Petet v. State

Decision Date12 December 2000
Parties(Mo.App. W.D. 2000) . Jessica Petet and Deanna Bailey, Respondents, v. State of Missouri, Department of Social Services, Division of Family Services, Appellant. WD58299 Missouri Court of Appeals Western District Handdown Date:
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Clay County, Hon. James E. Welsh

Counsel for Appellant: Lawrence D. Love

Counsel for Respondent: Sherrill P. Roberts

Opinion Summary: State of Missouri Department of Social Services, Division of Family Services, appeals a judgment reversing a Child Abuse and Neglect Review Board finding that probable cause existed to believe that respondents Jessica Petet and Deana Bailey had abused or neglected a minor child on August 18, 1993. The circuit court held that the Division lacked statutory authority to "re-open" or "continue" an investigation of respondents over a year after it sent out notification that the investigation had been completed and that no probable cause existed to support charges of neglect.

AFFIRMED.

Division holds:

(1) Under the clear language of sections 210.145.6 and 210.145.12, the Division was required to immediately pursue hotline investigations and complete those investigations within thirty days unless a valid reason for keeping the investigation open is set forth in the information system and regular updates are made to the information system.

(2) The trial court did not err in finding that the Division lacked authority to re-open the investigation of Respondents over a year after it completed its original investigation and determined that no probable cause existed to support charges of neglect where nothing in the record indicated that the Division had a valid reason for keeping the investigation open and no new hotline calls had been received by the Division.

Opinion Author: Joseph M. Ellis, Judge

Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED. Smith, P.J., and Ulrich, J., concur.

Opinion:

Appellant State of Missouri Department of Social Services, Division of Family Services ("Division"), appeals from a judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Clay County reversing a Child Abuse and Neglect Review Board ("CANRB") finding that probable cause existed to believe that Respondents Jessica Petet and Deana Bailey had abused or neglected a minor child on August 18, 1993. The Circuit Court held that the Division lacked statutory authority to "re-open" or "continue" an investigation of Respondents over a year after it sent out notification that the investigation had been completed and that no probable cause existed to support charges of neglect. The parties submitted the case to the circuit court on the following stipulated facts.

On August 18, 1993, a hotline report was filed alleging that Michael S_____, a minor child, had been abused or neglected.1 As a result of that report, the Division undertook an investigation of the allegations related to that incident.

After conducting that investigation, on October 5, 1993, the investigator for the Division determined that there was no evidence to substantiate the allegations of abuse and/or neglect against either Petet or Bailey. Later that day, the Division sent a letter to Petet stating, in relevant part, "Our investigation has been completed under Sections 210.110-210.165 RSMo and the Division has determined that . . . [t]here is no evidence to substantiate Child Abuse or Neglect."

From October 1993 through September 1995, there were no new hot line reports of abuse or neglect related to either Petet or Bailey. However, in September 1995, the Division sent letters to Respondents stating that the Division intended to "continue the investigation" related to the August 18, 1993, report. In the first week of November 1995, the Division sent a letter to Respondents stating that it had determined that probable cause existed that both of them had been involved in child abuse and/or neglect in the August 18, 1993, incident.

As a result of that determination, the Respondents' names were placed on the list of individuals determined by the Division to have abused or neglected a child. The names of individuals placed on that list are available to potential childcare employers.

Respondents timely requested that the CANRB review the Division's decision. In their request for review, Respondents asserted that the Division had no jurisdiction to "continue" the investigation in the fall of 1995 and that the Division's probable cause determination should be deemed a nullity and void ab initio.

On December 2, 1998, the CANRB conducted a hearing on the matter. On December 23, 1998, the CANRB issued its decision upholding the Division's probable cause determination after a substantive review of the evidence. In the course of its review, the CANRB did not address the procedural or jurisdictional arguments raised by Respondents.

Respondents timely filed a petition for de novo judicial review in the Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri pursuant to section 210.152.5.2 On November 24, 1999, the parties appeared by their attorneys and submitted the matter for de novo review to the court upon stipulated facts and briefs filed by the parties. On January 31, 2000, the Circuit Court entered judgment finding that the Division did not have jurisdiction to "continue" or "reopen" its investigation of Respondents where no new hotline complaints had been lodged against either of them and no new evidence had been presented to the Division to prompt further investigation. The Circuit Court held that the Division's initial finding that there was insufficient evidence to establish probable cause was final and could not be revisited by the Division. The Division appeals from that judgment.

In determining the proper appellate standard of review, we first address the nature of the trial court proceeding. Section 210.152.5 provides, in pertinent part:

If the alleged perpetrator is aggrieved by the decision of the [CANRB], the alleged perpetrator may seek de novo judicial review in the circuit court.... In reviewing such decisions, the circuit court shall provide the alleged perpetrator the opportunity to appear and present testimony. The alleged perpetrator may subpoena any witnesses except the alleged victim or the reporter. However, the circuit court shall have the discretion to allow the parties to submit the case upon a stipulated record.

(emphasis added). When the determination of the CANRB is challenged and the alleged perpetrator seeks de novo judicial review in the circuit court, that court conducts a fresh hearing on the matter and is not limited in any way by the previous decisions of the Division or the CANRB. Williams v. State, Dept. of Social Services, Div. of Family Services, 978 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998). In that de novo review proceeding, the alleged perpetrator is afforded the opportunity for a full hearing on all issues. Brown v. Stangler, 954 S.W.2d 707, 708 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). "The case law indicates that the trial de novo, although in theory an appeal of the administrative hearing, is an original proceeding and is not an exercise of review jurisdiction." Jenkins v. Director of Revenue, 858 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993).3 Therefore, we review the decision of the circuit court and not that of the Division.

The circuit court's decision "will be sustained unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or misapplies the law." Davis v. Missouri Division of Family Services, 907 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995). When, as here, the parties agree to submit a case to the circuit court upon a stipulation of facts, appellate review is limited to whether the circuit court drew the proper legal conclusions from the stipulated facts. Bakker v. Employee Sav. Plan of McDonnell Douglas Corp., 919 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996); Miskimen v. Kansas City Star Co., 684 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Mo. App. W.D. 1984).

In its sole point on appeal, the Division claims that the circuit court erred in concluding that the Division lacked jurisdiction to continue or re-open an investigation after making an initial determination that there was insufficient evidence to establish probable cause. The Division argues that it has the implied and inherent power to continue investigations because it is not prohibited from doing so by statute and because it is necessary to carry out its statutory purpose.

The Division states that while section 210.145 provides that the Division must complete all investigations within thirty days unless good cause is shown, the relevant statutes do not prohibit the Division from continuing or reopening the investigation after that time. The Division also contends that the statutes should be construed broadly to grant it the power to continue or reopen investigations to carry out its statutory purpose under section 210.109 to "prevent and remedy child abuse and neglect."

Ultimately, this case depends on statutory interpretation of the provisions of Chapter 210. Issues involving the interpretation of statutory language are questions of law, not judicial discretion. Hadel v. Board of Educ. of School District of Springfield, R-12, 990 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999). Our ultimate purpose in interpreting statutory language is...

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    ...and not merely review the record before the CANRB. See also Lipic v. State, 93 S.W.3d 839, 842 (Mo. App. E.D.2002); Petet v. State, 32 S.W.3d 818, 821 (Mo.App. W.D.2000). Without further explanation, however, Williams also concluded that in so doing the ultimate issue was whether there was ......
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