Nelson v. Nederland Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 February 1900
• Citation: 110 Iowa 600,81 N.W. 807
• Parties: NELSON v. NEDERLAND LIFE INS. CO., LIMITED.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

110 Iowa 600

81 N.W. 807

NELSON

v.NEDERLAND LIFE INS. CO., LIMITED.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 8, 1900.

Appeal from district court, Calhoun county; S. M. Elwood, Judge.

The defendant is a life insurance company organized under the laws of Holland, with its principal place of business at Amsterdam, and an office in New York City. It issued a policy to Charles J. Nelson, January 18, 1897, based on an application dated January 6th previous. To cover the first premium, he executed a note to the soliciting agent of the defendant which remains unpaid, and died April 27th of the same year. In his application were these questions and answers: “Q. What is the name and address of your medical attendant, or that of your family? A. None. Q. What physicians have you consulted here or elsewhere? When? For what complaints? A. None. Q. What is your present health? A. Good.” It was stipulated that these statements to the medical examiner should be the basis of the policy, and that, if any untrue averment was contained therein, or “if it shall thereafter appear that any material information has been withheld, then said policy shall be null and void, and all moneys which shall have been paid on account of insurance shall be absolutely forfeited to the company.” Payment of the indemnity was refused on the ground that these answers were false, in that the insured had had a medical attendant; that he was then suffering from the disease known as “nephritis,” and had concealed the ailment of suppression of the urine. After all the evidence had been introduced, the court directed a verdict for the defendant, upon which judgment was subsequently entered. The plaintiff appeals. Reversed.L. W. Moody and Dale & Bissell, for appellant.

Guernsey & Granger, for appellee.

LADD, J.

The policy was, by its terms, based on the application of the assured, which stipulated that, in event any of its statements proved untrue, the contract should be null and void. This application formed a part of the policy, and amounted to a warranty of the truthfulness of the statements made, and it is not material that some of the answers may have been unimportant. The parties, having agreed to their materiality, set that inquiry at rest. Hygum v. Insurance Co., 11 Iowa, 25;Miller v. Insurance Co., 31 Iowa, 225;Miles v. Insurance Co., 3 Gray, 580;Insurance Co. v. France, 91 U. S. 510, 23 L. Ed. 401;Powers v. Association, 50 Vt. 630;McCoy v. Insurance Co., 133 Mass. 82; Dewees v. Insurance Co., 34 N. J. Law, 244; Cushman v. Insurance Co., 63 N. Y. 404;Insurance Co. v. Raddin, 7 Sup. Ct. 500, 30 L. Ed. 644; Macdonald v. Insurance Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 328. If the insured consulted a physician, even though for a disease other than that from which death resulted, or from apprehension of having some ailment, the defendant was interested in knowing the fact, that further investigation might be made. By the answers that none had been seen, it may have been induced to refrain from doing so. The information as to whether the insured had had occasion to resort to medical aid, however, would seem of no little importance to a company about to take a risk on the extent of his life, and, if false in this respect, there appears no ground, in the absence of statutory enactment, for upholding a contract based thereon. As directly in point, see Cobb v. Association (Mass.) 26 N. E. 231, 10 L. R. A. 666;Insurance Co. v. McTague, 49 N. J. Law, 587, 9 Atl. 766.

2. The defendant set up in its answer the falsity of the answers of the assured contained in the application as a breach of warranty, and relied thereon to defeat recovery on policy. No claim was made that the report of its medical examiner was improperly obtained. In Weimer v. Association (Iowa) 79 N. W. 122, and Stewart v. Association (decided at the present term) 81 N. W. 782, we held that the insurer is estopped from inquiring into the correctness of such answers in the absence of an allegation that the medical examiner's report was procured through fraud or deceit. The fact that the statements amounted to warranties can make no difference. “The estoppel,” as said in Weimer's Case, “is directed to inquiry as to the condition of health, and it is quite immaterial what representations have been made or warranties given. The company having investigated, and for itself ascertained and declared the condition of the insured to be such as required by its rules and regulations, will not be permitted to interpose as a defense the physical infirmities of the deceased of which it knew or might have known as the result of its examination.” No defense then available to the defendant was pleaded, and the verdict in its favor cannot be sustained. This error was as clearly and specifically assigned as required by the statute. Though somewhat involved in repetition, the twenty-fourth assignment points out that in holding, throughout the trial, notwithstanding the examiner's report the defendant might plead and prove the noninsurable condition of the assured at the time the policy was issued, without averring fraud in the procurement of such report, the court erred.

3. Whether the policy is a New York contract or not, the laws of this state relating to procedure control. “Foreign insurance companies are not compelled to do business in this state. If they voluntarily choose to do so, however, they must submit to such conditions and restrictions as the legislature may see fit to impose.” Stanhilber v. Insurance Co. (Wis.) 45 N. W. 221;Hebb v. Insurance Co. (Pa. Sup.) 20 Atl. 837;Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357;Insurance Co. v. Rudwig, 80 Ky. 223;Williams v. Haines, 27 Iowa, 251;Insurance Co. v. Herriott (Iowa) 80 N. W. 665. The rule of the statute (section 1812 of the Code) so evidently relates to procedure that discussion of the point is not required.

4. Dr. Wright was permitted to testify that he was consulted in his professional capacity by the assured December 1, 3, 9, 23, 29, 1896, and January 7 and 12, 1897, and that he prescribed for him during this time. This was objected to as being in violation of section 4608 of the Code, providing that: “No * * * practicing physician * * * shall be allowed, in giving testimony, to disclose any confidential communication properly entrusted to him in his professional capacity, and necessary and proper to enable him to discharge the functions of his office according to the usual course of practice or discipline. Such prohibition shall not apply to cases where the party in whose favor the same is made waives the rights conferred.” It will be observed that nothing was sought as to what may have been orally communicated by Nelson, or what the...