Pfister v. Doon Electric Co.
| Decision Date | 17 February 1925 |
| Docket Number | 36715 |
| Citation | 202 N.W. 371,199 Iowa 548 |
| Parties | MARGARET PFISTER, Appellee v. DOON ELECTRIC COMPANY et al., Appellants |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Lyon District Court.--C. C. BRADLEY, Judge.
THIS is an appeal in a workmen's compensation case. Compensation was allowed by the arbitration committee, by the industrial commissioner, and by the district court. From the judgment of the district court, the defendant has appealed.
Affirmed.
Harvey H. Hindt and Snyder, Gleysteen, Purdy & Harper, for appellants.
Deacon Sargent & Spangler, George C. Gorman, and Riniker & Thomas for appellee.
EVANS J. FAVILLE, C. J., and STEVENS, ARTHUR, DE GRAFF, VERMILION, and ALBERT, JJ., concur.
Compensation was allowed for the death of the employee. The contention of the defendant is and has been that the employment of the decedent was "casual" only, and that for that reason he did not come within the provisions of the Compensation Act. The principal defendant is the Doon Electric Company. It is a corporation organized and operated for the purpose of supplying electric light and power to the citizens of the town of Doon. Its property consists in the main of its poles and wires within and in the vicinity of the town of Doon, together with the usual equipment for distributing the service to its local patrons. It buys its electricity from another company, and operates no plant for the manufacture or generating of the electric light or power. Its territorial range of operations is, therefore, limited. Its employees were few. The deceased, Pfister, was its sole lineman, and was accidentally killed in June, 1922, while in the service of the defendant. It is conceded that such service was within the scope of trade or business of the defendant company. Though he was the sole lineman of the company, such service did not constitute his sole occupation. On the contrary, his principal occupation was in the service of a telephone company, for which he was also lineman. He received from the telephone company a fixed wage of about $ 97 per month. His contract with the telephone company bound him to perform a certain amount of service, but he was not bound to render such company his full time. In other words, subject to the performance of his stipulated duties, he reserved control of his own time, and was at liberty to engage in other service and employment. He did engage in other service. He agreed informally with the defendant to become its "lineman:" that is to say, he agreed to do the "line" work for the company at the rate of 65 cents per hour whenever he should be called for. This engagement recognized a priority of call for his service in favor of the telephone company. The volume of line work necessary to keep up the lines of the defendant company in proper shape was comparatively small, and required only part-time work. This engagement was entered into in August, 1921. Pfister did all the line work of the defendant company thereafter, although such work required only a few hours a day for a few days in a month. His compensation was paid at the agreed rate of 65 cents per hour of time expended. In August, he worked for a few hours of one day; and likewise in September and in October. In November, he worked for a few hours on each of six days between November 16th and November 30th. In December, he worked upon each of 11 days; in January, upon each of 5 days; in February, upon each of 6 days; in March, upon each of 7 days; in April, upon each of 4 days; in May, upon each of 5 days; in June, upon each of 2 days, the last being the date of his death. The total number of hours devoted by him to the work in that period amounted approximately to 160 or 170 hours.
These are sufficient of the salient facts to indicate the general reason why the defendant contends that employment was "casual," and not within the provision of the Compensation Act. The question presented involves a construction of that proviso of the statute which excludes from its operation persons whose employment is purely "casual." This proviso appears in Section 2477-m16 of the Code Supplement of 1913, as follows:
"Except a person whose employment is purely casual and not for the purpose of the employer's trade or business."
By Section 10 of Chapter 270 of the Acts of the Thirty-seventh General Assembly, this proviso was made to read:
"Except a person whose employment is purely casual or not for the purpose of the employer's trade or business."
In Section 1421 of the Code of 1924, this proviso appears in the following form:
"A person whose employment is purely casual and not for the purpose of the employer's trade or business."
It also appears in Section 1361 of the Code of 1924 as follows:
"Persons whose employment is of a casual nature."
The death of the decedent occurred while the amendment made by the thirty-seventh general assembly was in force, and we shall concentrate our attention upon the form of the proviso there provided.
We have had occasion to consider this proviso and to give affirmative effect to it in the following cases: Bedard v. Sweinhart, 186 Iowa 655, 172 N.W. 937; Herbig v. Walton Auto Co., 191 Iowa 394, 182 N.W. 204; Porter v. Mapleton Electric Light Co., 191 Iowa 1031, 183 N.W. 803; Oliphant v. Hawkinson, 192 Iowa 1259, 183 N.W. 805. No one of these cases is sufficiently in point to be controlling of the case before us. The construction of this brief proviso involves to some degree a construction of the entire Compensation Act. The purpose of such proviso is to define and limit the objective of the Compensation Act.
It may be stated broadly that this objective was and is to impose upon industrial enterprises the burden and cost of their hazards, and to make such cost a part of the "overhead" of the trade or enterprise. Necessarily, the act has its natural application to such trade or business as employs labor and offers labor a hazardous occupation. The terms of the statute are broad and comprehensive enough in the first instance to include within its provisions every employer and every employee, regardless of whether the employer was engaged in any trade or business which required the employment of labor for its operation. In carrying out its objective, this statute requires the employer to insure his liability, and thereby to furnish security to the laborer for the performance of his duties, under the statute. Without the proviso under consideration, the statute might defeat its own ends, by becoming a nuisance in its operation. No person, even though not engaged in any trade or business, could employ any other person to do any service without coming under the operation of the statute. If one should employ a man to repair a fence, he must needs first take out a policy of insurance and insure his liability. The purpose of the proviso under consideration was to narrow or to withdraw the application of the broader terms of the statute from those "casual" employments which are more or less incidental to the daily life of everybody.
What, then, is a "casual" employment? That is the rub. It is less difficult to recognize such "casual" employment when it is presented in a given case than it is to lay down a rule or definition that can become decisive of every case. So far as we are advised, no court has ventured on such a definition, though Compensation Acts seem to be generally in vogue in many states.
The persistency with which the legislature has joined, both conjunctively and disjunctively, the "casual employment" and the employment "for the purpose of the employer's trade or business" would indicate a legislative purpose to correlate those terms and to treat them as in...
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