Pevia v. Comm'r of Corr.
| Decision Date | 06 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action ELH-21-1656 |
| Parties | DONALD R. PEVIA Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONS, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Donald R. Pevia, a Maryland prisoner, filed this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF 1 (Complaint). Plaintiff names as defendants Commissioner of Corrections Assistant Commissioner Frank Bishop, and Officers Eric Muir Christine Reynolds, Carolyn Price, and Sergeant Anthony Koelker.[1] Pevia alleges that while he was housed at North Branch Correctional Institution (“NBCI”) he was improperly exposed to a chemical agent and thereafter was denied a decontamination shower. Id. In plaintiff's view, the amount of “mace” that was used was excessive. ECF 1 at 5. The suit is accompanied by exhibits, docketed collectively at ECF 12.
The defendants have moved to dismiss or for summary judgment (ECF 9), supported by a memorandum (ECF 9-1) (collectively, the “Motion”) and exhibits. Pevia opposes the Motion. ECF 14; ECF 19. And, he has submitted an Affidavit with his response.
No hearing is necessary to address the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons stated below I shall grant the Motion.
On March 3, 2020, plaintiff was in the dayroom at NBCI for his recreation period. ECF 1 at 4. When the doors opened to permit inmates to exit the dayroom, another inmate ran into the dayroom and began to assault Inmate Cooper. Id. Plaintiff saw defendant Muir run toward the dayroom with his fog can out and he tried to cover himself, anticipating that a chemical agent would be sprayed into the dayroom. Id. Muir opened the slot in the back dayroom door and, without any command to the inmates to stop fighting, began to spray the two inmates who were fighting. Id. Defendant Reynolds then arrived, opened the slot in the front dayroom door, and, without warning, sprayed pepper spray into the day room. Id. Then, Defendant Koelker arrived and “took over for Reynolds”, also spraying pepper spray into the dayroom. Id.
Plaintiff states that he and other inmates were hit with the chemical agent, causing them to choke, some to the point of vomiting. Id. He also claims that their skin was burning. Id. Pevia recalls that he and the other inmates “crawl[ed] over top of each other like crabs in a pot” to try to escape the chemical agent. Id. at 5.
The two inmates who had been fighting had stopped and were “secured” at the door slots. Id. After the inmates were secured, the dayroom doors opened and plaintiff ran out of the room. Id. Using his shirt, which he had wet in a bucket, he tried to cool his skin. Id. Plaintiff was patted down and “forced to lock in his cell with his cell mate ” Id.
Approximately 45 minutes later, defendant Price made rounds on the tier. Id. Plaintiff asked if he could have a shower. But, Price declined his request, stating that he was not involved in the altercation and therefore was not in need of a shower. Id. Plaintiff sought to put his contaminated clothes out of his cell to be washed, but that request was denied by Reynolds. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he and his cellmate stripped in their cell and took a “bird bath” in the sink, one at a time, in an effort to wash off the pepper spray. Id. In his view, this was not a good alterative as the spray was mostly on his back, shoulders, and the back of his head. Id. Because Pevia was afraid of contaminating his mattress, plaintiff slept on his steel bunk. ECF 1 at 6.
Plaintiff filed a timely administrative remedy procedure complaint (“ARP”) regarding the incident. ECF 1-2. Thereafter, a contested hearing was heard by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) at the Office of Administrative Hearings, with testimony taken from plaintiff. ECF 1-2 at 16-29. The ALJ determined that defendants directed the spray toward the fighting inmates and only the amount of force necessary to quell the fight was utilized. Id. at 24-25. Additionally, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not offered a decontamination shower but, had he asked for one, it would have been provided. Id. at 25. Moreover, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was able to wash the chemical agent from his body utilizing the sink in his cell and plaintiff was not entitled to relief. Id. at 28.
Plaintiff now seeks declarative and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 7-8.
On March 3, 2020, at approximately 6:47 p.m., inmate Robert Hilton left the shower and rushed into the dayroom, attacking inmate Cooper with a homemade weapon. ECF 9-2 at 1, ¶ 4 (White Decl.); ECF 9-2 at 6-9, 23, 37, 53 (attachments); ECF 9-3 (surveillance video) at 18:46:48:07-18:47:50).[2] Defendant Reynolds, who witnessed the altercation, announced a “1010” (inmate on inmate fight) and waited for assistance. ECF 9-2 at 6, 23. Muir and Koelker, along with several other officers, responded to the dayroom. Id.; ECF 9-3 at 18:47:28. Muir and Koelker also directed the inmates to stop fighting and separate but the inmates did not comply and continued to fight. ECF 9-2 at 6, 17-18, 21-22.
Muir deployed pepper spray through the slot in the door toward the two inmates, but it had no effect. Id.; ECF 9-3 at 18:47:32. The inmates continued to fight. ECF 9-2 at 6 and ECF-9-3 at 18:47:32-18:-47:39. Muir and Koelker sprayed additional pepper spray toward the two inmates. ECF 9-2 at 6; ECF 9-3 at 18:47:38. However, the pepper spray was not aimed at plaintiff or any of the other inmates in the dayroom. ECF 9-2 at 6; ECF 9-3. While the inmates fought and officers used pepper spray to stop the fight, plaintiff remained on the opposite side of the dayroom along with several inmates who all appeared, from the video, to be attempting to avoid exposure to the spray. ECF 1-2; ECF 9-3 at 18:47:34-37. Plaintiff removed his shirt to cover his face and turned toward the wall. ECF 1-2; ECF 9-3 at 18:48:13.
Plaintiff's back and neck were exposed to the pepper spray. ECF 9-3 at 18:47:32. Once the fighting inmates were subdued and the dayroom doors opened, plaintiff left the dayroom while wiping his face with his shirt, and returned to his cell. ECF 9-3 at 18:49:29-end.
On March 10, 2020, plaintiff was seen for nurse sick call. ECF 9-4 at 2. He declined to be treated, reporting that his symptoms had resolved. ECF 9-4 at 2-3.
The video evidence demonstrates that the entire altercation lasted approximately one minute. It comports with the reports of correctional staffs concerning the incident. ECF 9-3.
Bishop was not the Warden of NBCI at the time of the incident. He retired on December 6, 2019. ECF 9-2 at 1, ¶ 2.
Plaintiff's claims are predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that a plaintiff may file suit against any “person” who, acting under color of state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012); see also Graves v. Loi, 930 F.3d 307, 318-19 (4th Cir. 2019); Owens v. Balt. City State's Attorney's Office, 767 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Baltimore City Police Dep't v. Owens, 575 U.S. 983 (2015). However, § 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). In other words, § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a “person acting under the color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 823 (2011); Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2009); Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997).
The phrase “under color of state law” is an element that “is synonymous with the more familiar state-action requirement-and the analysis for each is identical.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Memorial Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982)). A person acts under color of state law “only when exercising power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); see also Philips, 572 F.3d at 181 () (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (); Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); LoveLane v. Martin, 355 F.3d...
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