Phelan v. City of Buffalo

• Decision Date: 12 November 1976
• Citation: 388 N.Y.S.2d 469,54 A.D.2d 262
• Parties: John J. PHELAN and Donald J. Siwek, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Respondents, v. The CITY OF BUFFALO, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 469

388 N.Y.S.2d 469

54 A.D.2d 262

John J. PHELAN and Donald J. Siwek, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Respondents, v. The CITY OF BUFFALO, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Nov. 12, 1976.

Leslie G. Foschio, Corp. Counsel, Buffalo (Carl Tronolone, Buffalo, of counsel), for appellant.

Moot, Sprague, Marcy, Landy, Fernbach & Smythe, Buffalo (John J. Phelan, Buffalo, of counsel), for respondents.

Before CARDAMONE, J.P., and MAHONEY, DILLON, GOLDMAN and WITMER, JJ.

DILLON, Justice:

Plaintiff Phelan became a resident of the City of Buffalo in June, 1974 and was lawfully a candidate for the city-wide office of President of the Common Council in the November, 1974 election. He was defeated. Local Law No. 1 (1975) of the City of Buffalo, effective January 7, 1975, provides, Inter alia, that:

'No person shall be eligible for election or appointment as a successor to the office of mayor, comptroller, president of the council or councilman-at-large who has not been a domiciled resident of the city for a period of at least two (2) years preceding the date of his election or appointment.' (Buffalo City Charter, art. 2--A, § 1.)

Prior to the enactment of Local Law No. 1, there had been no durational residency requirement for eligibility to hold any of the enumerated offices.

Plaintiff's action was instituted on March 21, 1975, seeking a declaration that Local Law No. 1 is unconstitutional and void. He alleges that he intended to be a candidate for the office of councilman-at-large in the 1975 general election, and that his candidacy was proscribed by the newly enacted eligibility requirement. He asserts further that his right to be considered by his political party as an eligible candidate was adversely affected by the law's application.

The court rejected defendant's arguments that there was no justiciable controversy between the litigants and that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action.

Relying upon Matter of Berger v. Friese, 45 A.D.2d 734, 356 N.Y.S.2d 648, app. dsmd., 35 N.Y.2d 712, 361 N.Y.S.2d 644, 320 N.E.3d 276, the court found an absence of a rational relationship between the two-year residence requirement and the right to run for the office of Councilman-at-Large of the City of Buffalo, and declared the Local Law unconstitutional.

Plaintiff appears in a dual role in this proceeding. He contends that he is aggrieved as an avowed candidate and that his right of suffrage is diluted.

Declaratory judgment is the proper remedy for determining the legal relations of parties to a justiciable controversy (CPLR 3001). Whether an individual has standing to seek such relief is largely determined by whether he has a matured legally protectible interest in the outcome of the case such as to assure concrete adverseness in the presentation of issues (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663). One is not entitled to a declaratory judgment absent 'concrete legal issues presented in actual cases, not abstractions' (United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89, 67 S.Ct. 556, 564, 91 L.Ed. 754; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 61 S.Ct. 510, 85 L.Ed. 826). Whether a case is a proper subject for declaratory judgment shall not be determined by circumstances as they existed when the action was instituted but rather shall be judged by circumstances as they exist when the issues are presented to the court (Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113).

This matter was presented to the court for decision prior to June 9, 1975, which was the first date for candidates for public office to collect signatures on designating petitions. Plaintiff's lawful candidacy in 1974 and his alleged intention to be a candidate in 1975 lend weight to his assertion that Local Law No. 1 was then adversely affecting his opportunity to procure a nomination from the party of which he is a member (cf. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714, reh. den., 417 U.S. 926, 94 S.Ct. 2635, 41 L.Ed.2d 230; cf. also Chimento v. Stark, D.C., 353 F.Supp. 1211, affd., 414 U.S. 802, 94 S.Ct 125, 38 L.Ed.2d 39). In that light he was an aggrieved person who was 'perceptibly harmed' by the legislation (United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254). Having qualified as a candidate in the past under the eligibility requirements then in effect, he had a legally protected interest which was adversely affected in a real and immediate manner by the promulgation of Local Law No. 1. The controversy was thus ripe for judicial determination when it was presented to the court (see 3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y.Civ.Prac., pars. 3001.04, 3001.05).

Additionally, plaintiff's status as a qualified voter in the City of Buffalo gives him standing to seek declaratory relief (see Landes v. Town of North Hempstead, 20 N.Y.2d 417, 284 N.Y.S.2d 441, 231 N.E.2d 120). While it is true that in Landes standing was not an issue because plaintiff was a duty designated nominee of the Democratic Party for the office of Councilman in the Town of North Hempstead, the court held that 'the proscription against nonlandowners as town councilmen amounts to a 'dilution' or 'debasement' of the vote' of plaintiff and other residents of the town 'not unlike that occasioned by the malapportionment which the Supreme Court has held violative of the equal protection clause.' (Id., p. 421, 284 N.Y.S.2d p. 444, 231 N.E.2d p. 122, citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, reh. den., 379 U.S. 870, 85 S.Ct. 12, 13 L.Ed. 76 and Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821.) If we were to opt for a narrow construction of standing and deny a voter an adjudication of a claimed unconstitutional encroachment, his right to equal protection indeed would be hollow (see 3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y.Civ.Prac., par. 3001.04).

Moreover, recent decisions have indicated a departure from the harsh standing requirements which previously had limited the access of potential plaintiffs to the courts in challenging legislation and official actions (see, e.g., Chimento v. Stark, supra; Matter of Dairylea Cooperative, Inc. v. Walkley, 38 N.Y.2d 6, 377 N.Y.S.2d 451, 339 N.E.2d 865; Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623, 334 N.E.2d 579; Matter of Douglaston Civic Association, Inc. v. Galvin, 36 N.Y.2d 1, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830, 324 N.E.2d 317).

Despite the declaration of unconstitutionality by the trial court, plaintiff never became a candidate for city-wide office in 1975, nor does it appear that he attempted to do so. To the extent of plaintiff's candidacy, therefore, the issue is academic and moot (Matter of Berger v. Friese, 35 N.Y.2d 712, 361 N.Y.S.2d 644, 320 N.E.2d 276). We should not refrain from deciding serious constitutional issues, however, where the controversy is of public importance and is 'of a character which is likely to recur * * * with respect to others * * *' (East Meadow Community Concerts Assoc. v. Board of Education, 18 N.Y.2d 129, 135, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341, 346, 219 N.E.2d 172, 175; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714, reh. den., 417 U.S. 926, 94 S.Ct. 2635, 41 L.Ed.2d 230; Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 92 S.Ct. 1245, 36 L.Ed.2d 1, reh. den., 411 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1920, 36 L.Ed.2d 419; Matter of Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 177, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407, 410, 282 N.E.2d 306, 307; Rudd v. Rudd, 45 A.D.2d 22, 356 N.Y.S.2d 136.) In the present posture of this case, neither the City of Buffalo, second largest in the state, nor potential candidates or voters, should be left to speculate on the constitutionality of durational residency eligibility for the major offices of the city.

The absence of conclusive authority dealing with the precise classification with which we are confronted warrants a discussion of the applicable law. The question presented is whether a local law, which disqualifies potential candidates for public office until they have completed a two-year residency, unlawfully discriminates against the candidates so impeded or voters who wish to support them.

The Legislature has the power to prescribe qualifications but it cannot enact arbitrary exclusions from office. Any classification establishing qualifications must be nondiscriminatory and have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be accomplished by the legislation (Landes v. Town of North Hempstead, 20 N.Y.2d 417, 284 N.Y.S.2d 441, 231 N.E.2d 120). Age, integrity and training, for example, are recognized in Landes as qualifications for office having a rational basis. The question of whether residence may lawfully be established as a classification, however, was left open (Id., p. 420, 284 N.Y.S.2d 443, 231 N.E.2d p. 121).

While not yet specifically passed upon by our highest court, candidate durational residency requirements have been constitutionally upheld (Sununu v. Stark, D.C., 383 F.Supp. 1287, affd., 420 U.S. 958, 95 S.Ct. 1346, 43 L.Ed.2d 435; Chimento v. Stark, D.C., 353 F.Supp. 1211, affd. without opn., 414 U.S. 802, 94 S.Ct. 125, 38 L.Ed.2d 39; Draper v. Phelps, D.C., 351 F.Supp. 677; Hadnott v. Amos, D.C., 320 F.Supp. 107, affd. without opn., 401 U.S. 968, 91 S.Ct. 1189, 28 L.Ed.2d 318, and affd.,405 U.S. 1035, 92 S.Ct. 1304, 31 L.Ed.2d 576; see also Landes v. Town of North Hempstead, 20 N.Y.2d 417, 284 N.Y.S.2d 441, 231 N.E.2d 120). Such a classification will not survive, however, if it is violative of constitutional equal protection and due process clauses (Landes v. Town of North Hempstead,supra, p. 420, 284 N.Y.S.2d p. 443, 231 N.E.2d p. 121).

Application of the equal protection clause to a disputed statute requires an examination of 'the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.' (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S....