Peterson v. Chi., R. I. & P. Ry. Co.

• Citation: 45 N.W. 573,80 Iowa 92
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 15 May 1890
• Parties: PETERSON v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO. ET AL.

80 Iowa 92

45 N.W. 573

PETERSON

v.CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO. ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 15, 1890.

Appeal from district court, Scott county; CHARLES M. WATERMAN, Judge.

The plaintiff seeks to recover of the defendants, who are common carriers of passengers and baggage, the value of certain wearing apparel, ornaments, and other property which were stolen from certain trunks of the plaintiff and her husband, while being conveyed as baggage from Davenport, in this state, to the city of Los Angeles, in the state of California. There was a trial by jury, and at the close of the introduction of the evidence the court, on the motion of the defendants, directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendants. Plaintiff appeals.Bills & Hass, for appellant.

Cook & Dodge, for Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., appellee.

Nath. French, for other appellees.

ROTHROCK, C. J.

1. In the month of October, 1886, W. D. Peterson, the husband of the plaintiff, made a contract at Davenport, in this state, for transportation for himself and family from Davenport to Los Angeles, Cal. He purchased three through tickets, for which he paid the agent of the Rock Island Company the sum of $250. He had certain traveling trunks, which were checked by the Rock Island Company to Kansas City. The tickets were what are known as “coupon tickets.” The first coupon was good for transportation over the Rock Island road to Kansas City; the next coupon was for passage over the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad from Kansas City to its junction with the Atlantic & Pacific Railway, and on the last-named road to its junction with the California Southern Railroad; and the last coupon was for passage over the last-named road to Los Angeles. The following is a copy of one of the tickets purchased by said Peterson at Davenport, with the last coupon attached thereto:

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All of the coupons were attached to the ticket, and they were in the same words and figures, with the exception of the name of the road over which they were good for travel, and the names of the stations on the line of road as appears on the margin. Taken all together, the tickets were good for the entire route by one continuous passage from Davenport to Los Angeles, over the four connecting railways above named. When the said Peterson and his family arrived at Kansas City, he presented his checks to a baggage-man in the railroad depot at that place, and had them rechecked to Los Angeles. The baggage went through to its destination by the same train which carried Peterson and his family. Upon his arrival at Los Angeles, he delivered his checks to some one representing a transfer company, and the trunks were delivered at the hotel where the family stopped in about an hour after the checks were delivered to the agent of the transfer company. When delivered to said Peterson, and opened, it was found that some of the trunks had been unlocked and opened, and wearing apparel and ornaments and other property had been taken therefrom of the value of about $450, and the trunks had been again locked and fastened, so that when delivered to the owners at Los Angeles they had the appearance of not having been opened. There is no question made upon the fact that the trunks were pillaged at some point between Davenport and Los Angeles, as the said passengers had no access to the trunks on the journey, and did not see them except at Kansas City. The plaintiff's husband duly assigned all claim he had to recompense for the loss to the plaintiff, and the action to recover for the stolen goods was brought against all four of the connecting roads by which the journey was made.

The first count of the petition is based upon an alleged conspiracy of the four defendant companies, by which they confederated together and organized and perfected a plan by which said baggage should be transported over said lines of travel in such a way that defendants could steal the contents, and relock the trunks, so that it would be impossible for the owners of the same to discover, without the assistance of defendants, upon the road of which of said defendants said stealing was actually done. It is scarcely necessary to say that, if there was evidence to sustain this count of the petition, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover of any one or all of the defendants. But there is no such evidence. This count of the petition demands no further consideration.

2. In an amendment to the petition the plaintiff set up a second and further cause of action, in which it is, in substance, alleged that, at the time the tickets were purchased by Peterson and the journey was made, the four railroad companies owned and operated by the defendants formed a complete connecting line of railway from Davenport to Los Angeles, and at said time said four defendants had formed and entered into an agreement and combination for the purpose of transporting passengers and their baggage from Davenport to Los Angeles, by using said four lines of railway as a continuous line between said places, and making one fare or charge for such transportation for the entire distance; “that said business of transporting said baggage was done by defendants in such a manner that it was impossible for plaintiff or her husband to know or discover at what particular place on said route said property was so taken from said trunks, and she is therefore unable to state.” There was no evidence to sustain this count of the petition as against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company. On the contrary, it is expressly provided, on the face of the ticket, that the said company assumed “no responsibility beyond its own line.” It did not check the baggage beyond its own line, and the evidence shows that the trunks were not opened while they were in the possession of that company. When the baggage was delivered at Kansas City, the checks taken up and the trunks rechecked, the contract, so far as the Rock Island Company was concerned, was fully performed. This court is committed to the doctrine that the receiving or initial carrier may, by a stipulation in the bill of lading or contract of carriage, limit its liability to injuries to the consignment which occur on its own line. Mulligan v. Railway Co., 36 Iowa, 181. We do not understand counsel for appellant to claim that the court erred in directing a verdict for the Rock Island Company, and it has made no appearance in this court, and has not filed either brief or argument.

The important question to be determined in the case is whether the other three defendants are jointly, or, rather, jointly and severally, liable for the pillage of plaintiff's baggage. That some one of them is lible there can be no serious question. It is true the larceny may have been committed by the employes of the transfer company at Los Angeles. But, in view of the brief time between the delivery of the checks and the arrival of the baggage at the hotel, this is not at all probable. To determine this question, it will be necessary to analyze the contract, and determine its legal effect upon the rights of the parties. It will be observed that the ticket does not provide that the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, the Atlantic & Pacific, and the California Southern Railroad Companies assumed no responsibility beyond their own lines. Their obligation is therefore to be determined by the ticket with the coupons attached, and by the other facts developed in the evidence tending to show what the real contract was; and here it is proper to say that a railroad passenger ticket does not ordinarily import a complete contract. It is in some sense like a check for baggage. It is issued by the carrier as the evidence of the right of the passenger to transportation between the points named on the face of the ticket. It is surely not as complete a contract in form as a bill of lading for the transportation of goods, and a bill of lading is everywhere recognized as a receipt as well as a contract. In the case of Steam-Boat Co. v. Brown, 54 Pa. St. 77, speaking of a bill of lading, it is said: “On its face, it is but a memorandum, and not in form a contract inter partes. It is doubtless an instrument fitted for the occasions in which it is usually employed; and while what it clearly expresses may not be contradicted by oral testimony, unless under the qualification of fraud or mistake, yet there is no rule which excludes testimony to explain it, and to show what the real contract was, of which it is but a note or memorandum at best.” And...