Peterson v. People
| Decision Date | 02 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04SC18.,04SC18. |
| Citation | 113 P.3d 706 |
| Parties | Phillip PETERSON, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Charles L. Fife, Christopher B. Charles, Charles L. Fife & Associates, P.C., Denver, for Petitioner.
Don Quick, District Attorney, Seventeenth Judicial District, Jay Williford, Deputy District Attorney, Brighton, for Respondent.
Petitioner, Phillip Peterson, challenges an order of the Adams County District Court dismissing his appeal from a judgment of conviction entered by the County Court of Adams County. The district court dismissed the action as jurisdictionally barred because a notice of appeal was not filed in the county court pursuant to Crim. P. 37(a). We hold that the act required by Crim. P. 37(a) to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court is not filing a notice of appeal in county court, but timely docketing the appeal in the district court. Accordingly, we reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings.
On March 25, 2003, Peterson was convicted in the Adams County Court of driving while ability impaired by alcohol1 and failing to provide proof of insurance.2 On June 19, 2003, the court sentenced Peterson to 180 days incarceration and imposed costs totaling $377.00. On July 17, 2003, Peterson filed a timely notice of appeal and designation of record with the Adams County District Court and served notice of the appeal on the Adams County District Attorney's Office. That same day, Peterson also filed a "Motion for Stay of Execution of Sentence Pending Appeal" with the county court. The motion to stay filed in the county court referenced the notice of appeal filed in the district court, stating, "Contemporaneous with the filing of this motion, Defendant-appellant is filing a notice of appeal to the District Court."
The county court granted Peterson's motion to stay, but by October 6, 2003, the district court had not yet received the record on appeal from the county court clerk as required by Crim. P. 37(c).3 Peterson was directed by the district court to file the record on appeal within twenty days or suffer dismissal of the action. He therefore requested the county court to certify the transcript of a pretrial hearing that was the sole basis of the appeal. The county court certified this transcript on October 28, 2003, and it was filed with the district court on November 6, 2003. Upon receipt of the transcript, however, the district court clerk discovered that the county court file did not contain a notice of appeal.
On November 12, 2003, the district court issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to file a notice of appeal in the county court. Six days later, on November 18, 2003, Peterson filed a notice of appeal in the county court and on November 28, 2003, answered that he believed a notice of appeal was properly filed with the county court back on July 17, 2003.4 On December 3, 2003, without holding a hearing, the district court dismissed the appeal. In its dismissal order, the district court held that "no such notice is found in the [county] court records" and that there was "no reason to believe the clerk of the Combined Courts made any error." Thereafter, Peterson petitioned this Court for certiorari and we granted review.
We granted certiorari to determine whether filing a notice of appeal in the county court is a jurisdictional requirement of Crim. P. 37(a) and whether substantial compliance satisfies the content requirement for a notice of appeal pursuant to Crim. P. 37(b).5 We hold that filing a notice of appeal in the county court is not a jurisdictional requirement and that timely docketing an appeal in the district court is sufficient to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of that court.
Our analysis begins with Crim. P. 37(a) and the parties' respective interpretations of it. After rejecting the contention that all of the rule's requirements are jurisdictional, we refer to C.A.R. 3(a) which expressly conditions appellate jurisdiction upon the timely filing of a notice of appeal in the appellate court. We explain the jurisdictional significance of filing the appeal in the appellate court, and with this analysis as context, proceed to explore the origins of Crim. P. 37(a). We find that our early cases considered the docketing of the appeal in the appellate court a jurisdictional prerequisite. Because this requirement is consistent with the simplified procedure presently prescribed by Crim. P. 37(a) and the requirements of C.A.R. 3(a), we adhere to the principles established by our prior cases. We conclude that timely docketing an appeal in the district court is sufficient to invoke that court's jurisdiction and that filing a notice of appeal in the county court is not a jurisdictional requirement of Crim. P. 37(a).
This Court retains plenary authority to promulgate and interpret the rules of criminal procedure. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21; Borer v. Lewis, 91 P.3d 375, 380 (Colo.2004). The rules of criminal procedure are intended to provide for the just determination of criminal proceedings and shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay. Crim. P. 2. We read the rules together and adopt a construction consistent with their overall purpose. Patterson v. Cronin, 650 P.2d 531, 534 (Colo.1982); Rowe v. Watered Down Farms, 195 Colo. 152, 154, 576 P.2d 172, 173 (1978). We are also mindful that in Colorado, the right to direct appeal of a criminal conviction is fundamental. See § 16-12-101, C.R.S. (2004) (); People v. Baker, 104 P.3d 893, 895 (Colo.2005). Therefore, we construe the rules liberally and disfavor interpretations that work a forfeiture of that right. Wigton v. Wigton, 69 Colo. 19, 22, 169 P. 133, 134 (1917).
Crim. P. 37(a) governs the procedure for filing criminal appeals from the county court to the district court. It provides in relevant part:
[T]he defendant may appeal a judgment of the county court in a criminal action under a simplified procedure to the district court of the county. To appeal the appellant shall, within thirty days ... file notice of appeal in the county court, post such advance costs as may be required for the preparation of the record and serve a copy of the notice of appeal upon the appellee. He shall also ... docket the appeal in the district court and pay the docket fee.
In construing this provision, the People direct our attention to the word "shall." The People contend this language intimates absolute jurisdictional steps that must each be satisfied to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. The People argue that because Crim. P. 37(a) contains no express jurisdictional language, we must construe the rule as mandating strict compliance with all its requirements. The People claim that because Peterson failed to strictly comply with each of the rule's prescriptions, the jurisdiction of the district court did not attach and it was therefore correct to dismiss the appeal.
In contrast, Peterson contends that because Crim. P. 37(a) contains no jurisdictional language and expressly prescribes a "simplified procedure," the jurisdiction of the district court is invoked so long as an appellant substantially complies with the spirit of the rule. Peterson contends that because he timely docketed his appeal in the district court, served notice of the appeal on the People, and notified the county court of the appeal via the motion to stay execution of sentence, he was in substantial compliance with the rule.
Initially, we reject the contention that the word "shall" confers jurisdictional significance upon the requirements of Crim. P. 37(a). Although "shall" typically denotes mandatory action, see Riley v. People, 104 P.3d 218, 221 (Colo.2004),
the parties do not dispute that filing a notice of appeal in the county court is required by Crim. P. 37(a). The question, rather, is whether this step is jurisdictional and in this regard, the rule is silent. Additionally, there is little specific authority discerning the jurisdictional requirements of Crim. P. 37(a). This lack of authority, however, stands in stark contrast to the abundance of authority surrounding our parallel appellate rule C.A.R. 3(a). Indeed, not only have we previously discussed the jurisdictional requirements of C.A.R. 3(a), but the appellate rule also expressly states which of its requirements are jurisdictional. Of course, the jurisdictional requirements of C.A.R. 3(a) are not dispositive of those of Crim. P. 37(a), but the appellate rule and the rationale underlying its jurisdictional requirements offer a useful context within which to analyze Crim. P. 37(a). Therefore, we refer to C.A.R. 3(a) for guidance. See Butkovich v. Indus. Comm'n, 723 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Colo.1986) ().
Colorado Appellate Rule 3(a) provides:
An appeal permitted by law from a trial court to the appellate court shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within the time allowed by C.A.R. 4. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the appellate court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal.... An advisory copy of the notice of appeal shall be served on the clerk of the trial court within the time for its filing in the appellate court. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than timely filing of a notice of appeal in the appellate court does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal. Content of the...
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