Peyatt v. Moore

Decision Date03 December 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-714,03-714
Citation102 P.3d 535,2004 MT 341
PartiesKERRY PEYATT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JIM MOORE, and J. MOORE ENTERPRISES, LLC, Defendants, Third-Party Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. DON REUTER and JOHN DOES I-X, Third-Party Defendants.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

For Appellant: Gregory G. Murphy, Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather, P.C., Billings, Montana.

For Respondents: Kevin M. Funyak, Stacey & Funyak, Billings, Montana Brenda L. Blazer and Monte L. Rogneby, Vogel Law Firm, Bismarck, North Dakota (Third-Party Defendants).

Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Plaintiff Kerry Peyatt (Peyatt) appeals the October 22, 2003, bench ruling of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants Jim Moore and J. Moore Enterprises (collectively, Moore), Peyatt's employer, on Peyatt's claim for breach of duty under the Montana Safety Act (Act). We reverse and remand.

¶2 The following issue is presented on appeal:

¶3 Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Moore by holding that the statutory duty to provide a safe workplace did not extend to the out-of-state location at which Peyatt was injured?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 Peyatt was severely injured on February 3, 2001, in Bismarck, North Dakota, when his arm was torn off in the spinning power takeoff shaft (PTO) of a tractor. At that time, Peyatt was employed by Moore as a truck driver.

¶5 During the summer of 2000, the State of Montana was adversely affected by fires and drought. Particularly hard hit were ranchers in need of hay for their cattle. Then-Governor Marc Racicot indicated that Montana would need over one million tons of hay to help affected ranchers feed their livestock over the coming winter. Montana received a $300,000 federal grant to provide emergency hay to ranchers, which resulted in the creation of the "I Care a Ton" relief program.

¶6 The Montana Department of Agriculture contracted with the Montana Farm Bureau Foundation (MFBF) to handle the administration of the federal grant and day-to-day activities of the "I Care a Ton" program. The contract between the Department and the MFBF stated that the purpose of the program was to "organize, coordinate, supervise, and purchase transportation services" to ship emergency hay to Montana producers affected by fire and drought. To locate hay to be donated to the program, the MFBF placed advertisements within the media of Montana and surrounding states. Those ads requested that interested parties call the MFBF, which would then work with the donor on the specifics of the donation. Once the details were worked out with the donor, MFBF would forward this information to a transportation provider to pick up and deliver the hay. The MFBF would advise donors that they would need to make arrangements for the loading of the hay on the transport trucks.

¶7 Many North Dakotans were willing to help Montana in this emergency in light of the help Montana ranchers lent to North Dakota three years earlier in 1997 when North Dakota lost over 100,000 head of livestock during a spring blizzard. Montana ranchers responded by donating hundreds of cows through the "One Good Cow" program to help North Dakota ranchers rebuild their herds.

¶8 Don Reuter (Reuter), a North Dakota farmer, contacted the MFBF regarding his desire to donate hay through the "I Care a Ton" program. The MFBF reached an agreement with Reuter wherein the donated hay would be picked up at Reuter's property in North Dakota and then be delivered to a destination in Montana. To facilitate that agreement, the MFBF contracted with Moore to provide transportation services. The contract between the MFBF and Moore stated that Moore was to "provide commercial transportation services to haul hay." In short, Moore was to supply the necessary truck, trailer and equipment, and Reuter was to arrange for loading the hay. The MFBF gave Moore directions to Reuter's property in North Dakota. Moore then dispatched Peyatt, who was employed by Moore as a truck driver, to pick up the load of donated hay and deliver it back to Montana.

¶9 When Peyatt arrived at Reuter's farm, Peyatt positioned the trailer and prepared for the hay to be loaded by Reuter. Reuter was using machinery borrowed from a neighbor to load the hay onto the truck. In the process of loading one of the bales of hay, the tractor being used by Reuter became stuck in some snow, according to Peyatt's testimony, some thirty feet away from the truck and trailer. Reuter left the tractor, which was still running with the PTO engaged and spinning, to get his personal pickup to pull the tractor out. Reuter backed his pickup close to the tractor and pulled a chain out to hook between the tractor and his pickup. In an attempt to assist Reuter, Peyatt took one end of the chain and bent down to hook that end to the tow bar at the back of the tractor. As Peyatt attempted to hook the chain to the tow bar, his coat became entangled in the PTO shaft. Peyatt was maimed when his arm was torn off in the spinning mechanism.

¶10 For reasons unstated in this litigation, Moore was deemed not to have workers' compensation insurance, and, as an uninsured employer, was subjected to suit for Peyatt's injuries pursuant to § 39-71-508, MCA, and was prohibited from raising certain defenses, such as the employee's negligence, pursuant to § 39-71-509, MCA. Thus, the issues herein arise in the context of a work-related injury for which there was no workers' compensation coverage.

¶11 On December 19, 2001, Peyatt brought suit against Moore, raising claims under the "Montana Safety Act" (Act), § 50-71-101, MCA, et seq., asserting that, while in the scope and course of his employment as a truck driver for Moore, he suffered severe injuries as a direct result of Moore's failure to: (1) provide him with a safe place to work; (2) adopt and use practices, means, methods, operations and processes that were reasonably adequate to render his place of employment safe; and (3) do any other thing reasonably necessary to protect his life, health, and safety. Moore responded by filing a third-party complaint against Reuter and other unknown potentially liable parties which may have caused or contributed to Peyatt's injury.

¶12 Moore then moved for summary judgment, arguing that because Moore lacked control over the location where Peyatt's injury occurred—that is, Reuter's farm — that location did not constitute a place of work or employment under the Act, and therefore, Peyatt's claims failed as a matter of law. In a bench ruling at the hearing on summary judgment, the District Court granted Moore's motion for summary judgment. The District Court stated that although the Act does not define "place of employment," it must be one which is controlled by the employer, or over which the employer has the right to exercise control. The District Court stated that Peyatt's place of employment was the truck, and not the loading environment at Reuter's farm. The District Court ruled that since Reuter's farm was not Peyatt's "workplace," Moore could not have breached the duties upon employers imposed by § 50-71-201, MCA, to provide a safe workplace for employees. Peyatt appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶13 Our standard of review on appeal from summary judgment is de novo, and we apply the same criteria as the district court based on Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. Fisch v. Montana Rail Link, Inc., 2003 MT 76, ¶ 6, 315 Mont. 13, ¶ 6, 67 P.3d 267, ¶ 6. We set forth our inquiry for summary judgment in Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 264-65, 900 P.2d 901, 903, as follows:

The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of fact do not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the legal determinations made by a district court as to whether the court erred. Citations omitted.

In a summary judgment proceeding, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. LaTray v. City of Havre, 2000 MT 119, ¶ 15, 299 Mont. 449, ¶ 15, 999 P.2d 1010, ¶ 15. In reviewing the record, all reasonable inferences will be drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. LaTray, ¶ 15.

¶14 This Court has routinely stated that the purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate unnecessary trials, but that summary adjudication should "never be substituted for a trial if a material factual controversy exists." Boyes v. Eddie, 1998 MT 311, ¶ 16, 292 Mont. 152, ¶ 16, 970 P.2d 91, ¶ 16. Ordinarily, questions of negligence are poorly situated to adjudication by summary judgment and are better left for jury determination at trial. LaTray, ¶ 15 (citing Scott v. Henrich, 1998 MT 118, ¶ 13, 288 Mont. 489, ¶ 13, 958 P.2d 709, ¶ 13; Kolar v. Bergo (1996), 280 Mont. 262, 266, 929 P.2d 867, 869; Wiley v. City of Glendive (1995), 272 Mont. 213, 216, 900 P.2d 310, 312; Pappas v. Midwest Motor Express, Inc. (1994), 268 Mont. 347, 350, 886 P.2d 918, 920; Dillard v. Doe (1992), 251 Mont. 379, 382, 824 P.2d 1016, 1018; and Brown v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1982), 197 Mont. 1, 10, 640 P.2d 453, 458).

DISCUSSION

¶15 Peyatt asserts that Moore failed to inquire of Reuter about the nature of the hay loading operation, to insure that any equipment used by Reuter would be safe and to insure that Peyatt would be safe at Reuter's farm. He further asserts that Moore: (1) failed to provide him with any safety training related to hazards associated with loading hay onto flatbed trucks or with working around farm machinery, although Moore knew that he would be working around this type of machinery...

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