Petition of Brown
| Decision Date | 15 July 1985 |
| Citation | 395 Mass. 1006,480 N.E.2d 301 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | Petition of Dennis W. BROWN, Petitioner. |
Joseph J. Balliro, Boston (Stephen P. Colella, Haverhill, with him), for Dennis W. Brown.
Michael W. Dingle, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Sheriff of Essex County.
Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.
RESCRIPT.
The defendant, 1 Dennis W. Brown, was convicted by a jury in the Central Northern Essex Division of the District Court of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to one year in a house of correction (thirty days to be served) and was placed on two years' probation. This appeal arises out of the revocation of his probation by a District Court judge. The defendant claims that his due process rights were violated by various deficiencies in the revocation proceedings and by the judge's erroneous admission of and reliance upon uncorroborated hearsay.
The revocation proceedings were initiated by a "Notice of Surrender," served on December 9, 1981, which alleged that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation by continued involvement in "drug trafficking." At the hearing, police officers testified to admissions made by the defendant which indicated that he was engaged in drug trafficking. They also introduced hearsay statements, originating from named and unnamed informants, which also implicated the defendant in drug dealing. The judge revoked the defendant's probation. The defendant then filed a petition in Superior Court for habeas corpus relief which was transferred here pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 4A (1984 ed.). A single justice of this court upheld the revocation of the defendant's probation and that judgment is now before us on appeal.
As to the defendant's principal claim, the single justice concluded that the judge "was warranted in relying on [the defendant's] admissions in making his findings." However, he determined that We agree with both conclusions. According to the single justice, the hearing judge "appear[ed] to have regarded Brown's uncontroverted admissions as most significant." Therefore the single justice decided against remanding for the judge's consideration "whether the evidence apart from the hearsay statements attributed to informants would lead the judge to the same conclusions that he reached previously." We cannot agree with this conclusion of the single justice. The only language of the District Court judge...
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HARRIS v. U.S.
...1987) (parties agreed that preponderance standard applied and court declined to consider different standard); Petition of Brown, 395 Mass. 1006, 480 N.E.2d 301, 302 (1985) (concluding that "sufficient evidence" was presented to warrant revocation where trial court found that state "sustaine......
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Com. v. Durling
...careful consideration. This court has always allowed the use of hearsay at probation revocation hearings. See Brown, petitioner, 395 Mass. 1006, 1007, 480 N.E.2d 301 (1985) (although bulk of hearsay was insufficient, no contention that it was improper). Two overriding principles identified ......
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Com. v. Holmgren
...(1st Cir.1994) ("it is enough if the proof, reasonably viewed, satisfies the court that a violation occurred"); Brown, petitioner, 395 Mass. 1006, 1007, 480 N.E.2d 301 (1985) (trial judge applied preponderance of evidence Because of the differences in the burden of proof, the concept of col......
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Commonwealth v. Foster.
...case, but “the hearing judge ... is responsible for determining the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Brown, petitioner, 395 Mass. 1006, 1007, 480 N.E.2d 301 (1985). See Commonwealth v. Cates, 57 Mass.App.Ct. at 763, 786 N.E.2d 411. Finally, we see no abuse of discretion in the judge......