Petrowsky v. Krause, 97-2205

• Citation: 223 Wis.2d 32,588 N.W.2d 318
• Decision Date: 04 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-2205,97-2205
• Parties: Annette PETROWSKY, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Brad KRAUSE, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Wisconsin

Page 318

588 N.W.2d 318

223 Wis.2d 32

Annette PETROWSKY, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Brad KRAUSE, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 97-2205.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs Sept. 18, 1998.

Opinion Released Nov. 4, 1998.

Opinion Filed Nov. 4, 1998.

On behalf of the respondent-appellant, the cause was submitted on the brief of Russell D. Bohach of Brennan & Collins of Milwaukee.

On behalf of the petitioner-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Thomas J. McAdams of Reinhart, Boerner, Van Deuren, Norris & Rieselbach, S.C. of Milwaukee.

Before SNYDER, P.J., BROWN and NETTESHEIM, JJ.

BROWN, J.

Our state domestic abuse statute applies to certain acts engaged in by "an adult family member or adult household member against another adult family member or adult household member." Section 813.12(1), STATS. "Household member" means any person "currently or formerly residing in a place of abode with another person." Section 813.12(1)(c). In this case, the parties were dating, but were not married. The evidence shows only that they stayed together under one roof when they took frequent trips to a cabin in northern Wisconsin during the summer of 1996. We hold as a matter of law that the evidence is insufficient to find that they were "household members" for purposes of the domestic abuse statute. We reverse.

The relevant facts are that Annette Petrowsky and Brad Krause dated from approximately June 1994 until September 1996. During the summer of 1996, they took numerous trips to Krause's parents' cabin in northern Wisconsin. They would stay in the cabin together and then come back to their respective homes in Ozaukee county. They did this repeatedly throughout that summer.

In September 1996, the parties ended their dating relationship. There is evidence that they were in contact after that, although it is disputed who initiated the contacts. These communications caused Krause to contact the police in June 1997 and Petrowsky to petition for a temporary restraining order against Krause under the domestic abuse statute in August 1997. The petition alleged physical and emotional abuse throughout their relationship and a threat of physical violence during a 1997 phone call.

The temporary restraining order was granted. Subsequently, a hearing was held to determine whether an injunction under § 813.12(4), STATS., should be granted against Krause. The trial court found that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the parties were living together during the summer of 1996 and that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Krause had engaged in or may engage in domestic abuse of Petrowsky. Therefore, the injunction was granted.

The issue on appeal is who constitutes a "household member" under the domestic abuse statute. This involves the construction of a statute. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law that appellate courts review without deference to the trial court. See State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court, 214 Wis.2d 605, 613, 571 N.W.2d 385, 387 (1997). The relevant statute here is § 813.12(1)(c), STATS., which defines a "household member" for the purposes of domestic abuse restraining orders and injunctions. The domestic abuse statute only applies to abuse by adult family members or adult household members. See § 813.12(1)(a). As stated above, the statute defines a household member as "a person currently or formerly residing in a place of abode with another person." Section 813.12(1)(c).

"Whether a statute is ambiguous is a question of law." See Boltz v. Boltz, 133 Wis.2d 278, 284, 395 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Ct.App.1986). Only if the statute is ambiguous should the court look to the history, legislative intent, and purpose of the statute. See id. Otherwise, the court must give statutory language its ordinary and accepted meaning. See DOR v. Gordon, 127 Wis.2d 71, 73-74, 377 N.W.2d 212, 213 (Ct.App.1985). This meaning may be found in a standard dictionary, as long as the words are not technical. See Wisconsin Prof'l Police Ass'n v. Waukesha County, 128 Wis.2d 256, 260, 381 N.W.2d 598, 599 (Ct.App.1985).

The statute uses the word "reside" to define the actions of a household member. The plain meaning of reside implies a continuous arrangement. The dictionary definition of reside is "to dwell permanently or continuously ... expressing the idea that a person keeps or returns to a particular dwelling place as his fixed, settled, or legal abode." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1931 (3d ed.1993) (emphasis added). While we acknowledge that the term "reside" is also a legal term of art, here, the legal and general meanings are the same. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines the term by using phrases such as "settled," "permanently," and "continuously." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1308 (6 th ed.1990). Therefore, the clear language of the statute mandates a continuous living arrangement between the parties in order for them to be considered household members.

The question remains whether Petrowksy met her burden by presenting enough facts to make a prima facie case that she and Krause shared a household. "Although credibility is a matter for the trier of fact, whether a party has met its burden of establishing a prima facie case is a question of law which this court may examine independently without giving deference to the trial court's conclusions." Burg v. Miniature Precision Components, Inc., 111 Wis.2d 1, 12, 330 N.W.2d 192, 198 (1983).

In accordance with the clear language of the statute, in...