Peterson v. Christenson
Decision Date | 20 March 1942 |
Docket Number | 31339. |
Citation | 3 N.W.2d 204,141 Neb. 151 |
Parties | PETERSON v. CHRISTENSON. |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Prescher v Baker Ice Machine Co., 132 Neb. 648, 273 N.W. 48.
2. "An independent contractor usually enters into a contract to do a specified piece of work for a specific price; makes his own subcontracts; employs, controls, pays and discharges his own employees; furnishes his own tools and materials; and directs and controls the execution of the work." Prescher v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 132 Neb. 648 273 N.W. 48.
Chambers, Holland & Locke, of Lincoln, for appellant.
Vasey & Mattoon, of Beatrice, for appellee.
Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and ROSE, EBERLY, CARTER, MESSMORE, and YEAGER, JJ.
This is a workmen's compensation case. It presents the sole question, was the plaintiff an independent contractor or an employee of the defendant? Trial was had to one judge of the compensation court who held that plaintiff was an independent contractor and dismissed plaintiff's petition. Rehearing was waived and an appeal was taken to the district court and trial had. That court held he was an employee. The question is now presented to this court subject to the statutory provision that the judgment of the district court may be set aside only upon the ground "That the findings of fact are not conclusively supported by the evidence *** and if so found, the cause shall be considered de novo upon the record." Comp.St.Supp. 1941, § 48-174.
The facts are not difficult nor in serious dispute. Plaintiff is a "cement finisher and common laborer." Defendant had a business building which he was redecorating. There was a small piece of plaster off on the inside and also a few places outside under the marquee that needed patching. Defendant says plaintiff came by and suggested that he (plaintiff) plaster these places. Plaintiff says that as he was passing the building the defendant asked him to do the plastering. In any event, plaintiff agreed to return the next morning and do the job. Nothing was said as to pay, etc. The next morning plaintiff came to the job with his tools. Defendant asked what materials were necessary. Together plaintiff and defendant went to the lumber yard, got the materials, which were charged to the defendant, and returned to the building. Defendant furnished a stepladder, bucket and water. Plaintiff mixed the materials. Defendant told plaintiff to do the inside job first, which he did. He then went outside, and while working there the ladder slipped, and plaintiff got some lime in his eye. A friend suggested a first aid remedy which was applied. Defendant then advised plaintiff to go to a doctor, naming him; he was not known to plaintiff. Plaintiff went to the doctor and was treated. Plaintiff did not agree to pay and did not pay the doctor. The record does not show who agreed to pay the doctor or whether or not he was paid. The amount of his bill was stipulated.
Plaintiff had previously done work for the defendant for which he submitted bills and was paid on the basis of a certain amount an hour. Plaintiff says he expected to submit a similar bill for this work, but had not done so at the time of the trial. Plaintiff did not finish the job nor have it finished. The job, had it been completed, would have taken about one and one-half hours to perform.
Defendant argues that an employer, under such circumstances as these, ought not to be responsible under the compensation act. That is not a question for the court but for the legislative body to decide.
The statute is broad. Leaving out language not necessary here, an employer is defined as one "who is engaged in any trade, occupation, business, or profession *** and who has any person in service under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written ***." Comp.St.1929, sec. 48-114. An employee is defined as "Every person in the service of an employer" as above described under such a contract.
This court has on a number of occasions undertaken to define an independent contractor as distinguished from an employee. In Petrow & Giannou v. Shewan, 108 Neb. 466, 187 N.W. 940, 941, we said:
Again, in Reeder v. Kimball Laundry, 129 Neb. 306, 261 N.W. 562, 563, we quoted with approval the following from a text:
Again, in Prescher v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 132 Neb. 648, 273 N.W. 48, 49, we said:
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