Petion v. State

• Decision Date: 21 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. SC09-664.,SC09-664.
• Parties: Gerald PETION, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

48 So.3d 726

Gerald PETION, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC09-664.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 21, 2010.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Alan T. Lipson, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Celia A. Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.

LEWIS, J.

Gerald Petion seeks review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Petion v. State, 4 So.3d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), asserting that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in J.D. v. State, 553 So.2d 1317 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), with regard to the correct standard of review for an error in the admission of evidence during a non-jury trial. We exercise our jurisdiction to resolve this conflict, see art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const., and hold that during a non-jury trial, a judge is presumed to have disregarded inadmissible evidence, but that a trial court's express and specific finding of admissibility on the record can rebut that presumption. Accordingly, we quash the decision below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In addition, we disapprove the decisions discussed in this opinion to the extent that they hold a presumption of disregard applies when a trial court during a bench trial admits evidence over objection and does not expressly state on the record that this evidence did not contribute to the final judgment or determination. Lastly, we disapprove J.D. to the extent it holds that there is no presumption that a trial court disregards exposure to inadmissible or improper evidence during a bench trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts from the decision below establish that following a non-jury trial, GeraldPetion was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of cannabis with intent to sell, and unlawful use of a false name. During a suppression hearing, a law enforcement officer testified that he had obtained information from a local resident that a driver of a white Toyota Camry had asked the resident whether he was "straight or looking to party," and handed the resident a piece of paper which contained a phone number and was inscribed with the initials "GP." During the bench trial, two law enforcement officers testified that a few days after the tip, they conducted a traffic stop of a white Toyota Camry matching the description provided by the resident. The vehicle was driven by Gerald Petion and carried several passengers.

The officers requested identification from Petion, and Petion produced a driver's license that was not his own. Petion was arrested for providing false identification to a law enforcement officer, and he was searched. During the search of Petion, the officers discovered crack cocaine and twenty-six bags of powder cocaine. A search of the vehicle revealed twelve bags of marijuana, a number of clear plastic bags, and slips of paper inscribed with the initials "GP" and a phone number.

In addressing these facts, one of the officers was allowed to testify over defense objection that it was common for street-level narcotics dealers to distribute drug-related contact references on slips of paper similar to those recovered from the vehicle. The testimony disclosed:

[STATE]: Okay. Did you at any point later see pieces of the paper with the initials "GP" on it?

[OFFICER]: Yes, ma'am.

[STATE]: Where did you see those pieces of paper?

[OFFICER]: I believe there was a cup in the center console of the vehicle that had quite a few of those pieces of paper in the vehicle.

[STATE]: What did the pieces of paper say on them?

[OFFICER]: They all said the same thing. They said the initials "GP" with a telephone number.

[STATE]: Okay. Have you ever seen-based on your training and experience, have you ever seen anything like this before?

[DEFENSE]: Objection. Now we're being really speculative. Pieces of paper with initials and a telephone number, and now he's going to speculate what they are used for?

THE COURT: Based on his training and experience? Overruled.

[OFFICER]: It's common for street level narcotics dealers to hand out contact reference for potential buyers to contact them, and that's consistent with that.

The trial court found Petion guilty of the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of cannabis with intent to sell, and unlawful use of a false name. Petion was sentenced to concurrent terms of forty-six months imprisonment on the first two convictions and to time served on the last. On appeal to the Fourth District, Petion contended that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting a police officer to testify that it was common for drug dealers to provide contact information to potential buyers. See Petion, 4 So.3d at 85.¹ Petion assertedthat testimony from a police officer concerning generalized common practices among drug dealers is inadmissible as substantive proof of a particular defendant's guilt. See id. at 87. The district court agreed that the testimony was inadmissible, but reasoned that any error by the trial court in admitting the testimony was harmless because the trial court was presumed to have disregarded any inadmissible evidence. The district court stated:

We find, however, that any error in admitting this testimony was harmless in this case, which was tried without a jury. When a trial judge, sitting as the trier of fact, erroneously admits evidence, the judge is presumed to have disregarded that evidence. See C.W. v. State, 793 So.2d 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Although this presumption is rebuttable, nothing in the record suggests that the trial judge relied upon this inadmissible evidence.

Id. (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, the Fourth District affirmed Petion's conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell.

Thereafter, Petion sought discretionary review in this Court based on conflict with J.D. v. State, 553 So.2d 1317 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). In J.D., two officers arrested the appellant, whom they believed to be the driver of a vehicle which they had been pursuing. See id. at 1318. During the bench trial, an officer testified that after J.D. was arrested and read his Miranda² rights, he refused to respond to questions. See id. J.D. objected and moved for a mistrial, asserting that the officer's statement was an impermissible comment on J.D.'s post-arrest silence. See id. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial but did not provide an express ruling on the objection. See id. The trial court adjudicated J.D. delinquent, and J.D. appealed the adjudication to the Third District. See id.

The Third District held that the trial court's failure to respond to the objection implicitly overruled the objection and, therefore, the trial judge had considered the offending comment in reaching the judgment. See id. The district court applied a harmless error analysis but expressly declined to apply the presumption utilized in Petion. The court reasoned:

We understand the State's position to be that, inasmuch as the trial which we review here was a non-jury trial, the trial judge certainly knew to disregard the comment and, accordingly, we can rest assured that he has done so. The standard which the State urges would, then, be nothing more than one which requires this court's subjective interpretation of what the trial judge did or did not consider, inasmuch as the record presented for review is silent on this point. We respectfully decline the State's invitation, and prefer, as indicated above, instead to hold to an objective interpretation of the evidence presented in the record on review. When the record is examined in this light, two facts are clear: first, the quoted comment was, in fact, made; and, second, this court cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt from the record, as [ State v.] DiGuilio[, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986),] requires, that the error complained of did not contribute to the adjudication of delinquency.

Id. at 1319. The Third District reversed the adjudication and remanded for a new trial. See id.

Based on the conflicting standards of review expressed in these decisions, this Court accepted review to resolve the conflict between Petion and J.D.³

ANALYSIS

The initial presumption that a trial court has disregarded inadmissible evidence during a non-jury trial is well established in Florida. In a non-jury trial, the factual findings of the judge are entitled to the weight of a jury verdict. See, e.g., Spataro v. State, 179 So.2d 873, 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). However, unlike a jury, it is generally understood that a trial judge acting as both the trier of fact and arbiter of the law "is trained by learning and experience to segregate evidence" that is inadmissible and improperly prejudicial from evidence that is admissible, reliable, and relevant to the issue. M.A. v. State, 384 So.2d 740, 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (quoting United States ex rel. Placek v. Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298, 1304 (7th Cir.1976)). From that principle, the appellate courts of Florida have derived the rebuttable presumption that in non-jury cases, trial judges base their decisions upon admissible evidence and have disregarded inadmissible evidence. See id. (citing United States v. Masri, 547 F.2d 932 (5th Cir.1977) (applying Florida law); see also Jalbert v. State, 95 So.2d 589 (Fla.1957)). Accordingly, if a trial judge receives evidence as the finder of fact and hears inadmissible evidence, such as through a suppression hearing, a proffer, a motion in limine, or prior to sustaining an objection to the evidence, the judge is generally presumed to have disregarded the improper evidence. Therefore, any error in the trial judge's exposure to this improper evidence is deemed harmless. In addition, a trial court may initially rule that evidence is admissible but later conclude that such evidence...