Pferrman v. BPS of Tifton, Inc.
| Docket Number | A22A0581 |
| Decision Date | 29 June 2022 |
| Citation | 364 Ga.App. 624,876 S.E.2d 6 |
| Parties | PFERRMAN et al. v. BPS OF TIFTON, INC. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
The Hadden Law Firm, John David Hadden, Atlanta; Morris Law, F. Leonard Morris, Jr., Francis Leonard Morris III; John D. Blair, for Appellants.
McMickle, Kurey & Branch, Scott Wayne McMickle, Alpharetta, Chandler L. Smith, for Appellee.
This case involves interpretation of the High-voltage Safety Act, OCGA § 46-3-30 et seq. ("HVSA"). John A. Pferrman was severely injured after being electrocuted while replacing a billboard sign. He seeks to hold the owner of the billboard, BPS of Tifton, Inc., strictly liable for his injuries under the HVSA due to BPS’ alleged failure to provide appropriate notice under the law that Pferrman would be working in the vicinity of high-voltage power lines. BPS moved for summary judgment contending that the HVSA did not apply to it, which the trial court granted. Pferrman also filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the application of the HVSA to this case, which the trial court denied. Pferrman appeals; however, we find no error and affirm.1
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and the undisputed evidence show that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). On appeal from the grant or denial of summary judgment, the appellate courts conduct a de novo review, construing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Bank of North Ga. v. Windermere Dev. , 316 Ga. App. 33, 34, 728 S.E.2d 714 (2012).
So viewed, the evidence shows that Pferrman was an employee of a company called Ty Ty Signs, which had been hired by BPS to change out a sign on a billboard owned by BPS. Ty Ty was an independent contractor of BPS and was hired to work on BPS’ billboards on a job-by-job basis. Here, BPS hired Ty Ty to change a billboard sign in Warwick, Georgia, and to do so, it provided Ty Ty with a vinyl replacement sign, rods, and straps. No specific day was stated by BPS for Ty Ty to perform the work, and no one at Ty Ty notified BPS of the day it went to the Warwick billboard.
On April 29, 2019, Pferrman went to the billboard to change the sign. No one from BPS was present with him at the billboard. He used a lift to raise himself into the air to access the billboard. During his work on the sign, he was holding a metal rod in his hands and inching it up to remove the rod from the previously installed vinyl billboard sign. He was aware that the billboard was close to a power line and was attempting to take precautions. However, as Pferrman was taking the pole out of the old sign, he was electrocuted and severely injured.
Pferrman sued BPS on several grounds, including seeking to impose strict liability against BPS pursuant to the HVSA.2 Pferrman moved for summary judgment as to his HVSA claim, and BPS cross-moved for summary judgment as to all of Pferrman's claims. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Pferrman's partial summary judgment motion and granted BPS’ motion. This appeal followed.
1. Pferrman contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to BPS by finding that it did not perform "work" as defined by the HVSA. We find no error.
OCGA § 46-3-31.
Paragraph (3) of that code section relevantly defines "[p]erson responsible for the work" as "the person actually doing the work as well as any person, firm, or corporation who employs and carries on his payroll any person actually doing the work or who employs a subcontractor who actually does the work[.]" OCGA § 46-3-32 (3). As to the notice required, "the person responsible for such work shall give notice to the utilities protection center[3 ] during its regular business hours at least 72 hours, excluding weekends and holidays, prior to commencing such work ...." OCGA § 46-3-34 (b).
The HVSA provides that "[a]ny person responsible for the work who violates any of the provisions of this part shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be liable for a fine of $1,000.00 for a first offense and $3,000.00 for a second or subsequent offense." OCGA $ 46-3-6 (a). It also provides that "[a]ny person responsible for the work who violates the requirements of Code Section 46-3-33 and whose subsequent activities within the vicinity of high-voltage lines result in damage to utility facilities or result in injury or damage to person or property shall be strictly liable for said injury or damage.... OCGA § 46-3-40 (a) - (b).
Here, it is undisputed that no one provided notice to the utilities protection center prior to attempting to remove the old billboard sign and install a new one. It is also undisputed that Pferrman was performing work, as defined by the HVSA, because he was performing an activity "under, over, by, or near high-voltage lines."4 The relevant question for this appeal, however, is whether BPS was performing work, as defined by the HVSA, as that is a prerequisite to imposing strict liability under the HVSA. Georgia law has rarely had the opportunity to interpret the definition of "work" under the HVSA, and no case has addressed the precise question presented here.
It is undisputed that BPS was not present at the billboard, so it was not itself performing an activity "under, over, by, or near high-voltage lines" at the time of Pferrman's injury. Pferrman argues, however, that the HVSA defines " ‘work’ broadly, to include not just the physical act of performing an activity near high-voltage lines, but also any act of preparing to perform an activity that ultimately occurs near high-voltage lines."
Accordingly, Pferrman contends that BPS’ storage of the vinyl sign Pferrman was supposed to hang, as well as its provision of metal rods and straps, is sufficient to constitute "work" under the HVSA even though those activities occurred miles away from the high-voltage lines at issue. We cannot agree with this interpretation.
When this Court interprets any statute, we necessarily begin our analysis with familiar and binding canons of construction. When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Moosa Co., LLC v. Ga. Dept. of Revenue , 353 Ga. App. 429, 430-431, 838 S.E.2d 108 (2020).
The HVSA, which provides for strict liability, is in derogation of the common law. See Gropper v. STO Corp. , 250 Ga. App. 820, 822 (1), 552 S.E.2d 118 (2001).
[I]t has always been a rule of construction of statutes that those in derogation of the common law, that is those which give rights not had under the common law, must be limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed, and not extended beyond the plain and explicit terms of the statute. The legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of this rule of construction, and with that body only lies the right and privilege to grant rights not given under the common law and to extend and broaden any rights so granted. Such is not the function of the courts.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Delta Airlines v. Townsend , 279 Ga. 511, 512 (1), 614 S.E.2d 745 (2005) ; see also Heard v. Neighbor Newspapers , 259 Ga. 458, 459 (5) (b), 383 S.E.2d 553 (1989) ().
In addition to imposing strict civil liability, the HVSA imposes criminal liability for violation of...
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