coleman v. City of Everett, 194 Wash. 82, 76 P.2d 1007; Morrison v. Hess, 231 S.W. 997.

OPINION

Douglas, P. J.

This case was decided by the Kansas City Court of Appeals but was transferred to this court because the Judges of that Court deemed their decision in conflict with a decision of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in the case of Lewis et al. v. Kaplan et al. (Mo. App.), 5 S.W.2d 699. We hear this case anew as though it came here by ordinary appellate process. [Const. Amend. 1884, Sec. 6.]

The question for decision is whether an appellate court may dismiss an appeal where the entire controversy became moot by the lapse of time while the appeal was awaiting argument.

The question arises in this way. Appellant was employed by respondent under a contract which prevented him from engaging in a competitive employment for a year after the contract terminated. Appellant violated this prohibition of the contract. Respondent filed suit to enjoin him. The trial court found for respondent. It permanently enjoined appellant from engaging in such competitive employment for the period of one year from October 12, 1940, the date the contract terminated. This was the only point decided by the trial court. While an appeal from this decree was pending in the Kansas City Court of Appeals and before the same had been argued the injunction decree expired by its own terms on October 12, 1941. As a result no controverted issue remained in the case. Thereafter respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal because the controversy had become moot.

The motion to dismiss should be sustained for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Kansas City Court of Appeals reported in 158 S.W.2d 197.

Lewis v. Kaplan, supra, deemed to be in conflict therewith was a suit to enjoin the erection of a store building. An injunction was issued. On appeal the case was twice argued and submitted. On the first submission there were three issues presented. First, whether defendant had the right to enter upon the property and erect a building thereon; second, whether the building would violate certain restrictions on the use of the property; and third, whether the building would violate certain zoning ordinances then pending but not passed. The second submission was restricted to the one question of the right of defendant to enter upon the property and erect a building thereon. Also at the second submission there was a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that since the filing of the suit and issuance of the injunction the city had adopted a zoning ordinance forbidding the erection of business buildings in the district in which the premises were located so that the matter had become a moot question. However, the...