Peters v. Peters

• Decision Date: 24 June 1997
• Docket Number: Docket No. C
• Citation: 697 A.2d 1254
• Parties: Carol A. PETERS v. Donald R. PETERS. um-96-543.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1254

697 A.2d 1254

Carol A. PETERS v. Donald R. PETERS.

Docket No. Cum-96-543.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued May 12, 1997.

Decided June 24, 1997.

Peter L. Murray (orally), Law Office of Peter L. Murray, Michael D. Traister, Ann M. Courtney, Murray, Plumb & Murray, Portland, for plaintiff.

John A. Graustein (orally), Deirdre M. Smith, Drummond, Woodsum & MacMahon, Portland, for defendant.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, DANA, and RUDMAN, JJ.

DANA, Justice.

¶1 Carol Peters appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, MacNichol, J.) granting her a divorce from Donald Peters. Carol contends that the court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for further findings of fact, distributed the marital property, awarded alimony, and refused to award Carol her attorney fees, and that it erred when it found that Donald did not violate the preliminary injunction imposed pursuant to 19 M.R.S.A. § 692-A(1)(B)(1) (Supp.1996). We affirm the judgment.

¶2 Donald and Carol Peters were married in 1961. Carol stayed at home to care for their two children while Donald built a real estate construction and development business. In 1968, Donald incorporated his business as Donalco, Inc., and it thrived. He acquired several investment properties in and around Portland, some of which he used for rental units. In the mid 1980s, Donald and two other individuals created another corporation, Ariel Corporation, and started doing development work in the Augusta area. Donald also developed partnership interests in two housing projects known as "North School housing" and "Stratford County housing," and created Main Street Autos, which owns a collection of vehicles. Donald bought two parcels of land in Eustis and built a house there. At the time of the divorce, Donald owned several rental properties in Portland. Donalco also owned property, but according to Donald's testimony at the divorce hearing, the business was suffering due to the economic downturn of the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the time of the divorce, Donalco did not have the credit, equipment, or employees to enable the company to bid on construction jobs.

¶3 Donald recently acquired a $225,000 home equity loan from Fleet Bank and has been using the money to maintain the rental properties and pay his own living expenses. His 1994 tax return reflects a net taxable income of $20,284.

¶4 The parties obtained a divorce in 1979 but remarried nine months later. They separated again in 1985 and Carol moved to Florida. Donald bought the condominium that Carol was renting and later bought another condominium on Key Biscayne. While Carol was living in Florida, Donald paid all of her expenses. He sent her $450 per week, and on the last week of every month sent her a check for $1400. He also provided her with a credit card and medical insurance. Donald stopped sending money to Carol after she filed for the divorce, asserting that he had run out of money; the last three or four checks that he sent to her came out of the funds from his home equity loan.

¶5 Donald made several property transfers after Carol filed for divorce. He transferred the Eustis property to their son in October 1994, ostensibly to avoid the reach of creditors. The gift tax return stated that the property's value was $217,000. Donald testified that he sent a copy of the conveyance to Carol prior to the transfer and when she did not respond he completed the transfer. In June 1995 Donald sold one of the rental properties on Carleton Street in Portland for $150,000, and another unit on Harrison Street for $75,000. According to Donald, Fleet Bank requested that he sell those properties and apply the proceeds to the mortgages. At the time, Donald was trying to get a line of credit from Fleet Bank.

¶6 At the divorce hearing, Carol presented a personal financial statement dated June 1995 that Donald submitted to Fleet Bank in his attempt to obtain financing. The statement included values for Donald's assets including real estate, stocks, accounts, notes receivable, life insurance, and personal property, and also listed his liabilities. Some of the values provided in the statement were based on Donald's own estimates while others were based on prior appraisals. According to Donald, he prepared the statement himself without the aid of an accountant because Fleet Bank told him it needed a statement as a formality and was going to independently appraise the property. Donald testified that the statement "was a very optimistic, hopeful, desperate attempt to keep financing going."

¶7 Donald presented a somewhat different financial picture at the divorce hearing than that portrayed by the financial statement submitted to the bank. According to his testimony, Donalco is not operating and he is currently using the proceeds of the home equity loan for his living expenses. The notes payable from several of his business interests, such as a $900,000 note from Ariel Corporation, are worthless because the businesses are insolvent and unable to make payments. He also testified that his partnership interests in the housing projects are worth nothing. All of his personal real estate except the two condominiums in Florida and the property in Eustis is mortgaged and cross-collateralized to Fleet Bank. Donald is personally liable for one-third of Ariel Corporation's debt. He submitted tax returns and financial statements indicating that Ariel Corporation's investments are also not doing well. All of the income from the rental units goes to pay the mortgages and he subsidizes their operation with the proceeds from his home equity loan. Donald testified at length about the values on his June 1995 personal financial statement. He stated that many of the properties for which he provided different values at the hearing had been reappraised by Fleet after he submitted the statement.

¶8 Carol argued at the hearing that the court should make her and Donald co-owners of all of the marital property, but the court divided the marital property as follows: Carol received the unencumbered condo in Florida in which she lives, and half of the interest in the Eustis property. Donald received everything else and all the marital debts. The court awarded Carol the Key Biscayne condo, worth about $100,000, as lump sum alimony, along with $1 per year as periodic alimony. The court declined to order Donald to pay Carol's attorney fees amounting to over $40,000.

I.

¶9 Carol contends the trial court's judgment lacks findings sufficient for effective review because the court failed to make specific findings regarding marital net worth, the values of certain assets, and the parties' entitlements to various assets, and that the court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.

¶10 "The divorce court has a duty to make findings sufficient to inform the parties of the reasoning underlying its conclusions and to provide for effective appellate review." Bayley v. Bayley, 602 A.2d 1152, 1153-54 (Me.1992) (citation omitted). "[W]e have consistently stated the need for the divorce court to assign specific values to marital property, both to 'make the result more comprehensible for the litigants and ... [t]o facilitate appellate review as often as such review may become necessary.' " Murray v. Murray, 529 A.2d 1366, 1368 (Me.1987) (quoting Grishman v. Grishman, 407 A.2d 9, 12 (Me.1979)).

¶11 When, as here, a party moves for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, "we will not assume the divorce court made the necessary findings to support its judgment." Bayley, 602 A.2d at 1154. If the court does not make the requested findings, "and the divorce judgment does not contain adequate findings on the contested issues, intelligent review is impossible and the denial of a motion for further findings of fact is an abuse of discretion." Id.

¶12 The court acted within its discretion by denying Carol's motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law because the court's judgment contains adequate findings. The court's judgment makes findings and assigns specific values to Donald's business interests, the couple's real estate and accompanying encumbrances, the couple's personal property, their debts to attorneys, Donald's personal liability on outstanding debts to businesses, and the parties' income history and earning capacities. These findings are sufficient to inform the parties of the court's reasoning and allow for our review. ¹ Furthermore, Carol's motion for further findings of fact did not seek specific findings on any particular issue; ² given the court's extensive findings provided in its judgment and Carol's failure to assert that the judgment was inadequate on any particular issue, the court acted within its discretion by denying her motion.

II.

¶13 Carol contends that the court failed to value accurately the marital property. She asserts that the court should have relied on Donald's personal financial statement submitted to Fleet Bank in June 1995 rather than on Donald's testimony during the hearing.

¶14 We review a divorce court's determination of the value of marital property for clear error. See Gray v. Gray, 609 A.2d 694, 697 (Me.1992); Cole v. Cole, 561 A.2d 1018, 1020 (Me.1989). "The value determined must reflect a reasoned evaluation by the court of all of the evidence." Cole, 561 A.2d at 1020 (citation omitted). Here, the court was not obligated to base its measure of the value of marital property on Donald's personal financial statement when Donald testified about the value of the same property at the divorce hearing. Donald was competent to testify about the value of his property, see Simmons v. State Highway Comm'n, 234 A.2d 330, 332 (Me.1967), and "[w]e give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence." Gray, 609 A.2d at 697 (citations...