Peterson v. Des Moines Life Ass'n
| Decision Date | 02 October 1901 |
| Citation | 87 N.W. 397,115 Iowa 668 |
| Parties | FRANCE E. PETERSON v. DES MOINES LIFE ASSOCIATION, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Madison District Court.--HON. J. H. APPLEGATE, Judge.
ACTION on a policy of insurance for $ 5,000, issued in January 1898 by defendant on the life of Hannah S. Peterson, and payable to plaintiff. Insured died in August, 1898. Defendant alleges false statements made by assured in the application as constituting fraud and breaches of warranty. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
George R. Sanderson, Steele & Robbins and Dabney & Cooper for appellant.
Guiher & Tidrick for appellee.
The policy in question was issued in pursuance of (1) an application, signed by assured, for membership in the defendant association; (2) an application, also signed by assured, containing questions answered by the applicant to one Dr. Ayers, who acted as medical examiner for defendant and who wrote the answers of assured therein, and witnessed her signature thereto; and (3) a special report of said Ayers as medical examiner, in which, in response to questions, he made answers as to the physical condition of the applicant, based upon his examination, oral and physical, reported her to be a good risk, and recommended her acceptance as a subject of insurance. In the application for membership was a stipulation on the part of the assured that all statements and answers written therein and those made to the medical examiner in the second application above referred to were warranted to be true, and to be full and fair answers to the questions. There can be no doubt that, aside from any statutory restriction, the parties to a contract of life insurance can thus make the truth of statements in the application material to the risk, and that the falsity of statements thus made will constitute breach of warranty, and render the policy void, regardless of whether the matters falsely stated affected or might have affected the risk, and regardless of whether the false statements were fraudulently made. Wilkinson v. Insurance Co., 30 Iowa 119; Miller v. Insurance Co., 31 Iowa 216; Nelson v. Insurance Co., 110 Iowa 600. But by Code, section 1812, it is provided that, where the company's medical examiner or physician acting as such under the rules and regulations of the company, reports the applicant to be a fit subject for insurance, the company "shall be thereby estopped from setting up in defense of the action on said policy * * * that the assured was not in the condition of health required by the policy at the time of the issuance or delivery thereof, unless the same was procured through the fraud or deceit of the assured." It is evident that the medical examiner or physician contemplated in this section is the person who examines the applicant, and determines his condition of health and reports whether he is a proper risk. This was done in the present case by Dr. Ayers. It is no doubt customary for life insurance companies to have a general medical adviser or director at the home office whose advice is taken into account in determining whether the risk shall be accepted; but the person who makes the actual examination, and reports on the applicant's condition, is evidently contemplated by the statute as the medical examiner or physician referred to. In the construction of this statute this court has held that it is fraud in procuring the certificate or report of this medical examiner, and not fraud in procuring the policy, which the statute above referred to permits to be shown for the purpose of defeating the policy, notwithstanding the estoppel therein provided for. Weimer v. Association, 108 Iowa 451, 79 N.W. 123; Stewart v. Association, 110 Iowa 528; Nelson v. Insurance Co., 110 Iowa 600. It is to be noticed that the estoppel declared by the statute is as to the condition of the health of the assured at the time the policy was issued. There may, no doubt, be warranties as to other matters not relating to the health of the assured,-- such as his place of residence or occupation,--breach of which will avoid the policy notwithstanding the statute: but, so far as the statements relied on as warranties relate to the health of the assured and his acceptability as a risk on that account, the company is estopped from showing their falsity, unless they constitute fraud or deceit in procuring the report or certificate of the medical examiner. Nelson v. Insurance Co., supra. Appellant's counsel contend, however, that the estoppel applies only to the condition of health of the assured at the time the policy is issued, and that statements as to previous disease, treatment by physician, accidents, etc., are warranties any breach of which will avoid the policy. But we cannot agree to this construction. The ultimate object of the inquiries in response to which these statements are made is to ascertain whether the applicant is a suitable risk, and that depends upon age, occupation, health, etc. Statements as to previous sickness, treatment,...
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