Petition of Vermeulen, C-148

• Decision Date: 19 July 1960
• Docket Number: No. C-148,C-148
• Citation: 122 So.2d 318
• Parties: Matter of the Petition for Adoption of an Infant by Richard T. VERMEULEN and Lucille P. Vermeulen. Anson A. CARRIER, Appellant, v. Richard T. VERMEULEN et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 318

122 So.2d 318

Matter of the Petition for Adoption of an Infant by Richard T. VERMEULEN and Lucille P. Vermeulen.

Anson A. CARRIER, Appellant, v. Richard T. VERMEULEN et al., Appellees.

No. C-148.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 19, 1960.

Edward L. Bush, Palatka, for appellant.

Eugene L. Eastmoore, Palatka, for appellees.

WIGGINTON, Chief Judge.

On the appeal of this case we reviewed a final decree entered in a proceeding by which the Vermeulens sought the adoption of a minor child, Susan Ruth Helen Carrier. Attached to the petition filed in the trial court was a consent agreement for adoption signed by the child's natural mother, Ruby Carrier Townsend, by which the mother purported to grant, bargain and transfer the child in question to the Vermeulens for adoption. By this agreement the mother relinquished the permanent care, custody and control of the child and waived and surrendered all of her rights as natural mother of the child to the Vermeulens.

The child's father, Anson A. Carrier, appeared in the cause and filed an answer objecting to the adoption of his child by the petitioners and prayed that custody of the child be awarded to him. During the course of the trial the child's mother, Ruby Carrier Townsend, appeared as a witness on behalf of the petitioners. By her testimony she affirmed her consent to adoption by the petitioners and attested to their good character and ability to provide the child with a good home. The evidence taken during the trial, which was considered by the chancellor and upon which his final decree was based, is fully set forth in the opinion rendered by this court. ¹ By such final decree the petitioners' prayer for adoption was denied, but they were awarded the permanent care and custody of the child with visitation rights granted the father.

By our opinion we found that the custody of the minor child involved in the proceeding had previously been fully adjudicated in an adversary proceeding between the child's natural father and mother by a court of competent jurisdiction in the State of Oregon. By the Oregon decree the custody of the child was awarded to the appellant father, Anson A. Carrier. We held that the record of this case was devoid of any evidence tending to show that since the entry of the Oregon decree appellant's circumstances have so changed as to render him incapable of caring for and rearing his child. We further held that there was no proof of such misconduct on the part of appellant as would justify a forfeiture of the custodial rights granted him by the court of original jurisdiction. We ultimately held that the trial court in this case erred in granting custody of the child to the appellees Vermeulen, and reversed that decree with directions that it be vacated and an appropriate decree be entered in accordance with the views expressed in our opinion. Implicit in our judgment in our holding that the appellant father is entitled to a decree awarding him custody of the child, and that a decree should be entered accordingly. Petition for writ of certiorari to review this court's decision was denied by the Supreme Court. ²

Upon the going down of our mandate January 8, 1960, the appellant filed in the trial court a motion praying for the entry of a decree in accordance with the judgment and mandate of this court. This motion came on for hearing before the chancellor whose decree we had reversed. Instead of passing upon the motion the chancellor entered an order in which it is recited: 'In the preparation and entry of the final decree in this cause by the undersigned language was used as follows--'I am not hardhearted or cold-blooded enough to order, etc.,' and by reason of such language and the opinions otherwise expressed in the findings of the court in said decree it probably appears that the mind of the undersigned is so firmly fixed upon the correctness of said decree that it might influence his official action in any further consideration of this matter.' By his order the chancellor then proceeded to disquality himself from further participation in the cause and transferred the case to another circuit judge of that court to perform all further judicial functions incident to a final and complete determination thereof.

It becomes apparent by such order of disqualification that the chancellor misconceived his proper function as an administrator of the law. For personal rather than legal reasons he abdicated the responsibility which devolved upon him to comply with this court's mandate. The courts of this country are committed to the doctrine that a trial court is without authority to alter or evade the mandate of the appellate court absent permission to do so. ³ The judgment of an appellate court is a final judgment in the cause and compliance therewith by the lower court is a purely ministerial act. ⁴ The lower court's duty to perform such an act may not properly be avoided merely because of some preconceived notion as to the correctness of its judgment or the supposed incorrectness of the appellate court's opinion and judgment of reversal.

Appellate courts neither ask or expect a trial court to accept responsibility for the opinions and judgments rendered by them. Responsibility for the correctness of such opinions and judgments is exclusively theirs. Whether the court whose judgment or decree had been reversed continues to adhere to the conclusions originally reached by it, and assumes a position of disagreement with the wisdom or correctness of the appellate court's opinion, is wholly immaterial insofar as concerns the lower court's duty under the law to enter an appropriate decree in accordance with the appellate court's mandate.

Courts are the mere instruments of the law and can will nothing. In the over-all scheme for administering justice courts at the various levels of authority are required to discharge their lawful duties within the orbit of their respective jurisdictions. When one court has completed its judicial functions with respect to any matter brought before it, its responsibility as to such matter ends. If on appeal the result reached by the court of original jurisdiction is reversed or modified, that court is required to effectuate with fidelity and dispatch the mandate of the superior court. The reason for this rule is obvious. When a particular judgment is directed by the appellate court, the lower court is not acting on its own motion, but in obedience to the order of its superior. What that superior says it shall do, it must do, and that alone. Public interest require that an end shall be put to litigation, and, when a given cause has received consideration on...