Petroff Trucking Co. v. Illinois Dep't of Transp.

• Decision Date: 02 December 2011
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 11-241-GPM
• Parties: PETROFF TRUCKING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and JIM LAYDEN, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois

PETROFF TRUCKING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff,

v.ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and JIM LAYDEN, Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 11-241-GPM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DATED: December 2, 2011

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MURPHY, District Judge:

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Petroff Trucking Company, Inc. ("Petroff"), brings this action alleging that Defendants Illinois Department of Transportation ("IDOT") and Jim Layden, an IDOT employee, wrongfully have denied Petroff the status of a disadvantaged business enterprise ("DBE"), that is, a minority-owned and -operated business that thus is entitled to certain privileges in bidding for IDOT contracts. See generally Northern Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois, No. 00 C 4515, 2004 WL 422704 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2004). In Count I of Petroff's complaint, Petroff seeks a declaratory judgment that Petroff is a DBE within the meaning of IDOT regulations. In Count II of Petroff's complaint, Petroff brings a claim against Layden in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Layden has violated Petroff's right of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by refusing to certify Petroff as a DBE. In Count III of Petroff's complaint, Petroff asserts a Section 1983 claim against Layden in his official capacity for allegedly violating Petroff's equal protection rights by refusing to certify Petroff as aDBE. Petroff filed this action originally in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Madison County, Illinois, and the case has been removed to this Court by IDOTand Layden, who allege federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 with respect to Petroff's Section 1983 claims; Count I of Petroff's complaint is within the Court's supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Currently, this matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment brought by IDOT and Layden (Doc. 6). In their initial motion for summary judgment, IDOT and Layden sought dismissal of Petroff's claims on grounds of lack of standing, claiming that Petroff has never been denied certification as a DBE. In its brief in response to the sumary judgment motion, Petroff produced evidence that in 1991 it was denied certification as a DBE by IDOT. See Doc. 9, Doc. 9-1. In their reply brief in support of their motion for summary judgment, IDOT and Layden explained that IDOT maintains records concerning applications for DBE status for only ten years and thus were unaware that in 1991IDOT had denied Petroff certification as a DBE until Petroff called their attention to this fact in Petroff's response to their summary judgment motion. See Doc. 12. In their reply brief in support of their summary judgment motion, IDOT and Layden argued further that the evidence submitted to the Court by Petroff proving that in 1991 IDOT refused to certify Petroff as a DBE shows that Petroff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See id. The Court then afforded Petroff an opportunity to file a brief addressing the issue of whether Petroff's Section 1983 claims are time-barred. See Doc. 26. Petroff elected not to file a brief addressing the statute of limitations. Having considered carefully the motion for summary judgment brought by IDOT and Layden, Petroff's response and its supporting documentation, and Defendants' reply brief, the Court now rules as follows.

II. ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, the Court notes the standard under which it must evaluate a motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, generally at any time until thirty days after the close of discovery in a case, "[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense - or the part of each claim or defense - on which summary judgment is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The rule provides further that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion." Id. Under Rule 56, "[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be . . . genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or . . . showing that the materials cited do not establish the . . . presence of a genuine dispute[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). The rule provides also that "[t]he court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). With respect to affidavits and declarations, the rule provides that "[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).

In responding to a summary judgment motion, the non-moving party may not simply rest upon the allegations contained in the pleadings but must present specific facts to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-26 (1986); Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 1996). A genuine issue of material fact is not demonstrated by the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties or bysome metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only if a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party on the evidence presented. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000). In considering a summary judgment motion, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Miller v. Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 733 (7th Cir. 2010). On summary judgment a court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, because these are tasks for a factfinder. See O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2011); Morfin v. City of E. Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 999 (7th Cir. 2003). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, "the court has one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial." Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994)) (brackets omitted). With the foregoing standard in mind, the Court turns to consideration of the instant summary judgment motion.

To the extent that Petroff seeks compensatory damages against IDOT or against Layden in his official capacity, the Court notes that any such claim must fail. "[T]he Eleventh Amendment prohibits a suit in federal court 'in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant.'" Moore v. Indiana, 999 F.2d 1125, 1128 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)). See also Keri v. Board of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 641 (7th Cir. 2006); Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1997). IDOT, as an agency of the State of Illinois, enjoys immunity from suit in federalcourt. See Midwest Fence Corp. v. United States Dep't of Transp., No. 10 C 5627, 2011 WL 2551179, at *13 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 2011) (citing Kroll v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1991)); McGee v. IDOT, No. 02 C 0277, 2002 WL 31478261, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2002). A state may waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1981); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 337 (7th Cir. 2000). However, Illinois has waived its sovereign immunity only to the extent of authorizing itself to be sued in the Illinois Court of Claims. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing 705 ILCS 505/8(d)); Williamson Towing Co. v. Illinois, 534 F.2d 758, 759-60 (7th Cir. 1976).

Additionally, with respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which Count II and Count III of Petroff's complaint are brought, that statute provides, in relevant part,

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983. In general, "states and their agencies are not 'persons' subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983[.]" Johnson v. Illinois Supreme Court, 165 F.3d 1140, 1141 (7th Cir. 1999). Also, while it is the case that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity, Section 1983 does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of a state and its agencies from suit in federal court. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-45 (1979); Meadows v. Indiana, 854 F.2d 1068, 1070 n.3 (7th Cir. 1988). Claims against state employees in their official capacities are deemed, of course, to be claims against a state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.159, 165-66 (1985) (citing Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)); Garcia v. City of Chicago, Ill., 24 F.3d 966, 969 (7th Cir. 1994). Similarly, state employees sued in their official capacities, are not "persons" within the meaning of Section 1983. See Howlett v. Rose, 496...